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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis contributes to the recent turn towards 
ordinary events, objects, and practices in scholarship on 
modernist literature. While modernism is typically 
characterized by formal experimentation and the 
aesthetics of shock, scholars are beginning to consider 
that many of the most potent energies animating modernism 
arise from its fascination with the ordinary. While this 
new approach has been productive, its tendency to 
minimise the rhetorical dimension of literature in favour 
of questions about content (what do modernist texts say 
about the ordinary?) and context (what ideas about the 
ordinary circulated in the period?) remains problematic. 
 That is because these approaches neglect a potent 
contradiction: if literature uses figurative language to 
depict the ordinary, does it not thereby transfigure what 
it represents by bringing it within the “charmed circle” 
of art? Whatever else modernism is, it is clearly 
concerned with putting pressure on the means by which 
likenesses and illusions are produced. Modernist texts, I 
argue, are drawn to elaborate means to declaim their 
status as representations: a “rhetoric of not having 
rhetoric” is integral to modernist representations of the 
quotidian. Out of this generative paradox arises the 
succession of rhetorical strategies that this 
dissertation identifies in the works of T. S. Eliot, 
Wallace Stevens, Gertrude Stein, and James Joyce. 
      Recent scholarship has set the terms for a 
comprehensive reassessment of literary modernism, which 
this thesis pursues through explorations of modernism’s 
relationship with realism, the avant-garde, mass culture, 
space and place, and the nature of modernity. My argument 
has specific ramifications for these ongoing debates in 
modernist studies, the relationship between rhetorical 
and historicist paradigms of literary criticism, and, 
above all, the fate of modernism: its legacies in 
twentieth century literature and its ongoing place in our 
public culture. 
 
  
3 
 
Dedicated to my parents, J. D. and D. K. Madden. 
 
 
I’d like to acknowledge the staff of the University of 
York Library, the Borthwick Institute for Archives, the 
Archives of King’s College, Cambridge, and the Archives 
of Trinity College, Cambridge. 
 
My thanks to all the friends and colleagues who have read 
and commented upon my work. Natalie Pollard, Benjamin 
Poore, and Stef Lambert in particular have been sources 
of endless support and stimulation, while Bryan Radley’s 
extraordinary guidance as a friend and colleague on 
Modernism/modernity has been vital. Prof. Derek Attridge 
has been a genial, patient, and incisive guide. Prof. 
David Attwell has made the Department of English and 
Related Literature a welcoming and supportive environment 
to study in. Prof. Jason Edwards has been an invaluable 
friend and mentor, as well as a passionate supporter in 
his role as Director of the Centre for Modern Studies. 
Above all, Prof. Lawrence Rainey’s supervision, and his 
generosity as an interlocutor, have made my studies a 
more enriching experience than I could have expected or 
anticipated.  
 
This work could not have happened without the generous 
support of the Holbeck Trust, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, and the Gavron Trust. 
 
 
  
  
4 
CONTENTS 
 
List of Illustrations      5 
List of Abbreviations      7 
Author’s Declaration      8 
 
Introduction        9 
 
Chapter 1: Gertrude Stein’s Queer Ordinary  68 
 
I. William James, Gertrude Stein, and the 
   Rhetoric of the Ordinary     77 
 
II. The Making of Americans and Loving Repeating 94 
  
III. “Tender Buttons” and the Queer Ordinary  119 
 
Chapter 2: James Joyce and the Text of the  
 Ordinary       151 
 
I. Transubstantiation of the Commonplace  188 
 
II. “Cyclops” and the Two Economies of the  
Ordinary        214 
 
Chapter 3: T. S. Eliot’s Ordinary Ambivalence 231 
 
I. Sweeney Agonistes and Melodramatic Modernity 232 
 
II. The Four Quartets and Nostalgia for the  
    Ordinary         268 
 
Chapter 4: Wallace Stevens and the Ordinary 
    Imagination       
 
I. What’s So Ordinary about “The Ordinary Women”? 314 
 
II. “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven” and the 
 Modernist Grid       339 
 
Coda: Don DeLillo and the Half-Life of Modernism  381 
 
References        405  
  
5 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
Pg. 56: Fig. 1.: Baiocchi (on the far right) rehearses 
his performers. Vittorio de Sica, "Ladri Di Biciclette," 
93 min. Italy: Ente Nazionale Industrie Cinematografiche, 
1948. 
 
Pg. 57: Fig. 2.: Antonio and Bruno shelter with a group 
of German-speaking clergymen. de Sica, "Ladri Di 
Biciclette." 
 
Pg. 60: Fig. 3.: Bruno breaks off the pursuit to relieve 
himself. de Sica, "Ladri Di Biciclette." 
 
Pg. 264: Fig. 4.: Advertisement for Lysol Limited. The 
Times (22 April 1920): 7, Col. F.  
 
Pg. 321: Fig. 5.: Oriental Theatre (1926), Chicago. 
Courtesy of the Chicago Architectural Photographing Co. 
Collection, Theatre Historical Society, Elmhurst, 
Illinois, U.S.A. 
 
Pg. 324: Fig. 6.: Fox Theatre (1929), San Francisco. 
Courtesy of the Terry Helgesen Collection, Theatre 
Historical Society, Elmhurst, Illinois, U.S.A. 
  
6 
 
Pg. 331: Fig. 7.: Camera Obscura, from M. Brisson 
Dictionnaire raisonné de physique (Paris: A la Libraire 
éonomique, 1800), n.p. 
 
Pg. 359: Fig. 8.: Cover of Wallace Stevens, Notes toward 
a Supreme Fiction (Cummington, MA: The Cummington Press, 
1942). 
 
Pg. 375: Fig. 9.: New Haven, detail from 1806 engraving 
by William L. Lyon based on a 1748 drawing by James 
Wadsworth, in  
 
 
  
  
7 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
CPP: T. S. Eliot, Complete Poems and Plays of T. S. Eliot. 
 
MoA: Gertrude Stein, The Making of Americans. 
 
SCPP: Wallace Stevens, Collected Poetry and Prose of  
Wallace Stevens. 
 
“TB”: Gertrude Stein, “Tender Buttons.” 
 
U: James Joyce, Ulysses. 
 
  
  
8 
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION 
 
Material appearing in chapter 3 has been published as 
“Arnold Bennett and the Making of Sweeney Agonistes,” 
Notes and Queries 58.1 (2011): 106–10. Material appearing 
in chapter 4 has been published as “What’s So Ordinary 
about Stevens’ ‘The Ordinary Women?’” The Wallace Stevens 
Journal 36.1 (Spring 2012): 9–22. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
9 
INTRODUCTION 
 
I remember Yeats: “I have spent the whole of my life 
trying to get rid of rhetoric and have merely set up 
another.” 
   — Ezra Pound1    
 
If poetry introduces order, and every competent poem 
introduces order, and if order means peace, even 
though that particular peace is an illusion, is it 
any less an illusion than a good many other things… 
Isn’t a freshening of life a thing of consequence? 
—Wallace Stevens2   
 
 Ordinariness, the ubiquitous condition in which we 
are immersed for most of our lives, is, from one point of 
view, the implicit subject of a great deal of twentieth 
century literature and thought, though it has only 
recently begun to be recognized as such. The ordinary as 
                     
1 Ezra Pound, Make It New (London: Faber and Faber, 1934), 
245. 
2 Wallace Stevens, Letters of Wallace Stevens, ed. Holly 
Stevens (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 293. 
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a topic of enquiry is by nature capacious, and any 
attempt to limit it to a manageable scope will run the 
risk of arbitrariness. This introduction will delimit as 
much as possible what I mean by the ordinary, before 
showing that the ordinary presents itself as a special 
problem in the context of modernity. The rapidly shifting 
horizons of historical and social possibility that 
characterize our historical condition make the ordinary a 
site of continuous change. The ordinary in modernist 
writing is thus paradoxical: it is both a refuge from 
history and the strongest index of its relentless 
movement. Indeed, it may be that the social upheaval of 
modernity is necessary to bring the ordinary into view at 
all, by providing a standpoint outside of the immersion 
in custom and tradition that characterizes pre-modern 
societies.3  
                     
3 This anthropological dilemma has been a recurrent theme 
of ethnographic theory from the Bronislaw Malinowski’s 
Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922), which identifies 
the object of ethnography as “the imponderabilia of 
actual life,” to Clifford Geertz’s The Interpretation of 
Cultures (1973), which insists on the paradoxical 
necessity and impossibility of value-neutral description 
of culture as a precursor to theory. Geertz, The 
Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 
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 This, I think, accounts for the recurrent lapses 
into nostalgia that characterize one strain amongst 
modernist writers and their critics. “Modernism,” 
declared Louis Menand, “is a reaction against the modern,” 
but this, I think, accounts for only one of a variety of 
competing impulses among most modernist writers, and, 
indeed, within most modernist works.4 The challenge for 
the critic is to weigh these competing impulses in a way 
that avoids what Theodor Adorno would call a false 
reconciliation. “A thing final in itself and, therefore, 
good,” as Stevens put it in “Notes Toward a Supreme 
Fiction,” will necessarily elude us; in the condition of 
modernity, “It must change.”5 This study emphasizes the 
strain of modernism that Menand’s aperçu neglects: the 
playful, often irreverent side that turns the ordinary 
stuff of modernity into materia poetica. This is not to 
                                                           
3–30; Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An 
Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the 
Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea (London: Routledge, 
1922), 18. 
4 Louis Menand, “T. S. Eliot and Modernity,” New England 
Quarterly 69.4 (1996): 554. 
5 Wallace Stevens, Collected Poetry and Prose, ed. Frank 
Kermode and Joan Richardson (New York: Library of America, 
1997), 336, 350. Hereafter cited in text as “SCPP.” 
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say that modernist literature did not frequently evince 
anxiety about modernization and its repercussions. But 
the revival of modernist studies since the 1990s has 
generally endorsed the view that “rather than being a 
reaction against or an escape from the forces of 
modernity, cultural Modernism is implicated in numerous 
ways with the scientific, technological, and political 
shifts which characterize the modern era.”6 
 
 Throughout this study I use the term “ordinary” to 
denote objects, practices, and modes of attention that do 
not usually call attention to themselves, that seem to 
most of us, most of the time, unworthy of reflection. I 
choose “ordinary” in part as a reflection of its Latin 
etymology, from the noun ordo, arrangement, which also 
gives us the English “order,” to express the conviction 
that when we turn our attention on ordinary phenomena, 
what we discover there is not inchoate psychological 
sensation, insensate materiality, or the traumatic 
capital-R real. Rather, the ordinary is a, perhaps the, 
locus of social and material meaning, a vivid 
                     
6 Tim Armstrong, Modernism, Technology and the Body: A 
Cultural Study (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 4. 
  
13 
constellation of social relations subject always to 
processes of historical change and development. That said, 
in the words of Maurice Blanchot, “Le quotidien: ce qu’il 
y a de plus difficile à découvrir.”7 That is to say, the 
ordinary has a habit of frustrating our attempts to 
analyze it or theorize about it; for, once the heavy 
machinery of empirical inquiry or speculative thought is 
brought to bear, the ordinariness of the ordinary seems 
to evaporate: “Le quotidien a ce trait essential: il ne 
se laisse pas saisir. Il échappe.”8 
                     
7 Maurice Blanchot, L'entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 
1969), 355. “The quotidian: the most difficult thing to 
discover.” Cf. Maurice Blanchot, “Everyday Speech,” trans. 
Susan Hanson, Yale French Studies 73, Everyday Life 
(1987): 12–20. 
8 Blanchot, L'entretien infini, 357. “The quotidian has 
this essential trait: it doesn’t allow itself to be 
caught. It escapes.” Blanchot, like Michel de Certeau, 
uses the term le quotidien, as opposed to Lefebvre’s la 
vie quotidienne, which, while it still connotes the daily, 
also encompasses a more capacious sense akin to “ordinary” 
in English. This is the sense in which I use the term 
“ordinary,” and why in the course of my argument I allow 
some slippage between it and the term “everyday life.” 
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 The same problem arises in art: literary 
representation seems to turn a transfiguring gaze upon 
its objects. Literary works are necessarily limited in 
size and scope, and as a result they presuppose an 
economy of attention: the text itself can only offer a 
finite amount of detail, leaving the appurtenances of 
ordinary life—from the furnishings of a room to 
characters’ bodily cycles and everything in between—
merely implied. We tend to assume that everything 
presented explicitly by the literary text signifies. This 
convention applies even more forcefully to lyric poetry 
than to realist narration: lyric poems are characterized 
by their almost hyperbolic attention to their subjects, 
which, through the inherent ambiguity of lyric form, 
become amenable to any number of metaphorical 
transformations or symbolic recuperations.9 The power 
that this convention holds over readers is exemplified in 
poems that resist it, like Stevens’s “Anecdote of the 
Jar”: 
 
I placed a jar in Tennessee,  
And round it was, upon a hill.  
                     
9 I am indebted to Jonathan Culler on this point; See 
Culler, Theory of the Lyric [forthcoming]. 
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It made the slovenly wilderness  
Surround that hill. 
 
The wilderness rose up to it,  
And sprawled around, no longer wild.  
The jar was round upon the ground  
And tall and of a port in air. 
 
It took dominion everywhere.  
The jar was gray and bare.  
It did not give of bird or bush,  
Like nothing else in Tennessee. 
      (SCPP, 60–1) 
 
When lyric attention is directed toward an object so 
banal as a mason jar, and so deracinated as to be placed 
on a hill in Tennessee, the effect is, so to speak, 
jarring. The jar is “tall of a port in air,” that is, 
empty; the most it signifies is a refusal to signify. The 
term “anecdote” in the poem’s title says much: in its 
original meaning, “anecdote” referred to “secret, private, 
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or hitherto unpublished narratives or details of history,” 
a category obviously apt for the ordinary.10  
 That there is a modernist fascination with the mute 
object world and its resistance to literary 
representation is well attested in recent criticism.11 But 
this line of thinking has frequently veered towards what 
Victoria Coulson memorably describes as “Heidegger’s 
melancholy idealism,” registering a “profound distrust of 
language’s postlapsarian disconnection from the real.”12 
As such, by using the term “ordinary,” I also intend to 
evoke the ordinary language philosophy of Wittgenstein, J. 
L. Austin, et al. In any deployment of the term 
                     
10 “anecdote, n.” OED Online. September 2013. Oxford 
University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/7367 
(accessed November 21, 2013). 
11 See Douglas Mao, Solid Objects : Modernism and the Test 
of Production (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1998); Bill Brown, A Sense of Things: The Object Matter 
of American Literature (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2003); Bill Brown, “Thing Theory,” in 
Things, ed. Bill Brown (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004). 
12 Victoria Coulson, “Things,” in Henry James in Context, 
ed. David Bruce McWhirter (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 323. 
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“ordinary,” the question arises, “ordinary as opposed to 
what?” For Wittgenstein, the answer was “metaphysics,” 
and indeed, the whole philosophical and scientistic 
jargon that it brings to bear on the problems of 
philosophy. Wittgenstein and his successors, by contrast, 
stress the sufficiency of ordinary language to formulate 
and to resolve philosophical issues: 
 
“problems are solved, not by coming up with new 
discoveries, but by assembling what we have long 
been familiar with. Philosophy is a struggle against 
the bewitchment of our understanding by the 
resources of our language.”13 
 
This is the sense of the ordinary set out at length by 
Stanley Cavell, as a force that wards off the threat of 
                     
13 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen = 
Philosophical Investigations, Rev. 4th ed. trans. G. E. M. 
Anscombe et al. (Chichester and Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), 52. 
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skepticism, that is, the immobilizing possibility of 
communicative failure.14  
 
 Wittgenstein’s sense of the ordinary has been a spur 
to much of the tradition known as everyday life theory, 
most obviously in the case of Michel de Certeau, who sees 
in Wittgenstein’s work “a philosophical blueprint for a 
contemporary science of the ordinary.”15 A similar sense 
of the ordinary’s potential clearly lies at the heart of 
Henry Lefebvre’s project, too: 
 
All we need do is simply to open our eyes, to leave 
the dark world of metaphysics and the false depths 
of the “inner life” behind, and we will discover the 
                     
14 Stanley Cavell, “The Uncaniness of the Ordinary,” in In 
Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and 
Romanticism (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 
1988), 154. 
15 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. 
Steven Rendall (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1984), 14. 
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immense human wealth that the humblest facts of 
everyday life contain.16  
 
But recent accounts of modernism and the ordinary have 
differed on the merit and applicability of everyday life 
theory. Whereas Bryony Randall and Lorraine Sim situate 
their work as specific responses to this tradition, 
Siobhan Philips and Liesl Olson either elide it or 
explicitly deny its relevance.17 For Olson, “the everyday 
life described by Lefebvre differs historically from the 
everyday of literary modernism,” in part due to the 
former’s preoccupation with consumer culture, a social 
                     
16 Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Vol. I, 
Introduction, trans. John Moore (London and New York: 
Verso, 1991), 132. 
17 Bryony Randall, Modernism, Daily Time and Everyday Life 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008); Lorraine Sim, Virginia Woolf: The Patterns of 
Ordinary Experience (Farnham and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2010); Liesl Olson, Modernism and the Ordinary (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Siobhan 
Phillips, Poetics of the Everyday: Creative Repetition in 
Modern American Verse (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010). 
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configuration that according to Olson emerged only after 
the Second World War, at least in France.18 As both an 
historical and a philosophical claim, this study 
disagrees firmly: the development of consumer culture and 
its impact on ordinary life is one of its recurrent 
preoccupations.19 As Lefebvre himself puts it, “modernity 
and everydayness constitute a deep structure.”20 Recent 
contributions to cultural studies and the history of 
                     
18 Olson, Modernism and the Ordinary, 13. 
19 “Thing theorists” are not the only critics to focus 
attention on commodities and consumer culture in 
modernism; this has been a topic of lively debate in 
Joyce studies, with notable contributions from Thomas 
Richards, who offers an almost Althusserian attack on the 
consumerist ideology represented in “Nausicaa,” prompting 
a powerful rejoinder inflected with the outlook of Michel 
de Certeau from Garry Leonard. Cf. Thomas Richards, The 
Commodity Culture of Victorian England: Advertising and 
Spectacle, 1851–1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1990), 205–48; Garry Martin Leonard, Advertising and 
Commodity Culture in Joyce (Gainesville: University Press 
of Florida, 1998), 98–141. 
20 Henri Lefebvre, “The Everyday and Everydayness,” trans. 
Christine Levich, Yale French Studies 73, Everyday Life 
(1987): 11. 
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ideas by Ben Highmore and Michael Sheringham have not 
only elaborated a canon of thought on the everyday, but 
stressed its shared intellectual horizons with aspects of 
modernist literature.21 Rita Felski has identified 
everyday life as an urgent topic for feminist 
intervention, and this argument has been taken up by 
Bryony Randall, in a compelling account of the everyday 
in modernist literature as specifically bound up with 
daily temporality, canvassing issues of work, leisure, 
and so on.22 Randall also holds that everyday life theory 
and the criticism instigated by it have neglected the 
temporality of the everyday for an excessive focus on 
space; in my discussions of Eliot and Stevens, however, I 
will show that even spatial accounts of the everyday have 
neglected modernity’s more subtle dialectic of place and 
space. 
                     
21 Ben Highmore, Everyday Life and Cultural Theory: An 
Introduction (London and New York: Routledge, 2002); 
Michael Sheringham, Everyday Life: Theories and Practices 
from Surrealism to the Present (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
22 Rita Felski, “Introduction,” New Literary History 33.4, 
Everyday Life (Autumn 2002): 612. Randall, Modernism, 
Daily Time and Everyday Life, 10–20. 
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 The emergence of everyday life theory in the mid-
twentieth century is deeply bound up in the debates over 
ideology, political praxis, and the relationship between 
individual and society that convulsed Western Marxism 
during the early twentieth century, and which, in large 
part, gave rise to critical theory. There are any number 
of ways to recount this history; my own preference is to 
situate the question of the ordinary in relation to the 
concept of social totality that animated much of this 
debate. As Martin Jay argues, 
 
“Totality” has indeed enjoyed a privileged place in 
the discourse of Western culture. Resonating with 
affirmative connotations, it has generally been 
associated with other positively charged words, such 
as coherence, order, fulfillment, harmony, plenitude, 
meaningfulness, consensus and community. And 
concomitantly, it has been contrasted with such 
negatively valenced concepts as alienation, 
fragmentation, disorder, conflict, contradiction, 
serialization, atomization and estrangement.23 
                     
23 Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality : The Adventures of a 
Concept from Lukács to Habermas (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1984), 21. 
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Just as modernity has often been characterized as a 
falling away from order and plenitude into a fragmented 
and alienated state, so the everyday is invoked either as 
the victim of this process or its remedy. What Jay calls 
“the holistic impulse in Western Marxism” arises from the 
humanism that gained ground amongst Marxist theoreticians 
outside the Soviet Union beginning roughly in the 1920s, 
inaugurated by György Lukács’s History and Class 
Consciousness. In that work, Lukács devoted considerable 
space to developing the concept of “reification,” the 
putative power of the commodity form to disguise the 
social character of human relations behind a façade of 
objectivity.24 Reification is an effect of the division of 
labor, which Marx identifies in The German Ideology as a 
state wherein “man’s own deed becomes an alien power 
opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being 
controlled by him.” Implicit in the idea is a holistic 
view of human endeavor that sees specialization of any 
kind as a sacrifice of human potential. 
While the concept of reification appears in Capital, 
the new centrality accorded to it and, in particular, to 
the related concept of “alienation” in Western Marxism 
                     
24 Ibid., 244. 
  
24 
represents a shift in emphasis toward capitalist society 
conceived not merely as an economic structure, but as a 
social totality encompassing philosophical and cultural 
aspects. This is the descriptive use of totality, which 
stresses the interrelatedness of social, cultural, and 
economic phenomena, as distinct from the normative use, 
which designates the historical telos of a society free 
from alienation.25 Alienation is reification writ large, 
encompassing the full range of subjective and cultural 
ramifications of reified social relations. The argument 
that the concept of alienation should form the fulcrum of 
Marxist critique was bolstered considerably by the 
rediscovery of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844 and their publication in 1927. 
Sympathetic interpreters stress that Marx’s critique of 
capitalism is in no way a sanction for nostalgia, that 
rather he acknowledges alienation and estrangement as 
“necessary stages on the road to a higher level of 
fulfillment.”26 In practice, though, the rare instances in 
which Marx offers his reader a glimpse of a future 
communist society do tend to resemble an idealized past, 
as in The German Ideology: “Nobody has one exclusive 
sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in 
                     
25 Ibid., 23. 
26 Ibid., 63. 
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any branch he wishes… to hunt in the morning, fish in the 
afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after 
dinner.”27 But despite Marx’s refusal of nostalgia, 
locating an absent wholeness and plenitude in the past or 
in a utopian future amounts to much the same gesture. 
That gesture is a recurrent feature of both Western 
Marxist theorizing and modernist literature, which have 
both tended to locate the world before the fall somewhat 
closer to the present. Theodor Adorno, for instance, took 
the catastrophes of the twentieth century to indicate 
that the dream of a normative social totality would never 
be achieved; indeed, from Dialectic of Enlightenment on, 
“the concept of totality lost nearly all of its positive 
connotations and became almost a synonym for 
totalitarianism.”28 Modernity, for Adorno, implies the 
deadening ascendency of the professional/managerial class, 
ushering in “the administered world,” or, as the subtitle 
                     
27 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, 
trans. C. J. Arthur (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1970), 
54; ibid. 
28 Jay, Marxism and Totality, 261. 
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of Minima Moralia has it, “damaged life.”29 Hence Adorno’s 
famous aesthetic of modernism:  
 
The work of art ‘reflects’ society and is historical 
to the degree that it refuses the social, and 
represents the last refuge of individual 
subjectivity from the historical forces that 
threaten to crush it… Thus the socio-economic is 
inscribed in the work, but as concave to convex, as 
negative to positive.30 
 
For Adorno, the collapse of the social totality in 
modernity demands truthful representation in formal terms 
by the art of the present, rather than a revival of the 
past, however ironic: “in philosophy, as in music, 
                     
29 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (London: Verso, 1997), 
38; Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a 
Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London and New 
York: Verso, 2005). 
30 Frederic Jameson, Marxism and Form: Twentieth-Century 
Dialectical Theories of Literature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), 34–5. 
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atonality was more ‘truthful’ than an ‘extorted 
reconciliation.’”31  
In this, Adorno demonstrates his complex 
indebtedness to the modernist aesthetics of Walter 
Benjamin, who had advocated “the art of interruption in 
contrast to the chain of deduction; the tenacity of the 
essay in contrast to the single gesture of the fragment; 
the repetition of themes in contrast to shallow 
universalism; the fullness of concentrated positivity in 
contrast to the negation of polemic.”32 Adorno would go on 
to echo Benjamin’s praise of the essay, though not his 
dichotomy between essay and fragment, in his own 
celebrated account of the “Essay as Form.” That work of 
Adorno’s has lately taken on key significance in accounts 
of the ordinary, as Michael Sheringham has identified it 
as an aesthetic of the everyday that would reach full 
fruition in the work of Georges Perec: “Important here—
and this parallels a deep-seated tendency in approaches 
to the quotidien—is the small scale (‘little acts of 
knowledge’), the detail (‘the claim of the particular to 
truth’), and the concrete, experimental stance of the 
                     
31 Jay, Marxism and Totality, 255. 
32 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 
trans. John Osborne (London and New York: Verso, 2003), 
32. 
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essay.”33 These are the tropes common to that heterodox 
strain of Marxism embodied by the Frankfurt School. 
France had no institutional equivalent to the 
Frankfurt School, but it did produce a theoretician who, 
like Benjamin, possessed a masterful command of the 
philosophical tradition and whose Marxism was also 
transfigured by his encounter with Surrealism in the 
1920s. If Adorno’s thought is characterized by its 
pessimism about prospects for a normative social totality 
and endorses fragmentation as an appropriate aesthetic 
for contemporary art, Henri Lefebvre defends a utopian 
vision of social transformation, and does so from the 
perspective of everyday life. Lefebvre’s three-volume 
Critique of Everyday Life is the classic statement on 
everyday life in the twentieth century, although its 
legacy is still vigorously debated.34 Whereas Adorno 
disparaged alienation and manifested a consistent 
                     
33 Sheringham, Everyday Life, 53. 
34 Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Vol. I; Henri 
Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Vol. II, Foundations 
for a Sociology of the Everyday, trans. John Moore 
(London and New York: Verso, 2002); Henri Lefebvre, 
Critique of Everyday Life, Vol. III, From Modernity to 
Modernism, trans. John Moore and Gregory Elliott (London 
and New York: Verso, 2008). 
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preference for the later Marx, Lefebvre makes recourse to 
the concept throughout his discussion of everyday life: 
“We would suggest that alienation is spreading and 
becoming so powerful that it obliterates all trace or 
consciousness of alienation.”35 That said, “like the 
Surrealists who first sparked his interest in totality, 
Lefebvre remained doggedly optimistic in his belief that 
alienation could be overcome.”36 Thus when Frederic 
Jameson anoints Lefebvre “the last great classical 
philosopher,” he means the last to relinquish social 
totality as the framework of his critique.37 
The distinction between descriptive and normative 
concepts of totality that Jay develops maps exactly onto 
Lefebvre’s work; there is, we might say, a descriptive 
everyday life, the particular character of ordinary life 
in a given time and place, and a normative everyday life, 
a utopian vision of a society that has overcome 
alienation. Specialization remains the fulcrum of this 
discussion: the everyday is “what is left when you 
subtract higher activities,” that is, when we  
                     
35 Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, 
trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (London: Allen Lane, 1971), 94. 
36 Jay, Marxism and Totality, 298. 
37 See Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Vol. I. 
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strip human activity of what pertains to specialized 
activities, removing all technical knowledge and 
expertise and simply leaving such everyday factors 
as effort, time, and rhythm.38 
 
Importantly, though, however much importance Lefebvre’s 
theory lays on the overall problem of alienation, it also 
plays host to a contradictory impulse that identifies the 
everyday as a niveau de réalité that contains within 
itself the potential for its own transformation. It takes 
the form of an uncontainable excess: the everyday is a 
“something which reveals the inability of forms 
(individually and as a whole) to grasp content, to 
integrate it and to exhaust it.”39 That is to say, “the 
turn to the ‘hidden’, ‘despised’, remaindered and 
‘microscopic’ content of everyday experience unites the 
everyday with what escapes the totalization of reason and 
                     
38 Sheringham, Everyday Life, 147–8. C.f. Lefebvre, 
Critique of Everyday Life, Vol. II, 52. 
39 Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Vol. II, 64. 
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systematic philosophy.”40 This sense of the everyday as 
that which strains against the limits of form is central 
to my account of modernist formal experimentation. 
Lefebvre offers a much clearer sense of what a 
normative totality might look like than Marx did, 
particularly in a famous section of Critique of Everyday 
Life, Vol. 1, entitled “Notes Written One Sunday in the 
French Countryside.”41 There, Lefebvre constructs an 
idealized image of the fête, or carnival, in which, he 
holds, a prior social configuration effectively 
sacralized the everyday, and dramatized the “dialogic 
moments of struggle” within it.42 Sympathetic commentators 
like Highmore reject the view that this strain of 
Lefebvre’s thought is reducible to “nostalgia for an 
unrecoverable past,” emphasizing instead that the 
dynamism of Lefebvre’s conception contrasts with the 
static images of “forests and volk” to be found in 
Heidegger, for instance.43 But this tendency to align 
normative totality with archaic social forms has its dark 
                     
40 John Roberts, Philosophizing the Everyday: 
Revolutionary Praxis and the Fate of Cultural Theory 
(London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2006), 63. 
41 Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Vol. I, 201–27. 
42 Highmore, Everyday Life and Cultural Theory, 125. 
43 Ibid. 
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obverse in Lefebvre’s almost histrionic denunciation of 
certain aspects of modernity, notably postwar urbanism. 
“Every time I see these ‘machines for living in’ I feel 
terrified,” he writes of the new town of Mourenx. The 
first volume of Critique of Everyday Life ends with an 
extended invocation of the Nazi death camps, leading to 
the conclusion “if Fascism represents the most extreme 
form of capitalism, the concentration camp is the most 
extreme and paroxysmal form of a modern housing estate.”44 
The critique of everyday life might amount to “a study of 
alienation under conditions of modernity,” but yet, just 
as surely as everyday life goes on inside the modern 
housing estate, there is also an ethical value in 
attending to it for its own sake, and not merely as an 
object of condemnation.45 This conflict between normative 
and descriptive meanings of the everyday recurs 
throughout both critical discussions of modernity, and 
modernist literature. 
 It should be acknowledged, though, that following 
the end of the Cold War, this vocabulary has come to seem 
shopworn. However valuable a Marxist account of history 
has been and continues to be, present discussion has 
ossified around the risibly premature term “late 
                     
44 Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, Vol. I, 245. 
45 Highmore, Everyday Life and Cultural Theory, 120. 
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capitalism.” Moreover, following a wave of skepticism 
about the claims of the Enlightenment, augmented by the 
postcolonial critique that identifies imperialism as its 
logical extension, critical theory has tended to deny the 
emancipatory potential of modernity entirely. That the 
result of so much Marxist theorizing should be a 
distinctly un-dialectical account of our present state is 
a peculiar irony. Theory’s intransigence in the face of 
an increasingly dynamic and global capitalism is only 
exacerbated by arguments like Jameson’s, which make 
scholarly activity the focus of that familiar anxiety 
about specialization: 
 
The system has always understood that ideas and 
analysis, along with the intellectuals who practice 
them, are its enemies and has evolved various ways 
of dealing with the situation, most notably—in the 
academic world—by railing against what it likes to 
call grand theory or master narratives at the same 
time that it fosters more comfortable and local 
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positivisms and empiricisms in the various 
disciplines.46 
 
Why the local and the empirical should be conflated with 
positivism, and why especially any of these approaches 
should be more comfortable than theory, is unclear. 
Nonetheless, I hold that to attend to the ordinary is to 
assert the local and the empirical against all totalizing 
systems, be they theoretical or positivistic in 
orientation. 
 Arguments like Jameson’s are unappealing in part 
because they are coercive: only theory can successfully 
resist “the system”; other approaches—particularly those 
that might undermine or circumscribe the theoretical 
project in any way—are ipso facto complicit with capital. 
Some version of this anxiety must help to account for the 
current ubiquity of interdisciplinary approaches in the 
humanities, and the ordinary is, by its nature, an 
interdisciplinary topic of inquiry. This study remains 
resolutely literary in its focus, but it nonetheless 
draws upon a particular sociological model of modernity; 
                     
46 Frederic Jameson, “The Theoretical Hesitation: 
Benjamin's Sociological Predecessor,” Critical Inquiry 
25.2 (Winter 1999): 267. 
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not to acknowledge one would, after all, only be to 
adhere to one implicitly. The model I have in mind is 
Anthony Giddens’s theory of modernity, set out in a 
number of works from the 1990s, when the need for a post-
Marxist sociology was felt most keenly.47 Giddens 
characterizes modernity as a social system defined by its 
dynamism, which in turn derives from three sources:  
 
The separation of time and space and their 
recombination in forms which permit the precise 
time-space “zoning” of social life; the disembedding 
of social systems (a phenomenon which connects 
closely with the factors involved in time-space 
separation); and the reflexive ordering and 
                     
47 Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, Reflexive 
Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the 
Modern Social Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994); 
Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); Anthony Giddens, 
Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late 
Modern Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Anthony 
Giddens and Christopher Pierson, Conversations with 
Anthony Giddens: Making Sense of Modernity (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998). 
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reordering of social relations in the light of 
continual inputs of knowledge affecting the actions 
of individuals and groups.48 
 
The first two points are the most germane to a discussion 
of everyday life, and indeed, are hardly extricable from 
one another. Giddens glosses the point thus: “The advent 
of modernity increasingly tears space away from place by 
fostering relations between 'absent' others, locationally 
distinct from any given situation of face-to-face 
interaction.”49 What Giddens means by a separation between 
space and time is epitomized by the “communications 
revolution” of the early nineteenth century, especially 
the development of the telegraph: it was no longer 
necessary to physically transport a message from place to 
place; instantaneous communication over unfathomable 
distances became possible for the first time.50 
                     
48 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 19. 
49 Ibid. 
50 “The most important fact about the telegraph is at once 
the most obvious and innocent: It permitted for the first 
time the effective separation of communication from 
transportation.” James W. Carey, Communication as 
Culture: Essays on Media and Society (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 
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 The net result of this separation of time and space 
is the process Giddens describes as disembedding, or “the 
‘lifting out’ of social relations from local contexts of 
interaction and their restructuring across indefinite 
spans of time-space.”51 Giddens also identifies two of 
what he calls “disembedding mechanisms”: the creation of 
symbolic tokens, and the establishment of expert systems. 
By the former, Giddens means money, which, following 
Talcott Parsons, he situates alongside power and language 
as the “circulating mediums” of modernity.52 The latter 
need not concern us overly, except to note that where the 
Marxist tradition sees a diminution of human potential 
through the division of labor, Giddens sees a necessary 
development in social organization. We specialize for the 
same reason that we narrativize: in order to manage 
complexity. 
The net effect of disembedding might appear to be 
the wholesale destruction of tradition for which 
modernity is often reproached, but Giddens makes an 
important caveat: “modernity has rebuilt tradition as it 
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has dissolved it.”53 Moreover, the reconstruction of 
tradition is an ongoing and dynamic process, which has 
left its mark on many of the intellectual and cultural 
endeavors of the modernist period, including 
psychoanalysis, which responds to a moment in which  
 
traditions in everyday life were beginning to creak 
and strain under the impact of modernity. As 
tradition dissolves, one can speculate, ‘trace 
memory’ is left more nakedly exposed, as well as 
more problematic in respect of the construction of 
identity and the meaning of social norms.54 
 
Modernity, in other words, is characterized by rapidly 
shifting horizons of ordinary experience, in which the 
process of historical change produces an uncanny 
                     
53 Giddens draws particular attention to the cluster of 
rituals and observances that surround the concept of the 
nation, an argument that accords with Eric Hobsbawm’s 
notion of “invented tradition.” Cf. Beck et al., 
Reflexive Modernization, 56; E. J. Hobsbawm and T. O. 
Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
54 Beck, et al., Reflexive Modernization, 67. 
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uncertainty between tradition’s destruction and its 
persistence. A vital reason for studying modernist 
literature, then, is that it registers this uncertainty 
while also participating directly in modernity’s 
reconstruction of tradition, for instance, in its co-
optations of the commodity form and its interventions in 
debate over literary canons.  
 The interpenetration of everyday life by the kinds 
of abstract systems that Giddens identifies is also 
apparent to Lefebvre, who draws particular attention to 
it in Everyday Life in the Modern World: “Everyday life 
must shortly become the one perfect system… it would be 
the main product of the so-called ‘organized’ society of 
controlled consumption and of its setting, modernity.”55 
Lefebvre, like so many of his fellow theoreticians of the 
everyday, is echoing Max Weber’s famous figure of 
modernity as a state of imprisonment within an “immutable 
shell” of bureaucratic rationality.56 Lefebvre himself 
                     
55 Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, 72–3. 
56 The stahlhartes Gehäuse, or “immutable shell,” is 
better known to English-language readers as the “iron 
cage” of Talcott Parsons’ translation. Max Weber, The 
Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism and Other 
Writings, ed. and trans. Peter Baehr and Gordon C. Wells 
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uses a slightly different metaphor with his famous 
formulation “the colonization of everyday life,” 
subsequently taken up with vigor by the Situationists.57 
On this point, French and German traditions coincide: 
Jürgen Habermas, in a sense the last representative of 
the Frankfurt School, posits a “colonization of the 
lifeworld,” in which the extension of abstract systems 
into everyday life diminishes the agency of the 
individuals who are subject to them.58 Giddens departs 
from this view by emphasizing the dialectical 
relationship between these abstract systems and ordinary 
practices. Moreover, positing a pre-existent lifeworld 
that modernity then impinges upon and disrupts is itself 
a trope of modernity.59 Radical social change may be a 
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constant feature of modernity, but any attempt to measure 
that dynamism by reference to a prior social formation 
will necessarily be a reconstruction of it. 
 The ordinary in modernity is thus characterized, we 
might say, by rapidly shifting horizons of expectation. 
In other words, it might be the very rapidity of those 
shifts that makes the ordinary visible under the 
condition of modernity. Sociological models like 
Giddens’s can only amount to heuristics in the context of 
a literary study; they are, like literary texts, also 
assemblages of tropes. But to characterize modernity in 
such a way allows us to situate the modernist turn to the 
ordinary with reference to a broader set of cultural 
conventions, which the specific aspects of modernity I 
have just outlined begin to place under strain. I am 
referring to the Aristotelian poetics of narrative, which, 
though they might be more honored in the breach than in 
the observance at times, have exercised a determining 
influence on Western literature since the Renaissance. 
                                                           
modernity. It may well be the greatest conceit of 
modernity to claim for itself the special consciousness 
of transition and indeterminacy.” Peter Fritzsche, 
Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy 
of History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2004), 53–4. 
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“The signal event in this history of literary criticism 
in the Italian Renaissance,” writes Bernard Weinberg, 
“was the discovery of Aristotle’s Poetics and its 
incorporation into the critical tradition.” Weinberg 
describes a process of dissemination beginning with 
Giorgio Valla’s Latin translation of 1498, culminating 
with Bernardo Segni’s Italian translation of 1549. From 
the mid-sixteenth century on, a thriving tradition of 
commentary and exegesis developed.60 
 The rediscovery of Aristotle brought back into the 
Western literary consciousness an aesthetic of decorum 
that stressed a high degree of spatiotemporal and 
logical-causal connectedness as the foundation of 
narrative. Aristotle’s project is to defend mimesis, that 
is, fictional representation, from Plato’s attack on it 
in The Republic by showing that mimesis leads to 
philosophically significant forms of comprehension. To 
make this case, Aristotle takes on Plato’s argument from 
the Theatetus that philosophy begins in wonder.61 The 
                     
60 Bernard Weinberg, A History of Literary Criticism in 
the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols. (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1961), 349, 422. 
61 For a Cartesian exploration of the aesthetics of wonder, 
see Philip Fisher, Wonder, the Rainbow, and the 
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wonderful, then, becomes in a sense the essence of 
mimesis, its most sought-after effect. Much of the 
Poetics, then, is given over to describing how the poet, 
especially the tragedian, might elicit wonder from his 
audience without straining their credulity beyond 
breaking point. Thus, in a discussion of the 
characteristic tragic affects fear and pity from chapter 
9: 
  
Given that the mimesis is not only of a complete 
action but also of fearful and pitiable matters, the 
latter arise above all when events occur contrary to 
expectation yet on account of one another. The 
awesome will be maintained in this way more than 
through show of chance and fortune.62 
  
The surprise that provokes the audience’s wonder must be 
able to be resolved into a coherent, logically and 
                                                           
Aesthetics of Rare Experiences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), 10–1. 
62 The translator glosses “awesome,” thaumaston, as 
“wonder” in a footnote. Aristotle, The Poetics, trans. 
Stephen Halliwell (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 63n.88. 
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causally consistent, sequence of events. The audience’s 
decoding of that sequence mimics the process of 
philosophical understanding.  
 However, Aristotle also appears to contradict 
himself on the question of wonder when, in chapter 24, he 
writes: 
 
In tragedy one needs to create a sense of awe, but 
epic has more scope for the irrational (the chief 
cause of awe [wonder]), because we do not actually 
see the agent… Awe is pleasurable: witness the fact 
that all men exaggerate when relating stories, to 
give delight… Things probable though impossible 
should be preferred to the possible but implausible. 
Stories should not comprise irrational components; 
ideally there should be no irrationality, or failing 
that, it should lie outside the plot.63 
 
The concluding remarks in this passage plainly contradict 
its opening, where irrationality is cited as “the chief 
cause” of wonder. Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle’s 
translator and commentator, suggests that wonder, 
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properly conceived, “lies on the boundary between the 
explicable and the inexplicable, and so can slip into the 
latter (and hence become irrational) or, properly used, 
may stimulate and challenge understanding.”64 The 
relevance of this paradox to the aesthetics of modernism 
is readily apparent; as Lawrence Rainey argues, 
“Modernism, with all its machineries of extremism, was 
anything but eager to resolve the experience of 
wonder/horror into the ready comprehensibility of 
spatiotemporal and logico-causal connectedness.”65 And 
with the foregoing discussion of modernity in mind, we 
can see why: in a world of disembedding, abstract systems, 
and time-space distanciation, the canons of Aristotelian 
decorum must appear outdated, to say the least. 
 But it is not only modernism’s “machineries of 
extremism” that resist recuperation into narrative. The 
ordinary, the opposite of the wonderful, would seem to 
                     
64 Aristotle, Aristotle's Poetics, trans. Stephen 
Halliwell (London: Duckworth, 1986), 75n.41. 
65 Lawrence Rainey, “Introduction,” in Modernism: An 
Anthology, ed. Lawrence Rainey (Maldon, MA and Oxford: 
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constitute a fundamentally anti-Aristotelian aesthetic. 
Phillip Fisher’s excellent exploration of the nexus 
between aesthetics and epistemology, Wonder, the Rainbow, 
and the Aesthetics of Rare Experiences, situates wonder 
even more fundamentally in relation to the artwork: 
 
To characterize wonder we are forced to look at its 
alternative, the qualities of the ordinary, and 
paradoxically what we end up saying is that there 
cannot be any experience of the ordinary. As a 
result, surprise, the eliciting of notice, become 
the very heart of what it means to ‘have an 
experience’ at all… The ordinary can not or does not 
turn itself into experiences.66  
 
In other words, Fisher is restating the paradox we first 
encountered in Blanchot, of the ordinary’s propensity to 
slip the nets of inquiry and representation. Fisher 
refers to the impossibility of experiencing the ordinary 
as a paradox, since we can readily imagine what an 
experience of the ordinary might be like, and I think it 
is a paradox worth retaining. Rather than describe a 
literary work as representing the ordinary, we should 
                     
66 Fisher, Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare 
Experiences, 20. 
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think of it instead as offering a rhetoric of the 
ordinary. 
 
      Recent models of literary criticism, however, have 
tended to flatten out that paradox by taking the 
veneration of rare experiences to an extreme. Since the 
appearance of Cathy Caruth’s Unclaimed Experience: 
Trauma, Narrative, History (1996) and her collection 
Trauma: Explorations in Memory (1995), “trauma” has 
acquired a position of central importance in the lexicon 
of contemporary criticism. In her introduction to the 
latter volume, Caruth identifies the legacy of the 
Vietnam War as a major impetus for trauma’s resurgence in 
public discourse, epitomized by its incorporation as 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the third edition of 
the American Psychological Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1980).67 But 
“trauma theory,” as it has come to be known in literary 
studies, looks beyond the neurological approach to 
recover a psychoanalytic approach to trauma all but 
abandoned by clinicians. The founding text for this line 
of thought, then, is Freud’s “Beyond the Pleasure 
                     
67 Cathy Caruth, ed. Trauma: Explorations in Memory 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
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Principle,” in which he grapples with the challenge posed 
to his own wish-fulfillment theory of dreaming by the 
experience of traumatized soldiers following the First 
World War. If dreaming is indeed governed by the pleasure 
principle and unconscious wish fulfillment, why do the 
dreams of traumatized patients cause them to relive their 
experience, even while their waking life is characterized 
by rigorous attempts to avoid traumatic stimuli?68 Freud’s 
solution is to posit the “death drive,” a tendency 
implicit in all organic matter to return to a prior 
state. If the death drive did not offer a comprehensive 
explanation for the “compulsion to repeat” experienced by 
trauma victims, it did at least make space within the 
Freudian system for mental phenomena not governed by the 
pleasure principle.69 
      Trauma theory does not necessarily endorse Freud’s 
attempt at explaining traumatic symptoms, preferring 
instead to re-situate trauma as a challenge to 
representation: “What returns to haunt the victim… is not 
only the reality of the violent event but also the 
reality of the way that its violence has not yet been 
                     
68 Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Other Writings, trans. 
John Reddick (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 51–2. 
69 Ibid., 95. 
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fully known.”70 In describing trauma as a surfeit of “the 
real,” trauma theory owes something to Jacques Lacan’s 
notion that experience is divided into three registers, 
the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic. Lacan 
describes the Real as unmediated by the other two 
registers, and thus inassimilable; any encounter with it 
is inherently traumatic.71 Hence the notion that traumatic 
experience exposes its victim to an excess that returns 
again and again. “Trauma brings one repeatedly to this 
particular paradox: that in trauma the greatest 
confrontation with reality may occur as an absolute 
numbing to it; that immediacy, paradoxically enough, may 
take the form of belatedness.”72 Certain suggestive 
possibilities arise from this understanding of trauma, 
and Caruth seizes on one of them by making the traumatic 
                     
70 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, 
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impact of the real a figure for linguistic reference 
itself.73  
      Beyond the novel readings of literary and 
philosophical texts that it inspired, trauma theory has 
also had broad implications for the institution of 
literary studies. Caruth situates the emergence of trauma 
theory in the context of debates over post-structuralism 
and language’s capacity to offer reliable access to the 
world.74 If representation appears to break down when 
confronted with a surfeit of the real, perhaps the 
various strategies invoked by witnesses to gain a 
foothold in these circumstances offer a new approach to 
these more general problems of representation. But trauma 
theory goes further by framing literary criticism as a 
practice governed by ethical imperatives: victims’ 
testimony represents a “plea by an other who is asking to 
be seen and heard.”75 That literary criticism should be 
responsive to ethical demands is not unreasonable, but 
the rhetoric of trauma theory minimizes the inherent 
rhetoricity of literary texts, and privileges a rhetoric 
                     
73 See chapter 4, “The Falling Body and the Impact of 
Reference,” in Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, 
Narrative, and History, 73–90. 
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of authenticity. “Writing” becomes “testimony,” and 
“representing” becomes “witnessing.” Reading for trauma 
makes figural language less a question of deviation and 
play; instead troping becomes an even stronger testimony 
to the presence of an underlying reality, and literature 
less a rhetorical activity than an ethical one.76 
      As a consequence, trauma establishes a new 
aesthetic hierarchy, according to which those texts that 
claim to depict trauma and its aftermath have the 
strongest claim on critics’ and readers’ attentions. In 
short, trauma orients aesthetics toward rare experiences, 
                     
76 In doing so, trauma theory also runs the risk of 
prematurely naturalizing the category of trauma, blurring 
the lines between a cultural and a medical phenomenon. 
Without disputing its reality, it still necessary to 
remember that “trauma” denotes a floating cluster of 
symptoms that have been repeatedly rearranged and 
redeployed throughout the history of psychiatry. See 
Lawrence Rainey, “Shock Effects: Marinetti, Pathology, 
and Italian Avant-Garde Poetics,” in The Mind of 
Modernism: Medicine, Psychology, and the Cultural Arts in 
Europe and America, 1880-1940, ed. Mark S. Micale 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). 
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rather than ordinary ones.77 In its privileging of 
“testimony” over “representation,” trauma theory becomes 
reminiscent of the “jargon” which Adorno subjected to 
withering critique in his attack on existentialism. The 
jargon pretends to vouchsafe the “authenticity” of 
utterances made under the guise of the “statement,” which 
suppresses the fact that “the first price exacted by 
language is the essence of the individual.”78 
                     
77 Leaving aside, that is, the extraordinary extensions of 
definition to which the term is now subjected, epitomized 
by Mark Epstein’s “The Trauma of Everyday Life.” For 
instance, the distinction between mourning and 
pathological grief (notably articulated by Freud in 
“Mourning and Melancholia”) seems to be dissolving in 
contemporary psychiatric practice. According to “The 
Trauma of Everyday Life,” every experience of 
bereavement, displacement, or existential discomfort is 
an instance of trauma, making the concept virtually 
ubiquitous. Mark Epstein, The Trauma of Everyday Life 
(New York: Penguin, 2013). Cf. Benedict Carey, “Grief 
Could Join List of Disorders,” New York Times, January 25 
2012. 
78 Theodor Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Knut 
Tarnowski and Frederic Will (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 10. 
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“Statement” wants to announce that something which 
was said has come from the depth of the speaking 
subject; it is removed from the curse of surface 
communication. But at the same time communicative 
disorder disguises itself in the statement. Someone 
speaks and, thanks to the elevated term “statement,” 
what he says is to be the sign of truth—as if men 
could not become caught up in untruth, as if they 
could not suffer martyrdom for plain nonsense.79 
 
The rubric of trauma promises to revive the metaphysics 
of speech that Adorno scorned even against the 
poststructuralist wave of the following decades by 
grounding reference in a traumatic encounter with the 
Real. 
 
 
      The currency of these models of literary language 
reminds us that the present moment is characterized by an 
increasingly anti-rhetorical criticism (in addition to 
trauma theory, I could cite the many variants of 
historicism that posit social contexts as the ultimate 
referents of literary texts) situated within in an 
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increasingly anti-rhetorical culture.80 These factors, in 
combination with a certain predictable weariness with the 
anti-referential models of poststructuralist thought, 
have produced a resistance in criticism to figurative 
language, and a preference for content- or context-based 
readings that seek to ground reference in one or another 
kind of extra-linguistic reality.81 The body, the thing, 
trauma, and so on: each of these rubrics or paradigms 
that have swept over literary criticism in succession has 
held out the promise of curtailing the infinite play of 
figurative language. The ordinary, it seems at times, has 
the potential to do the same. But can we speak of the 
ordinary at all? Or can we only invoke it by its 
metaphors? In this sense, the problem of representing the 
ordinary amounts to a special case of the problem of 
literary language in general. 
 Hence my insistence, with Paul de Man, on “the 
rhetorical model of the trope, or, if one prefers to call 
it that, literature.” The trope, on this view, “is not a 
                     
80 See Rita Felski, “‘Context Stinks!’” New Literary 
History 42.4 (Autumn 2011): 573–91. 
81 Hence the fact that a resurgence of interest in form 
amongst literary scholars was thought worthy of 
particular mention; see Marjorie Levinson, “What Is New 
Formalism?,” PMLA 122.2 (2007): 558–69. 
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derived, marginal or aberrant form of language but the 
linguistic paradigm par excellence. The figurative 
structure is not one linguistic mode among others but it 
characterizes language as such.”82 What kind of figurative 
structure, then, produces the effect of the ordinary in 
modernist literature? One example must be found in what 
might be called the “rhetoric of not having rhetoric,” or 
a “trope of not troping.” To see what I mean, consider 
the film Ladri di Biciclette (Bicycle Thieves), the 1948 
neo-realist classic directed by Vittorio de Sica.83 The 
film follows Antonio Ricci, who is offered a job posting 
advertisements but needs the bicycle he has already 
pawned in order to be eligible for it. His wife pawns her 
dowry—the family’s bedding—in order to buy back the bike 
and Antonio takes the job, accompanied by his son Bruno. 
But his bike is promptly stolen, so Antonio and Bruno set 
off on a desperate search for the bicycle or its thief. 
Antonio’s quest is ultimately unsuccessful, and failure 
leads him to compromise his morality: he attempts to 
steal an unattended bike and is only saved from an irate 
                     
82 Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in 
Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1979), 15, 105. 
83 Vittorio de Sica, “Ladri Di Biciclette,” (Italy: Ente 
Nazionale Industrie Cinematografiche, 1948). 
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crowd by their compassion for Bruno, who cries at seeing 
his father accosted. As the crowd disperses, Bruno takes 
his father’s hand and leads him away, completing a 
poignant dramatic reversal between father and son.  
      Ladri di Biciclette is widely, if a little oddly, 
praised for its social realism: oddly insofar as, despite 
its unsparing depiction of a precarious existence, the 
film frequently has recourse to a symbolic register that 
augments the social and ethical implications of its 
events. Take, for instance, the scene in which Antonio 
visits a local fixer associated with the Communist Party, 
Baiocchi, to ask for his help recovering the stolen bike. 
After being chastised for interrupting the discourse of a 
party intellectual—the flow of abstract ideas thus taking 
precedence over an immediate problem—Antonio finds 
Baiocchi rehearsing a cabaret act, debating with one of 
his singers over the pitch of the lyric “gente”: “people” 
(Fig. 1).  
 
  
57 
 
Fig. 1: Baiocchi (on the far right) rehearses his 
performers. Vittorio de Sica, "Ladri Di Biciclette," 93 
min. Italy: Ente Nazionale Industrie Cinematografiche, 
1948.  
 
The next day, after having searched unsuccessfully for 
the stolen bike at a market guided by Baiocchi, Antonio 
and Bruno shelter from a rainstorm under an eave, joined 
by a group of clergy. It soon becomes apparent that these 
clergymen are visitors, speaking to one another in German 
(Fig. 2).  
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Fig. 2: Antonio and Bruno shelter with a group of German-
speaking clergymen. de Sica, "Ladri Di Biciclette." 
 
First, the film suggests that the day-to-day struggles of 
workers are of marginal interest to the Communist Party, 
whose displays of benevolence toward them are mere 
performances. Second, the film shows the clergy literally 
speaking a language incomprehensible to its parishioners. 
The Communist Party and the Catholic Church are the two 
institutional lynchpins of working class life in postwar 
Italy, but through a careful manipulation of symbolic 
artifice, the film implies that they are in fact 
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indifferent to the plight of those they claim to 
represent or minister to. These moments in which the 
texture of detail in the film exceeds strict narrative 
necessity are easily recuperable in terms of symbolic 
meanings. 
      But this tension between realism and symbolism 
comes to a head in a brief scene forty-five minutes into 
the film, during which Antonio and Bruno are pursuing an 
old man whom they’ve seen conversing with the bicycle 
thief. The two become separated, and at the moment of 
maximal narrative tension, and in stark defiance of 
narrative tension, Bruno breaks off from the pursuit to 
relieve himself against a nearby wall (Fig. 3). Before he 
can, though, Antonio catches up with him and calls him 
back to the pursuit. In the context of a climactic chase, 
Bruno’s action is explicitly anti-narratival. The 
anticipated end of the pursuit arrives with Bruno and 
Antonio catching up to the old man, but not before the 
narrative tension is dissipated by Bruno’s action. How is 
the viewer to interpret this brief scene in such a way as 
to justify this narrative disruption? One possibility 
might be to see the film as adverting, once again, to a 
symbolic register. But unlike my other examples, no 
obvious symbolic reading arises. In fact, Bruno’s actions 
seem anti-symbolic: the act of emptying one’s bladder 
seems so calculatedly banal and universal as to defy 
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symbolic recuperation. At the same time, though, it is an 
act often excluded from representation even within 
ardently realist modes of storytelling, and thus calls 
attention to itself. Through it, the film seems to make 
the claim for an even more hyperbolic realism: it will 
encompass even the most routine and intimate bodily acts. 
But this reading, though valid, both fails to account for 
the scene’s position within the film with its consequent 
anti-narratival effects, and, moreover, the film’s 
overarching claim to represent the real: where else 
within it are such detailed accounts of the ordinary to 
be found? Or is the presence of some principle or 
principles of selection guiding the rest of the narrative 
thereby disclosed? We are left with a paradox: a scene 
that makes an implicit claim to documentary realism but 
in doing so, exposes the artifice of realism at work in 
the film around it. The scene clearly constitutes a trope, 
but a trope of not troping, amounting to a rhetoric of 
not having rhetoric. 
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Fig. 3: Bruno breaks off the pursuit to relieve himself. 
de Sica, "Ladri Di Biciclette." 
 
 The world inhabited by de Sica, and indeed, by the 
modernists, has largely disappeared. In the West, 
industrial capitalism has given way to a different 
socioeconomic configuration, whose meaning for culture is 
still being determined. Finance capitalism must, 
according to Jameson, produce “new and unrepresentable 
symptoms in late-capitalist everyday life,” but it is far 
from clear that “late capitalism” has generated 
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representational dilemmas wholly unknown to the 
modernists.84 Giddens’s sense of radical modernity at 
least offers a less teleological and more historically 
expansive model for these phenomena. Moreover, the crisis 
of representation that Jameson alludes to has been a 
recurrent feature of theory and criticism throughout the 
twentieth century; it even occurs within everyday life 
theory, when Lefebvre decries “the significant decline of 
referentials at the beginning of the twentieth century.”85 
  
Language endows a thing with value, but in the 
process it devalues itself. Simultaneously it makes 
everyday life, is everyday life, eludes it, 
disguises it, and conceals it, hiding it behind the 
ornaments of rhetoric and make-believe, so that, in 
the course of everyday life, language and linguistic 
relations become denials of everyday life.86 
  
Lefebvre’s suspicion that rhetoric obscures and deforms 
the ordinary is emblematic of a distrust of 
                     
84 Frederic Jameson, “Culture and Finance Capital,” 
Critical Inquiry 24.1 (Autumn 1997): 252. 
85 Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, 111. 
86 Ibid., 120–1. 
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representation more deeply rooted in Western culture than 
modernity itself. But in the context of radical modernity, 
with no material commodity to back the currency, no 
absolute yardstick of value to contain the speculations 
of a financialized economy, and no transcendental 
signifier to curtail the infinite deferral of meaning, 
those anxieties are as apt as ever to reassert themselves. 
The rhetoric of not having rhetoric, then, allows us to 
negotiate those anxieties in a productive fashion. 
 
My first chapter takes up the vexed debate about the 
origin of Stein’s literary innovations, with particular 
emphasis on her relationship with the philosophy of 
William James and the art of the Cubists. Finding these 
accounts unpersuasive, despite recent attempts to 
reexamine James in relation to the ordinary, I turn to 
Stein’s epic novel The Making of Americans, which I read 
as a frustrated, and indeed, frustrating, attempt to move 
beyond the Aristotelian conventions of narrative and make 
repetition a generative aesthetic principle. I then read 
“Tender Buttons” as a more fully realized account of the 
ordinary, with a particular emphasis on its indeterminate 
genre. Whereas Stein’s critics have generally labored to 
reduce the work’s opacity, my reading attends to the 
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usefulness of that opacity as both an account of the 
ordinary and the outline of a queer identity. 
 My second chapter addresses the locus classicus of 
the modernist ordinary, James Joyce’s Ulysses. It begins 
with an account of the novel’s reception, charting a 
tradition amongst critics that I broadly label “symbolism” 
and associate with T. S. Eliot’s reading of the novel, 
which is inimical to the ordinary and the everyday 
despite the novel’s manifest concern with them. I 
identify an alternative, “realist,” tradition inaugurated 
by Ezra Pound, before considering the more recent 
critical paradigm brought about by textual genetics and 
post-structuralism. I consider the implications of these 
models for the modernist ordinary, particularly in the 
context of the novel’s incorporation of mass culture. 
This also prompts further enquiry into the realist 
tradition, building on my discussion from chapter 1. I 
then give a detailed account of the “Cyclops” episode as 
an example of the two textual economies at work in the 
novel, showing how Joyce figures the ordinary itself as a 
kind of excess, akin to the aesthetic rather than opposed 
to it.  
 My third chapter develops both the discussion of 
Eliot’s classicism and his ambivalent engagement with 
mass culture from Chapter 2 in the context of his 
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neglected 1924 verse-drama Sweeney Agonistes. Eliot uses 
mass culture to figure for the ordinary as an object both 
of attraction and repulsion. Eliot’s ambivalence toward 
daily life under the condition of modernity at this stage 
of his intellectual and poetic development had issued in 
productive aesthetic contradictions in The Waste Land, a 
compelling oscillation between an aesthetic of decorum 
and one of extremity. In Sweeney, however, that 
contradiction, manifested on a formal level in the work’s 
attempt to fuse poetry with drama, Aristophanes with jazz, 
and ritual with melodrama, results only in fragments. I 
then turn to Eliot’s Four Quartets, which have tended to 
be read with a view to explicating Eliot’s Christian 
worldview for so long that a secular reevaluation is 
overdue. Moreover, the Quartets demand an account of the 
relationship between the ordinary and the concepts of 
space and place, as opposed to the usual emphasis on 
temporality in both accounts of the poem and everyday 
life studies. The Quartets show that Eliot’s approach to 
resolving the latent contradictions of his earlier work 
was, in effect, to align the ordinary with a lost social 
totality located in the distant past, aligning his work 
with aspects of everyday life theory discussed in my 
introduction. 
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My fourth chapter takes up the ordinary in Wallace 
Stevens, a poet more celebrated for the visionary 
intensity and lofty abstraction of his poems than their 
sense of the everyday, or, to use his own preferred term, 
the commonplace. I begin by treating one of Stevens’s 
lesser-known lyrics, “The Ordinary Women,” as a work that 
poses fundamental questions about the relationship 
between the aesthetic and the ordinary in the context of 
early cinema. This discussion concludes the discussion of 
mass culture that has developed over the preceding 
chapters. I then return to the questions of space and 
place raised in chapter 3 as a way in to Stevens’s “An 
Ordinary Evening in New Haven,” in a discussion that 
raises a number of questions about the compatibility of 
formalist and historicist approaches to literature. The 
poem, I conclude, exemplifies both Stevens’s rhetoric of 
not having rhetoric and his hopeful account of the 
imagination’s power to transform the real. 
I conclude with a discussion of the contemporary 
American novelist Don DeLillo, who has been frequently 
misread as a critic of American consumerism in the latest 
iteration of criticism’s tendency to denigrate the 
ordinary. Out of this pervasive misreading has arisen an 
account of the relationship between modernism and 
postmodernism that my argument has sought to revise. This 
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coda explores the latent metaphors for the ordinary that 
have developed in the course of my argument, in 
particular the notion of the figuring both the ordinary 
and the aesthetic as waste. This allows me to situate my 
work in relation to ongoing debates about the realist 
tradition, popular culture, postmodernism, and above all, 
the fate of modernism and its legacies in twentieth-
century literature.
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Chapter 1: Gertrude Stein’s Queer Ordinary 
 
Though Gertrude Stein announced often that she was a 
grammarian, I would go a little further than grammar and say 
I value her also and most as a rhetorician.1 
 
It is a queer thing to me who am really entirely loving 
repeating that mostly not any one is seeing feeling hearing 
themselves as doing repeating. Perhaps it would not be 
pleasant to most of them, indeed very many of them are quite 
certain they do not at all love repeating.2 
 
      Gertrude Stein continues to occupy now, as she did 
during her career, an uncertain position in the modernist 
canon. Based in Paris for most of her writing career, she 
was at the center of modernist experimentation in the visual 
arts, while somewhat isolated from the network of publishing 
                     
1 Donald Sutherland, “Gertrude Stein and the Twentieth 
Century,” in Gertrude Stein Advanced: An Anthology of 
Criticism, ed. Richard Kostelanetz (Jefferson, NC and 
London: McFarland, 1990), 17. 
2 Gertrude Stein, The Making of Americans: Being a History of 
a Family's Progress (Normal, IL and London: Dalkey Archive 
Press, 1995), 599. Hereafter cited in text as “MoA.” 
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and patronage that fostered modernism in the English-
speaking world. Despite claims for the importance of Stein’s 
own critical outlook—“Composition as explanation”—for the 
sensibility of the New Critics, in practice she was largely 
neglected by their efforts to canonize modernism in the mid-
twentieth century.3 Despite a steady stream of monographs and 
essays, the most wide-ranging reconsideration of Stein 
occurred in the wake of Andreas Huyssen’s After the Great 
Divide, when feminist scholars and critics who identified 
with postmodernism agreed that Stein had never really been a 
“modernist” after all, but a postmodernist avant la lettre. 
      This argument starts from the view put forward by 
Huyssen and others that modernism is defined by its aversion 
to popular culture and its resultant determination to secure 
a domain of exclusive and inscrutable high art against the 
encroachment of the masses. As a result the culture of the 
masses, “the popular,” is the object of unremitting 
modernist disdain. I have argued elsewhere that Huyssen’s 
account of modernism does not extend much beyond caricature. 
But the important thing to note here is that he treats 
postmodernism not only as a repudiation of modernist 
                     
3 See Steven Meyer, “Gertude Stein,” in Modernism and the New 
Criticism, ed. A. Walton Litz, Louis Menand, and Lawrence 
Rainey, The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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ideology, but as a continuation of an historically 
contemporary alternative to modernism: the historical avant-
garde. Huyssen endorses Peter Bürger’s influential theory 
that the avant-garde is defined by an attack on the 
institutions of art and determination to reintegrate art 
with the praxis of life.4 Thus, postmodernism too celebrates 
popular culture and subverts the institutions of official 
culture through irony and appropriation. 
      The everyday is of crucial importance here; on this 
account, “Stein attempted to merge high art with certain 
forms and genres of mass culture and the culture of everyday 
life, self-consciously mixing these popular modes with 
avant-garde discourses.”5 Stein’s explorations of narrative 
did lead her to explore the detective genre in the 1930s, 
but from the perspective of Stein’s career as a whole, such 
                     
4 Peter Bürger, “Avant-Garde and Neo-Avant-Garde: An Attempt 
to Answer Certain Critics of Theory of the Avant-Garde,” New 
Literary History 41.4 (Autumn 2010): 704–5. Cf. Peter Bürger, 
Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
5 Ellen E. Berry, Curved Thought and Textual Wandering: 
Gertrude Stein's Postmodernism (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1992), 134. 
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a description is close to unrecognizable.6 Throughout her 
career, Stein’s experimental writing (as opposed to her 
forays into more conventional genres) remains resolutely 
opaque and largely impervious to intertextuality. Moreover, 
it would be wrong to claim that any of Stein’s writing 
demonstrates a degree of engagement with the popular 
comparable with Joyce’s Ulysses or Eliot’s The Waste Land. 
At work here is a double misrecognition: a selective reading 
of Stein crossed with a systematic misreading of modernism. 
Huyssen, following Bürger, is, I think, right to align 
“popular forms” with the “culture of everyday life” (or the 
ordinary), but profoundly mistaken to predicate a definition 
of modernism on their exclusion. But reversing Huyssen’s 
simple binary and allowing that modernism embraces the 
popular (as this thesis argues throughout) will still not 
account for Stein, who, any reader, any reader of the 
maddeningly hermetic The Making of Americans will agree, is 
not that kind of modernist. 
     The content-based approach to situating Stein fails 
because of its tendency to produce brittle dichotomies that 
do not capture the complexity of her work. Earlier critics 
preferred to emphasize a more imminent context: the Parisian 
                     
6 Cf. Gabrielle Dean, “Grid Games: Gertrude Stein's Diagrams 
and Detectives,” Modernism/modernity 15.2 (April 2008): 317–
41. 
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art scene of the 1900s and 1910s, particularly the 
development of Cubism. This is one of the earliest prisms 
through which Stein’s work was read.7 Stein’s friendship with 
Picasso has been a constant topic of interest, not least 
because her autobiographical writings are a rich source of 
anecdotes and witticisms about him. She also claimed for 
herself the role of his privileged interpreter: “I was alone 
at this time in understanding him, perhaps because I was 
expressing the same thing in literature.”8 This purported 
parallel has been a topic of long-running fixation in Stein 
studies.9 But arguments that posit cubism as a necessary part 
                     
7 “Public Gets Peep at Extreme Cubist Literature in Gertrude 
Stein’s ‘Tender Buttons’,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 5 
1914. 
8 Gertrude Stein, Picasso (New York: Dover Publications, 
1984), 16. 
9 Wendy Steiner’s Exact Resemblance to Exact Resemblance is 
the principle account of Stein’s “literary cubism,” but this 
formulation, or some variant of it, is endemic to Stein 
criticism. Leon Katz is among the earliest critics to 
emphasize painting as a source for Stein’s compositional 
technique. Michael Hoffmann invoked cubism decisively in his 
study of Stein’s “abstractionism”. Finally, Stein’s 
biographer John Malcolm Brinnin described “Tender Buttons” 
as “wholly a product of the cubist dispensation.” Wendy 
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of Stein’s intellectual genealogy and therefore a means of 
penetrating its opacity are almost invariably thin. For one 
thing, they tend not to be terribly specific about cubism. 
As Marjorie Perloff has noted, “In discussing Stein’s 
Cubism, critics repeatedly speak of ‘non-representational’ 
or ‘abstract’ art, of ‘flat surface,’ ‘shifting perspective’ 
and ‘interacting planes.’ All these are slippery terms: 
Kandinsky was one of the first non-representational painters 
of the twentieth century but he was hardly a Cubist.”10 Only 
Steiner’s account gives the parallel much depth, but she 
achieves this through an extraordinarily etiolated account 
                                                              
Steiner, Exact Resemblance to Exact Resemblance: The 
Literary Portraiture of Gertrude Stein (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1978); Leon Katz, “The First 
Making of The Making of Americans: A Study Based on Gertrude 
Stein's Notebooks and Early Versions of Her Novel (1902-
1908)” PhD Thesis (Columbia University, 1963), 97–157; 
Michael J. Hoffman, The Development of Abstractionism in the 
Writings of Gertrude Stein (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1965), 162; John Malcolm Brinnin, 
“Introduction,” in Selected Operas and Plays of Gertude 
Stein, ed. John Malcolm Brinnin (Pittsburgh and London: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970), x. 
10 Marjorie Perloff, The Poetics of Indeterminacy: Rimbaud to 
Cage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 71. 
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of both Cubism and Stein, reconciling the two only in the 
hinterland of Jakobsian semiotics, with scant regard for the 
phenomenology of reading or viewing. Other milder but 
equally unpersuasive accounts reject the notion that Stein’s 
writing derived from Cubism in favor of the view that they 
were both exploring “questions of representation”—
undoubtedly true, but terminally nonspecific.11 
     Neither an ensemble of ideas or an ideology, nor a set 
of formal devices borrowed from cubism will suffice to 
establish a reliable context for Stein’s work. Moreover, 
these kinds of arguments fail to clearly distinguish between 
modernism and the avant-garde themselves. A more fruitful 
approach is to regard the avant-garde as “neither more nor 
less than a structural feature in the institutional 
configuration of modernism.”12 Viewed from this perspective, 
the problem of situating Stein comes into sharper relief. 
                     
11 See Jayne L. Walker, The Making of a Modernist: Gertrude 
Stein from Three Lives to Tender Buttons (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 129–30; Harriet 
Scott Chessman, The Public Is Invited to Dance: 
Representation, the Body, and Dialogue in Gertrude Stein 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 92. 
12 Lawrence Rainey, Institutions of Modernism: Literary 
Elites and Public Culture (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1998), 99. 
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Although some of her boldest works predated the annus 
mirabilis of modernism in 1922 by over a decade, Stein was 
already reaching towards a version of the idiom that 
modernist institutions would foster though an intricate 
network of artists, patrons, and publishers. It was only 
when those institutions gradually embraced Stein in the 
1920s that she connected with an appreciative readership, 
signaled by the long-awaited (by Stein herself) publication 
of The Making of Americans by Robert McAlmon’s Contact 
Editions. And her enmeshment in those institutions was, on 
the whole, brief. Modernist institutions and the 
personalities that drove them could be fickle. Stein 
published voluminously alongside the likes of Joyce in 
Eugene Jolas’s transition, itself something of an outlier as 
an English-language magazine produced in Paris. But the 1933 
publication of The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas prompted 
a furious rejoinder from the transition group, seemingly 
appalled by Stein’s claims to have been a fulcrum for the 
development of modern art in Paris. 
 Georges Braque, Eugene and Maria Jolas, Henry Matisse, 
André Salmon, and Tristan Tzara each summarized their 
recollections of Stein and life at 27 Rue de Fleurus in an 
effort to show, in Eugene Jolas’s words, that she “had no 
understanding of what really was happening around her, that 
the mutation of ideas beneath the surface of the more 
obvious contacts and clashes of personalities during that 
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period escaped her entirely.”13 How much bearing this should 
have on those arguments that align Stein’s work with cubist 
aesthetics is debatable. But ironically enough, the success 
of The Autobiography freed Stein from her reliance on these 
institutions. With excerpts of the The Autobiography 
appearing in The Atlantic Monthly, new work appearing in 
Vanity Fair, and an interview in the New York Times, Stein 
had finally achieved a measure of celebrity in her home 
country, which would be consolidated by her triumphal 
lecture tour in 1934-5.14 In a sense, then, Stein began 
pursuing her experimental writing in relative isolation, and 
had to wait for modernism to offer both a means of 
disseminating her work and a cultivated reading public who 
would be sympathetic to it. Thus Gertrude Stein’s position 
in the complex constellation of modernist literature can 
best be appreciated by attending to her interaction with the 
institutions that produced, marketed, and disseminated it. 
 
 
 
                     
13 Eugene Jolas et al., “Testimony against Gertrude Stein,” 
transition pamphlet no. 1 (1935): 2. 
14 Ulla E. Dydo and William Rice, Gertrude Stein: The 
Language That Rises 1923-1934 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 2003), 573, 95, 99. 
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I. William James, Gertrude Stein, and the Rhetoric of the 
Ordinary 
 
      In recent years, critics have begun to re-litigate 
both the question of Stein’s intellectual genealogy and her 
relationship to modernism and the avant-garde. These lines 
of argument converge in two places: on the status of habit 
in the discourse of the avant-garde, and the importance of 
William James as Stein’s early mentor. Lisi Schoenbach 
argues for a return to an ideological distinction between 
the modernists and the avant-garde in her recent Pragmatic 
Modernism. “The main difference between avant-gardism and 
pragmatic modernism lies in their treatments of the problem 
of habit.”15 While the avant-garde pursues shock and rupture 
as means of overcoming entrenched habits and thus effect 
social transformation, modernism takes a more circumspect 
view of habit, emphasizing the “reintegration or 
recontextualization of released energies back into the 
social fabric.”16 “Pragmatic” modernism thus articulates a 
more nuanced program for social change than the avant-garde, 
                     
15 Lisi Schoenbach, Pragmatic Modernism (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 6. 
16 Ibid., 7. 
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which even Peter Bürger’s sympathetic account acknowledges 
has failed.17 
      Schoenbach’s effort to reintroduce a distinction 
between modernism and the avant-garde has some presumably 
unintended effects: modernist advocates of the aesthetics of 
shock like the early Eliot and Pound find themselves set 
apart from modernism, while continental avant-gardists like 
the Surrealists, fascinated by the relationship between 
habit and the unconscious, arguably find themselves in the 
company of the modernists. One response to this kind of 
objection on Schoenbach’s behalf would be to point out that 
she only attempts to isolate one particular strain within 
modernism: “pragmatic modernism,” as opposed to modernism 
tout court. But this comes to look like a case of special 
pleading: the set of ideological grounds on which to divide 
up the modernist constellation is potentially infinite. 
Moreover, her definition of avant-garde is remarkably ad-
hoc; recounting the break between Stein and the transition 
group following publication of The Autobiography, Schoenbach 
positions transition on the side of the avant-garde and 
Stein on that of “pragmatic modernism.” Granted, one of the 
founders of Dada, Tristan Tzara, contributes to the 
“Testimony”; but the remaining contributors (the painters 
Braque and Matisse, the poet and critic André Salmon, Eugene 
                     
17 Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde, 94. 
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and Maria Jolas) hardly amount to a coherent grouping of 
avant-gardists. Rather, this assemblage points to the 
special position that transition occupied amongst the 
institutions of modernism, as a point of contact between 
these heterogeneous artists and movements. 
      Schoenbach’s central claim about Stein, however, is 
that her work ought to be read as continuous with 
pragmatism, the philosophical tradition of which her 
instructor at Radcliffe, William James, was a part.18 The 
connection between Stein and James is so frequently invoked 
by scholars as to have achieved the status of a consensus.19 
This is particularly evident in recent studies of Stein and 
the ordinary: Liesl Olson and Bryony Randall also cite James 
as a source of Stein’s fascination with habit and 
                     
18 Schoenbach, Pragmatic Modernism, 50. 
19 Steven Meyer, Irresistible Dictation: Gertrude Stein and 
the Correlations of Writing and Science (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001); Jonathan Levin, The Poetics of 
Transition: Emerson, Pragmatism, & American Literary 
Modernism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); Joan 
Richardson, A Natural History of Pragmatism: The Fact of 
Feeling from Jonathan Edwards to Gertrude Stein (Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Lisa 
Ruddick, Reading Gertrude Stein: Body, Text, Gnosis (Ithaca, 
NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
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repetition.20 What each of these accounts has in common is an 
attempt to make Stein’s experimentation more legible by 
connecting it with an intellectual genealogy. Thus 
Schoenbach and others draw attention to the network of 
pragmatist thinkers who passed through Harvard in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, and who left their mark on 
the intellectual climate there.21 Each of the three American 
modernists discussed in this thesis studied at Harvard: 
Gertrude Stein (at the Harvard Annex, 1893-1897), Wallace 
Stevens (1897-1900), and T. S. Eliot (1906-1909). James’s 
charisma as a teacher is well-attested22, but arguments of 
                     
20 Olson, Modernism and the Ordinary, 91; Randall, Modernism, 
Daily Time and Everyday Life, 94. Omri Moses gives the most 
comprehensive recent account of the variety of biological 
and philosophical approaches to habit available to Stein 
during her early career. Omri Moses, “Gertrude Stein's 
Lively Habits,” Twentieth Century Literature 55.4 (Winter 
2009): 445–84. 
21 For an account of this network through the intellectual 
biographies of William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, John 
Dewey, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, see Louis Menand, The 
Metaphyisical Club (London: Flamingo, 2001). 
22 In a much-remarked upon Radcliffe theme on the topic “Is 
life worth living?” Stein gushed, “Yes, a thousand times yes 
when the world still holds such spirits as Professor James.” 
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this nature tend to rely on the assumption that exposure to 
an idea at the outset of one’s intellectual life will exert 
an enduring influence, often irrespective of the 
possibilities of indifference or misinterpretation. In his 
early, influential treatment of The Making of Americans, 
Leon Katz claimed that during the writing of the novel, 
Stein “was in full flight from James and from pragmatism.”23 
Katz offers little in the way of argument to substantiate 
his point, and as a consequence, later critics have ignored 
his assertion. Only Lisa Ruddock reads the novel in a way 
consonant with Katz’s view, but her assertion that it 
represents an oedipal attack on James is only a negative 
affirmation of his influence.24 
      The consensus that Stein developed her interest in the 
ordinary under the influence of James and pragmatism is 
widespread, but I find it unsatisfactory for a variety of 
reasons. To show why, I will begin by assessing the evidence 
for James’s influence that Stein herself provides. In “The 
Gradual Making of The Making of Americans,” published in 
Lectures in America, Stein gives an oft-cited account of the 
                                                              
Rosalind S. Miller, Gertrude Stein: Form and Intelligibility, 
Containing the Radcliffe Themes (New York: Exposition Press, 
1949), 146. 
23 Katz, “The First Making of The Making of Americans,” 199. 
24 Ruddick, Reading Gertrude Stein, 5. 
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novel emphasizing its origins in her psychological studies 
with James:  
 
I became more interested in psychology, and one of the 
things I did was testing reactions of the average 
college student in a state of normal activity and in a 
state of fatigue induced by their examinations. I was 
supposed to be interested in their reactions but soon 
found... that I was enormously interested in the types 
of their characters that is what I even then thought of 
as the bottom nature of them.25  
 
Later in the lecture she writes: “When I was working with 
William James I completely learned one thing, that science 
is continuously busy with the complete description of 
something.”26 Neither of these statements offer much 
specificity about James’s philosophy or about Stein’s 
writing. As a result, some critics have taken the spirit of 
her remarks—that some decisive connection exists—as license 
to look for it elsewhere. In The Poetics of Transition, 
Jonathan Levin recounts Stein’s well-known status as a 
favored pupil of James’s at Radcliffe, and describes an 
                     
25 Gertrude Stein, Lectures in America (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1957), 137. 
26 Ibid., 156. 
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extended pragmatist tradition from Emerson to Stein and 
Stevens. But ultimately the strongest statement Levin offers 
about the possible influence of pragmatism on the way Stein 
writes is a generic nostrum of avant-garde poetics: “[Stein] 
follows William James in recognizing that words acquire 
meaning from the mind’s stock of associations, but she 
refuses to allow habitual patterns of association to obscure 
the multiple associative contexts of words.”27 Levin has in 
mind the following passage from James’s Principles of 
Psychology: 
 
If we look at an isolated printed word and repeat it 
long enough, it ends by assuming an entirely unnatural 
aspect. Let the reader try this with any word on this 
page. He will soon begin to wonder if it can possibly 
be the word he has been using all his life with that 
meaning... It is reduced, by this new way of attending 
to it, to its sensational nudity. We never before 
attended to it in this way, but habitually got it clad 
with its meaning the moment we caught sight of it... We 
apprehended it, in short, with a cloud of associates, 
                     
27 Levin, The Poetics of Transition, 152. 
84 
 
and thus perceiving it, we felt it quite otherwise than 
as we feel it now divested and alone.28 
 
But as much as it suggests avant-garde strategies of radical 
decontextualization, James’s thought experiment does not 
describe Stein’s writing particularly well at all, a fact 
that she herself eventually acknowledges:  
 
I took individual words and thought about them until I 
got their weight and volume complete and put them next 
to another word, and at this same time I found out very 
soon that there is no such thing as putting them 
together without sense. It is impossible to put them 
together without sense.29 
 
In other words, no amount of fixation on individual words 
will entirely arrest the combinatory axis of language. If 
James’s influence is to be a necessary condition for Stein’s 
                     
28 William James, The Principles of Psychology, ed. Frederick 
H. Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis, vol. 
1, The Works of William James (Cambridge, MA, and London: 
Harvard University Press, 1981), 726–7. Cf. Levin, The 
Poetics of Transition, 18. 
29 Gertrude Stein, A Primer for the Gradual Understanding of 
Gertrude Stein (Los Angeles: Black Sparrow Press, 1973), 18. 
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literary experimentation, that influence must come from 
elsewhere than James’s thoughts on language. 
      Stein had read William James’s Principles of 
Psychology as a freshman, before joining his advanced 
seminar on “Consciousness, Knowledge, the Ego, the Relation 
of Mind and Body, etc.” as a junior.30 Liesl Olsen goes so 
far as to claim that habit is the “linchpin for the 
philosophical way of thinking that James called ‘radical 
empiricism’ and, later, pragmatism.”31 Principles of 
Psychology certainly evinces a thoroughgoing interest in 
habit, in the ways that it can be inculcated and the ways 
that it can be disrupted. James’s vision of habit 
encompasses its workings at each level of existence, from 
the individual to the social. He arrives at a vision of 
habit as “the enormous fly-wheel of society,” in other 
words, a repository that will absorb excesses and remedy 
deficiencies in both individual and social economies of 
energy.32 
      James’s early psychology proceeds from the conviction 
that psychological phenomena have their basis in the organic 
makeup of the brain. James quotes from the French 
                     
30 Levin, The Poetics of Transition, 150. 
31 Olson, Modernism and the Ordinary, 91. 
32 James, The Principles of Psychology, 125. 
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psychologist Léon Dumont, who published an essay on habit 
(“De l’habitude”) in the 1876 Revue Philosophique: 
 
Water, in flowing, hollows out for itself a channel, 
which grows broader and deeper; and, after having 
ceased to flow, it resumes, when it flows again, the 
path traced by itself before. Just so the impressions 
of outer objects fashion for themselves in the nervous 
system more and more appropriate paths, and these vital 
phenomena recur under similar excitements from without, 
when they have been interrupted a certain time.33 
 
Dumont describes habit as a path of least resistance through 
the material of the nervous system. Habit, inculcated by the 
repetition of any particular act or movement, provides the 
foundation of a mature personality by inscribing itself on 
the nervous system: “In most of us, by the age of thirty, 
the character has set like plaster.”34 To the limited extent 
that a coherent account of habit can be extracted from 
Stein’s work—and there are good reasons to suspect that it 
cannot—it differs markedly from James’s. His chipper 
                     
33 Léon Dumont, “De L'habitude,” Revue philosophique de la 
France et de l'étranger 1 (1876). Cf. James, The Principles 
of Psychology, 111. 
34 James, The Principles of Psychology, 126. 
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Victorian ethos of self-improvement is nowhere to be found 
in Stein; if habit is revelatory of one’s bottom nature, 
one’s bottom nature also determines one’s habits: “It is 
hard living down the tempers we are born with” (MoA, 3). 
      That said, James also conceives of habit as a vessel 
for individual choice; the kinds of habits we cultivate will 
determine the sorts of people we become. As Olson notes, 
“James associates habits with character-building behavior.”35 
In a shift of metaphors particularly evocative of the gilded 
age, James counsels his readers to approach their habits as 
an investment: “The great thing, then, in all education, is 
to make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy. It 
is to fund and capitalize our acquisitions, and live at ease 
upon the interest of the fund.”36  
      It is worth considering how the nature of Stein’s 
references to James develops throughout her oeuvre. 
Following the success of The Autobiography of Alice B. 
Toklas, Stein embraced her American lecture tour as an 
opportunity to defend her work against the charge of mere 
incoherence, in part by using her celebrity as an alibi.37 
                     
35 Olson, Modernism and the Ordinary, 93. 
36 James, The Principles of Psychology, 126. 
37 See Liesl Olson, “‘An Invincible Force Meets an Immovable 
Object’: Gertrude Stein Comes to Chicago,” 
Modernism/modernity 17.2 (April 2010): 331–61. 
88 
 
Hence, speaking of the American public: “It is the things 
they do not understand that attract them the most.”38 As 
such, her invocations of William James need to be read as, 
amongst other things, rhetorical arguments from authority. 
As we have seen, the two references to James in Lectures in 
America are notable mainly for their vagueness on the actual 
content of his philosophy. In addition to the passage 
already quoted concerning the object of science, in 
“Portraits and Repetition” Stein invokes “what William James 
calls the Will to Live.”39 The same resonant phrase recurs in 
Everybody’s Autobiography and, most evocatively, in Wars I 
Have Seen: 
 
William James was of the strongest [sic] scientific 
influences that I had and he said he always said there 
is the will to live without the will to live there is 
destruction, but there is also the will to destroy, and 
the two like everything are in opposition, like... 
wanting eternity and wanting a beginning and middle and 
ending.40 
                     
38 Alice B. Toklas, What Is Remembered (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1963), 145. 
39 Stein, Lectures in America, 169. 
40 “There was evolution and James’ the Will to Live and I I 
had always been afraid always would be afraid but after all 
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Stein never specifies the source of this “will to live” in 
James’s work, but it is likely that the phrase distills her 
recollection of James’s essay “Is Life Worth Living?,” 
delivered as an address before the Young Men’s Christian 
Association of Harvard and collected in The Will to Believe 
(1897).41  
      Stein’s biographers have frequently drawn attention to 
the Radcliffe theme entitled “Is Life Worth Living?,” quoted 
above.42 Having established Stein’s likely source for the 
                                                              
was that what it was to be not refusing to be dead although 
after all every one was refusing to be dead.” Gertrude Stein, 
Everybody's Autobiography (Cambridge, MA: Exact Change, 
1993), 242; Gertrude Stein, Wars I Have Seen (London: 
Brilliance Books, 1984), 63–4.  
41 William James, The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy, ed. Frederick H. Burkhardt, Fredson 
Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis, The Works of William James 
(Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1979), 
34–56. 
42  The Harvard edition of James’s essays corrects an 
erroneous footnote in the original publication, which had 
given the date of the address as May 1895. In fact, it took 
place on April 25, 1895, the same date given on Stein’s 
theme of the same title. Stein’s probable presence at the 
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phrase “will to live,” it is worth asking how adequately it 
represents James’s argument, particularly as the phrase in 
question doesn’t occur at all in the essay; as Meyer notes, 
“the will to believe” is about as close to “the will to 
live” as James comes.43 “Is Life Worth Living?” does indeed 
answer its own question in the affirmative by rehearsing the 
limitations of a strictly materialistic understanding of 
life. James’s sense of science’s inadequacy before the 
ultimate questions of ethics and metaphysics is briskly 
summarized in the passage from Everybody’s Autobiography, 
Stein’s most detailed invocation of James: “He said science 
is not a solution and not a problem it is a statement of the 
observation of things observed.”44 If James’s lecture did 
indeed imbue Stein with a sense of the limitations of the 
scientific world-view, it did nothing to prevent Stein from 
pursuing scientific studies at Johns Hopkins after leaving 
Radcliffe, or from putting that world-view at the center of 
The Making of Americans. Indeed, one of the ways the novel 
cripples itself qua narrative is by “pursuing the ideal 
                                                              
lecture is noted by Stephen Meyer. Meyer, Irresistible 
Dictation, 212. Cf. James, The Will to Believe, 321; Miller, 
Gertrude Stein, 146; Brenda Wineapple, Sister Brother: 
Gertrude and Leo Stein (New York: Putnam, 1996), 67–8. 
43 Meyer, Irresistible Dictation, 213. 
44 Stein, Everybody's Autobiography, 250. 
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order of classical science, a conceptual grid that would 
impose coherence on the vast field of human behavior.”45 Far 
from the testimony of a writer disabused of totalizing 
systems from the start, the meta-narrative of The Making of 
Americans is precisely the narrator’s slow, agonized 
abandonment of that ambition. The issue of James’s influence 
on the early Stein thus raises more questions than it 
answers. Only by flattening out a great deal of complexity 
and equivocation in Stein’s development can James’s 
pragmatism be made to account for much in her early work. 
      The most famous and frequently cited anecdote 
concerning Stein and James occurs in The Autobiography of 
Alice B. Toklas, when the narrator is reflecting on Stein’s 
time at Radcliffe: 
 
There was an examination in William James’ course. She 
sat down with the examination paper before her and she 
just could not. Dear Professor James, she wrote at the 
top of the paper. I am so sorry but really I do not 
feel a bit like an examination paper in philosophy 
today, and left. 
The next day she had a postal card from William 
James saying, Dear Miss Stein, I understand perfectly 
how you feel I often feel like that myself. And 
                     
45 Walker, The Making of a Modernist, 70. 
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underneath it he gave her work the highest mark in his 
course.46 
 
This passage is an especially good example of the breezy 
tone that predominates in The Autobiography, a tone that 
succeeds in mollifying the reader’s reaction to the book’s 
frequent egotism. Here, Stein refigures her student/teacher 
relationship with James as a meeting of equals, two geniuses 
united in mutual recognition and bold unconventionality. A 
generous interpretation might treat the story as an allegory 
for one of William James’s distinctive contributions to 
philosophy: his emphasis on the epistemological importance 
of mood.47 But I think the more telling indicator of its 
function is the claim at the end, that James awarded Stein 
                     
46 Gertrude Stein, The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas 
(London and New York: Penguin, 2001), 88. 
47 In the chapter on “Will” from Principles of Psychology, 
James notes that as we pass between “easy and careless” and 
“sober and strenuous” moods, “The whole scale of values of 
our motives and impulses then undergoes a change like that 
which a change of the observer’s level produces on a view.” 
William James, The Principles of Psychology, ed. Frederick H. 
Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, and Ignas K. Skrupskelis, vol. 2, 
The Works of William James (Cambridge and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1981), 1140. 
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the “highest mark in his course.” But her academic 
performance in James’s Philosophy 20b was mixed: an A and a 
C, as opposed to the sterling record that Stein implies.48 
Why should this particular embellishment matter in the 
context of a work defined by its winsome embellishments? In 
part because of the aptness of critics and biographers to 
take Stein at her word.49 In this way, James’s formative 
influence over Stein has become a rarely questioned part of 
her biographical mythos, despite its shaky foundations.50 
                     
48 Richard Bridgman, Gertrude Stein in Pieces (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 21, 357. 
49 In a recent article on Stein’s American tour, during which 
she visited Mortimer Adler’s “Great Books” class at the 
University of Chicago, Liesl Olson quotes from the anecdote 
to demonstrate Stein’s aversion to traditional pedagogical 
methods. Better evidence for the same argument might have 
been found in the sharp discrepancy between Stein’s 
classroom-based courses and her laboratory work at Johns 
Hopkins. Olson, “‘An Invincible Force Meets an Immovable 
Object,’” 358–9; Bridgman, Gertrude Stein in Pieces, 358–9. 
50 The pattern of giving credence to Stein’s claim was set 
early, particularly in Brinnin’s biography. That said, in a 
long appendix discussing Stein and James, Hoffman concedes 
that the most that can be concluded from their association 
is a “potentially open frame of mind” with which Stein might 
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From the outset of her writing career, Stein drew 
extensively on her own experiences to inform her work. The 
Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas in 1932 announces a 
“radical change in matter and manner,” introducing the style 
of memoir she would employ again in Everybody’s 
Autobiography and Wars I Have Seen.51 These two works also 
feature prominent references to William James. In treating 
these references as an index of James’s enduring influence 
over Stein, critics have elided their rhetorical dimension.  
 
 
II. The Making of Americans and “loving repeating.” 
 
    The Making of Americans (published 1925, written 1902-
1911) represents one of Gertrude Stein’s first concerted 
                                                              
have received James’s ideas. Janet Malcolm offers a welcome 
reprieve by quoting the passage only to demonstrate the 
illusory ease of the life Stein constructs in The 
Autobiography. John Malcolm Brinnin, The Third Rose: 
Gertrude Stein and Her World, Radcliffe Biography Series 
(Reading, MA: Merloyd Lawrence, 1987), 34; Hoffman, The 
Development of Abstractionism, 208–9; Janet Malcolm, Two 
Lives: Gertrude and Alice (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2007), 14. 
51 Dydo and Rice, Gertrude Stein, 535. 
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attempts at writing prose. Even Q.E.D. and Three Lives, as 
well as many of the portraits and other incidental pieces 
Stein wrote before 1912, were effectively digressions in the 
long process of composing the novel. Stein’s choice of form 
itself indicates an orientation towards the ordinary, with 
which novels have long been held to have an inherent 
affinity.52 But despite the novel’s fixation on ordinary 
places, events, and people, it conspicuously abandons the 
conventions of realism. This is the novel’s animating 
aesthetic question: how to represent the ordinary beyond the 
frontiers of realist narration? In its beginning, the novel 
is explicit about its ambition to show the genealogical arc 
of the Dehnings and the Herslands, the former a family of 
“lower middle class Jews, artisans and tradesmen from 
Germany, settled in Baltimore” (Bridgeport), though they 
soon move west to “Gossols” (Oakland).53 There, the Dehnings 
come into contact with a western family, the Herslands, 
leading to the climactic marriage of Julia Dehning to Alfred 
Hersland, then the early death of the younger David Hersland 
(who shares a name with his father, the subject of memorable 
passages in the novel’s opening), which prompts the short 
                     
52 See Ruth Bernard Yeazell, Art of the Everyday: Dutch 
Painting and the Realist Novel (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2009). 
53 Katz, “The First Making of The Making of Americans,” 161. 
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meditation on mortality that closes the novel.54 Genealogical 
plotting remains a sort of narrative spine throughout the 
novel.55 But most readers’ experiences of it will inevitably 
be conditioned more by the forces that impede the narrative 
than by the narrative itself: its digressiveness, its high 
degree of lexical and syntactic repetition, and the 
increasingly insistent intrusions of a metadiscursive voice 
reflecting on the process of writing. 
                     
54 Both Leon Katz and Richard Bridgman have undertaken the 
invaluable task of disentangling the novel’s fabula from its 
notoriously tangled szujet, its narrative chronology 
confused by constant digression and what Stein would later 
call “always and always beginning again.” Stein, Lectures in 
America, 148. 
55 Stein’s notebooks reveal a fairly comprehensive synopsis 
of the plot, which only partially informs the completed 
novel. Katz comments that “it becomes possible to follow the 
novel if one keeps in mind the story which lies at its base, 
and if one watches for those moments, more and more rare as 
the novel proceeds, when the realistic story emerges to the 
surface of the text.” Needless to say, it is a strange novel 
whose plot can only be followed with the aid of the author’s 
private notes. Katz, “The First Making of The Making of 
Americans,” 195. 
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      These features have led some critics to cite The 
Making of Americans as a prototypical postmodern text, 
characterized by epistemological indeterminacy and 
skepticism toward the unified human subject posited by much 
of the western philosophical tradition.56 Tanya Clement has 
used detailed textual analysis to rebut these readings of 
the novel, while arguing that it should be approached as a 
“modernist project using mimesis.”57 Unfortunately, Clement 
doesn’t specify which of the many senses of “mimesis” she 
intends here. It is clear, though, that the term stands in 
opposition to “postmodern indeterminacy”; in other words, 
the view that the novel’s insistent repetitions and tangled 
syntax express an epistemological uncertainty about the 
relation between the means of representation and the 
fictional world represented. Recalling Monica Fludernik’s 
                     
56 Cf. Berry, Curved Thought and Textual Wandering; Priscilla 
Wald, Constituting Americans: Cultural Anxiety and Narrative 
Form (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1995); 
Melanie Taylor, “A Poetics of Difference: The Making of 
Americans and Unreadable Subjects,” NWSA Journal 15.3 (Fall 
2003): 26–42. 
57 Tanya Clement, “The Story of one: Narrative and 
Composition in Gertrude Stein's The Making of Americans,” 
Texas Studies in Language and Literature 54.3 (Fall 2012): 
445. 
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definition of mimesis as “the artificial and illusionary 
projection of a semiotic structure which the reader 
recuperates in terms of a fictional reality,” we can see 
that Clement is asserting the continuity of a “fictional 
reality,” against the suggestion that it dissipates as the 
novel wears on.58 But both Clement and the postmodern critics 
she diverges from might be reliant on a false dichotomy. I 
want to approach the novel not in terms of recent skepticism 
towards the claims of mimesis, but rather in terms of a 
debate more fundamental to western aesthetics over the 
relationship between mimesis and diegesis. 
      This debate has vital implications for literary 
representations of the ordinary. In order to see how, we 
need to revisit the dispute between Aristotle and Plato over 
the status of what both refer to as diegesis, or, “simple 
narrative”; in Plato’s words, whatever the poet speaks “in 
his own person,” without attempting “to persuade us that the 
speaker is anyone but himself.”59 For Plato, diegesis 
                     
58 Monika Fludernik, Towards a “Natural” Narratology (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1996), 65. 
59 Plato, Republic, ed. and trans. by Chris Emlyn-Jones and 
William Preddy, Vol. I (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard 
University Press, 2013), 249. Cf. Gérard Genette, Figures of 
Literary Discourse, trans. Alan Sheridan (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1982), 128. 
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represents the least “imitative” form of literary language, 
and therefore the most acceptable. For Aristotle, on the 
other hand, who reverses Plato’s condemnation of mimesis, 
diegesis is a “weakened, attenuated mode of literary 
representation.”60 Thus while Plato would invite “into the 
City only some ideal poet whose austere diction would be as 
little mimetic as possible,” Aristotle “praises in Homer 
whatever brings his writing closer to dramatic diction,” in 
other words, pure mimesis.61 While neither aesthetic system 
could be said to obtain unmediated in Western culture, it 
seems clear that since the Renaissance, a broadly 
Aristotelian orientation has prevailed, while a Platonic 
distrust of representation lingers as a potent, but 
subliminal, alternative. According to Genette, this debate 
is mirrored in the further distinction within diegesis 
itself, between narration, the representation of actions and 
                     
60 Genette, Figures of Literary Discourse, 130. 
61 Ibid.; Cf. Wayne Booth, who suggests that this kind of 
Aristotelian injunction extends to authorial commentary of 
the type that Stein indulges in. The passage from Aristotle 
is: “The poet should say as little as possible in his own 
voice, as it is not this that makes him a mimetic artist.” 
Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, 2nd ed. (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 92; 
Aristotle, The Poetics, 123. 
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events, and description, the representation of objects and 
characters.62 
      Thus we ought to think of the novel as a form in terms 
of an axis of description and an axis of plot.63 The realist 
novel, the archetypal form of narrative in Western 
literature since the eighteenth century, depends for its 
effects on the author’s sophisticated manipulation of these 
two axes and their interaction. In the wake of the realist 
tradition and its successors, critics have introduced 
further distinctions within the category of description. As 
Fludernik argues, the realist novel deploys two kinds of 
illusion in particular: “the effet de réel on the one hand 
and the instantiation of psychological verisimilitude on the 
other.”64 Barthes’s effet de réel, or reality effect, is 
particularly notable in light of the everyday, since it 
names realist narration’s tendency to dwell on insignificant 
details—for instance, material aspects of the story’s 
setting—in order to heighten the story’s imaginative 
                     
62 Genette, Figures of Literary Discourse, 133. 
63 Genette also acknowledges that, since in practice 
description and narrative are deeply entwined, this kind of 
ideal schema is just that, ideal only: “Even a verb can be 
more or less descriptive, in the precision that it gives to 
the spectacle of the action.” Ibid., 134. 
64 Fludernik, Towards a “Natural” Narratology, 35, 38. 
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credibility.65 The second aspect, psychological interiority, 
reminds us of realism’s enduring concern with “an ordinary 
mind on an ordinary day.”66 Both, however, exist in permanent 
tension with the basically Aristotelian orientation of the 
realist novel towards a single, overarching plot.67 
Description and psychological interiority may contribute to 
the development of the plot, but they also necessarily 
suspend its progress, however momentarily.  
                     
65 “Descriptions of dresses, furniture, housefronts, and so 
on project an illusion of referentiality. These, besides 
their specific social significance, also signal real-life 
verisimilitude, calling to mind the abundance of objects 
surrounding us in everyday life and thereby supporting the 
effect of well-observed faithful representation of the world 
that the text attempts to achieve.” Ibid., 38. Cf. Roland 
Barthes, “The Reality Effect,” in The Rustle of Language, ed. 
François Wahl (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
66 Virginia Woolf, Selected Essays, ed. David Bradshaw 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 9. 
67 “The well-made plot, then, ought to be single.” Moreover, 
“Plot, then, is the first principle and, as it were, soul of 
tragedy, while character is secondary... Tragedy is mimesis 
of action, and it is chiefly for the sake of the action that 
it represents the agents.” Aristotle, The Poetics, 49, 69. 
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      The realist novel, then, requires the author to 
orchestrate the relationship between these two axes in such 
a way as to generate verisimilitude while developing the 
plot in such a way as to impart those descriptions with 
significance. The Making of Americans thwarts these 
narrative conventions, and it should be clear that it does 
so systematically enough not to by considered evidence of 
Stein’s incompetence as a novelist, but rather of the 
determinedly anti-Aristotelian aesthetic of the novel. If 
Aristotle, in this sense the father of realism, calls for 
unmediated mimesis, The Making of Americans ultimately 
offers only diegesis. The narrative spine offered by its 
genealogical plot is warped by constant digression. 
Successive characterological schemas are devised, tested on 
relatively minor characters, then abandoned, before the 
narrative turns back to assay the main characters again.68 
                     
68 For instance, the story of the Shillings that occupies 
pages 77-85. As Bridgman notes, the narrator begins by 
asserting that there are “millions” like the Shillings, 
making them an exemplary social type. Like, that is except 
for the “queerness” “that makes them different.” Just as 
soon as this qualification is introduced, however, the 
narrator concedes that “perhaps there was nothing... really 
queer inside them.” These reversals and qualifications 
typify the novel’s style, and make it nearly impossible to 
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Most critics straightforwardly identify the narrator with 
Stein, who uses long meta-discursive passages to detail the 
narrator’s struggle to tell the story, occasionally veering 
into her philosophical preoccupations, and, as the novel 
progresses, sometimes expressing her despair at being unable 
to complete the work to her satisfaction. In terms of the 
fundamental distinction between story and discourse, a 
heuristic tool that owes much to the aesthetic debates that 
I have canvassed already, The Making of Americans represents 
the overwhelming of story by a discourse that becomes 
increasingly self-referential as the novel develops. 
      Stein’s attack on the realist tradition thus plays out 
in terms of each of the distinctions described above. 
Diegesis dominates over mimesis, discourse over story, and 
description over narrative. The result is a singular style, 
which I now take up in detail, using an example from the 
novel’s description of David Hersland: 
 
In the street in his walking, and it was then his 
children were a little ashamed of him, he always had 
his hat back on his head so that it always looked as if 
it were falling, and he would march on, he was a big 
                                                              
extract from many such dense passages of character analysis 
anything resembling plot. Bridgman, Gertrude Stein in Pieces, 
70. 
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man and loved walking, with two or three of his 
children following behind him or with one beside him, 
and he always forgetting all about them, and everybody 
would stop short to look at him, accustomed as they 
were to see him, for he had a way of tossing his head 
to get freedom and a way of muttering to himself in his 
thinking and he had always a movement of throwing his 
body and shoulders from side to side as he was arguing 
to himself about things he wanted to be changing, and 
always he had the important feeling to himself inside 
him. (MoA, 49–50) 
 
Throughout passages of this kind, marked by her 
idiosyncratic syntax, Stein muddles the distinction between 
story time and narrative time. Whereas Stein herself 
described the novel as a thousand pages of continuous 
present, in fact the novel treats tense much more 
complicatedly.69 The David Hersland passage doesn’t contain a 
single example of the continuous present (otherwise known as 
the present progressive). Instead, its dominant tense is the 
                     
69 Gertrude Stein, “Composition as Explanation,” in 
Modernism: An Anthology, ed. Lawrence Rainey (Malden, MA and 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 409. Cf. Barrett Watten, “An Epic 
of Subjectivation: The Making of Americans,” 
Modernism/modernity 5.2 (April 1998): 95. 
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simple past, as in such constructions as: “he always had his 
hat back on his head so that it always looked as if it were 
falling.” The novel respects the frequent alignment of 
heterodiagetic narrators with retrospective (as opposed to 
concurrent) narration. But two aspects of Stein’s style 
stresses the retrospectiveness of the narration to the point 
of denaturing it. First, the adverb “always” appears five 
times, usually modifying verbs in the simple past, as in: 
“he always had his hat back on his head so that it always 
looked as if it were falling, and he would march on” (MoA,  
49–50). However, the final clause adds a note of ambiguity 
by introducing the modal auxiliary “would”: “and he would 
march on.” This particular use of “would” indicates 
propensity, as in “Whenever he heard her coming he would 
quickly put out his pipe.”70 Frequency adjuncts and modal 
auxiliaries are both common ways of indicating habitual 
actions; indeed, they are frequently used together: “he 
would always walk...” But Stein’s style is characterized by 
an oscillation between these and other grammatical 
permutations with the same end, as if unable to settle on a 
single one.  
                     
70 Rodney Huddleson and Geoffrey K. Pullum, The Cambridge 
Grammar of the English Language (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 197. 
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      A related peculiarity of Stein’s style is its fixation 
on gerunds, as in “In the street in his walking...” In his 
introduction to The Yale Gertrude Stein, Richard 
Konstelanetz notes that “Especially in The Making of 
Americans... Stein inserts extra gerunds into otherwise 
normal clauses.”71 In the case cited above, a number of more 
natural alternatives suggest themselves, such as “In the 
street as he was walking,” or “In the street, as he walked” 
(MoA, 49–50). Both alternative formulations preserve the 
sense of ongoingness or habituality that the passage seeks 
to express, but do so in a more “natural” style.72 Indeed, it 
isn’t a question of which of the several tenses and modes in 
English expressing habituality that the novel uses, but 
rather, maintaining consistent sentences. Instead, the novel 
constantly subverts this expectation, and in doing so 
institutes on a syntactical level the excess manifest on a 
                     
71 Gertrude Stein, The Yale Gertrude Stein (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1980), xiv. 
72 “Natural” in the specific sense described by Monika 
Fludernik, meaning “aspects of language which appear to be 
regulated by or motivated by cognitive parameters based on 
man’s experience of embodiedness in a real-world context.” 
It is these cognitive parameters against which Stein mounted 
a career-long polemic. Fludernik, Towards a “Natural” 
Narratology, 17. 
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macro-level in the novel’s sheer bulk. The first of my 
rewritings above highlights the peculiarity of Stein’s 
syntactical choice by using the participle form of the verb 
“to walk,” “walking.” In this version, “walking” remains a 
verb, while in Stein’s version, the syntax transforms the 
verb into a noun: “in his walking,” paraphrasable as “in his 
manner of walking.” But the gerund is, clearly, identical 
with the participle form of the verb. Whereas the verb 
expresses activity, the noun expresses stasis. But I would 
contend that the identity between these two forms creates a 
deliberate ambiguity in the reader’s mind: Richard Bridgman 
goes so far as to declare gerunds “the basic components of 
the abstract style of The Making of Americans.”73 Indeed, the 
hybrid participle/gerund exemplifies a paradox that animates 
the whole of The Making of Americans: the simultaneity of 
movement and stasis, change and consistency, in a version of 
the ordinary characterized by habit. 
      These kinds of sentences also embody the novel’s 
ambitions to arrive at a universal description of character: 
“I knew while I was writing The Making of Americans it was 
possible to describe every kind there is of men and women.”74 
While the novel tends to hold out a description of “every 
kind there is” as a pious aspiration rather than an 
                     
73 Bridgman, Gertrude Stein in Pieces, 97. 
74 Stein, Lectures in America, 150. 
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achievable project, its relentless drive toward generality 
renders those descriptions practically inassimilable. The 
example of David Hersland’s “walking” disappears amidst a 
morass of other activities (also rendered as gerunds) that 
we engage in: 
 
As one sees everyone in their living, in their loving, 
sitting, eating, drinking, sleeping, walking, working, 
thinking, laughing, as any one sees all of them from 
their beginning to their ending... sometime all of them 
will have the last touch of being, a history of them 
can give to them, sometime then there will be a history 
of each one, of all the kinds of them, of all the ways 
any one can know them. (MoA, 179–80) 
 
A list of this kind could be extended enormously, as Stein 
herself acknowledges: “As often as I thought and had every 
reason to be certain that I had included everything in my 
knowledge of any one something else would turn up that had 
to be included.”75 With no principle of inclusion or 
exclusion at work, description becomes aimless and 
overwhelming. Genette holds that, in the context of 
narrative, psychological description serves the secondary 
                     
75 Ibid., 143–44. 
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purpose of justifying characters’ actions.76 In The Making of 
Americans, these values are reversed, and actions only seem 
to take place so as to offer specimens for the character 
type under consideration. 
     Stein seems untroubled by her contradictory rhetoric: 
acknowledging that her universal characterology is 
unobtainable, she nonetheless repeats, like an incantation, 
“sometime then there will be a history of everyone...” (MoA, 
180). The fact that the novel sets up aesthetic goals that 
it cannot fulfill is only an index of its modernist 
ambition. The novel’s self-consciousness goes further, in 
fact, and at times draws attention to the consequences of 
inverting plot and character, as in a striking passage that 
Stein draws attention to in Lectures in America, quoted here 
from the novel: 
 
The little son wanted to make a collection of 
butterflies and beetles and it was all exciting to him 
and it was all arranged then and then the father said 
to the son you are certain this is not a cruel thing 
that you are wanting to be doing, killing things to 
make collections of them... at last the boy was 
convinced it was a cruel thing and he said he would not 
do it. (MoA, 489) 
                     
76 Genette, Figures of Literary Discourse, 135. 
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The next morning the father sees a moth, which he kills and 
pins to show to his son, who is confused by the 
contradiction in his father’s behavior: “The boy was all 
mixed up inside him and then he said he would go on with his 
collecting and that was all there was then of discussing” 
(MoA, 490). This anecdote serves as a figure for the novel’s 
own conflicted approach to its characters. In its zeal to 
construct various ways of classifying its characters, it has 
indeed turned them into specimens, “pinned and wriggling on 
the wall.” But however alert to the pitfalls of this 
approach, the drive to accrete more and more is 
irresistible. 
      The sense of anxiety that underlies this allegory of 
writing represents a small departure in tone for the novel, 
reminding the reader of what it so often lacks: 
psychological depth. The Making of Americans insists on its 
intention to excavate the inner being of her characters, and 
yet it eschews virtually all of the tools of the 
conventional novel for imparting psychological interiority. 
The novel focuses heavily on external manifestations of 
character, and when it turns to articulating personality 
traits, it leans heavily on abstract nouns: “Mr. David 
Hersland had in him a feeling of being as big as all the 
world around him, he had in him a strong feeling of 
beginning, of fighting, of brushing people away from him” 
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(MoA, 157). This passage bears all the hallmarks of the 
style described earlier, in particular the blending of 
gerunds with present participles. Action, the motor of plot, 
stands in an etiolated relationship with character, 
including on the level of syntax. David Hersland does not 
“brush people away from him,” either habitually or in a 
specific instance: he merely “has in him a strong feeling” 
of doing so. 
      It is difficult, then, to see how Stein’s sense of 
character and habit could usefully be said to develop from 
the philosophy of William James, whose emphasis on habit as 
an active tool of self-fashioning is belied by the very 
syntax of The Making of Americans. Whereas in James, 
character can be built by conscious manipulation of habit, 
in Stein the ultimate sources of one’s “bottom nature” 
remain obscure: “As I was saying often for many years some 
one is baffling; the repeated seeing, hearing, feeling of 
the being in them does not make clear the nature of the 
bottom being in them” (MoA, 351). At times in the novel 
Stein resorts to a rhetoric of depth: the view that, in 
Charles Taylor’s words, “We are creatures with inner depths; 
with partly unexplored and dark interiors.”77 The attempt to 
                     
77 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern 
Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 
111. 
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master those dark interiors leads Stein to adopt the series 
of psychological schemes that occupy the novel from its 
second section on: the exhaustively elaborated categories of 
the “dependent independent” and the “dependent independent,” 
or “attacking” and “resisting” natures, or some combination 
of the above as in “the dependent independent resisting 
murkily engulfing kind...” (MoA, 165, 551, 605). As Richard 
Bridgman observes, “Such a list can only come to an 
arbitrary end.”78 The uselessness of these schemas frequently 
accounts for the expressions of despair and self-doubt that 
crop up in the novel’s metadiscursive passages: “Sometimes I 
lose it, sometimes I doubt it, it is too clear or too vague 
or too confused inside me” (MoA, 308). By declining all of 
the narrative and stylistic strategies offered by the 
realist tradition for exploring interiority, the novel 
short-circuits its own ambitions. 
      The example of The Making of Americans clarifies the 
affinity between realist narration and the ordinary. Through 
realism, the vast accretions of detail in which the ordinary 
consists are ordered and imbued with significance by the 
unfolding plot. Even when they are insignificant, that is, 
they exercise no determinative influence over the causal 
development of that plot, they remain significant in their 
                     
78 Bridgman, Gertrude Stein in Pieces, 76. 
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insignificance—Barthes’s “reality effect.”79 But rather than 
give an account of the novel wholly grounded in its negative 
relation to the realist tradition, I want to conclude by 
drawing attention briefly to the positive aspects of a novel 
which, after all, has been described (subject to 
qualifications) as “the birth scene of modern 
experimentalism.”80  
      The main development that Stein can be said to have 
made in the representation of the ordinary is the 
unprecedented predominance of lexical and syntactic 
repetition at the level of diegesis. While repetition 
remains pronounced throughout the novel, Tanya Clement 
identifies a shift from long passages repeated less 
frequently in the first half of the novel to short passages 
repeated more frequently in the second.81 This accounts for 
the sense that as the novel progresses, the plot 
disintegrates; repetition at the level of discourse impedes 
the reader’s ability to filter and arrange the novel’s 
                     
79 “Flaubert’s barometer, Michelet’s little door finally say 
nothing but this: we are the real; it is the category of 
‘the real’ (and not its contingent contents) which is then 
signified.” Barthes, “The Reality Effect,” 148. 
80 Lawrence Rainey, “Review of the Making of Americans, by 
Gertrude Stein,” Modernism/modernity 4.2 (April 1997): 223. 
81 Clement, “The Story of One,” 438. 
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content into a comprehensible sequence. Far from adding 
emphasis or correcting misapprehensions, as repetition tends 
to do in life, literary repetition can have an obfuscatory 
effect. On the other hand, as Peter Brooks and others have 
noted, repetition also effectively constitutes literature:  
 
Narrative, we have seen, must ever present itself as a 
repetition of events that have already happened, and 
within this postulate of a generalized repetition it 
must make use of specific, perceptible repetitions in 
order to create plot, that is, to show us a significant 
interconnection of events.82 
 
As Derek Attridge puts it, “Meaning itself is grounded in 
repetition; the never-before-experienced, the wholly other, 
is meaningless, not even available to perception.”83 
      Stein, it seems, would agree. Her love of repetition 
is attested to in explicit terms in The Making of Americans: 
“Loving repeating in me makes of me then one understanding 
                     
82 Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention 
in Narrative (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University 
Press, 1984), 99. 
83 Derek Attridge, "Meaning in Movement: Phrasing and 
Repetition," in Moving Words: Forms of English Poetry 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 34. 
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being in men and women” (MoA, 710). But Stein is also alive 
to repetition’s paradoxes. As Brooks puts it: 
 
Is repetition sameness or difference? To repeat 
evidently implies resemblance, yet can we speak of 
resemblance unless there is difference? Without 
difference, repetition would be identity, which would 
not usually appear to be the case.84 
 
Stein’s opinion on this matter is emphatic: “I am inclined 
to believe there is no such thing as repetition.”85 Instead, 
there is only iteration: “It is not repetition if it is that 
which you are actually doing because naturally each time the 
emphasis is different.”86 Stein couches her thinking about 
repetition in analogies with the cinema, a technology 
predicated on iterative repetition, making a cunning 
implicit claim for her use of repetition as in index of her 
work’s modernity. However, as an apologia for the style of 
The Making of Americans, “Portraits and Repetition” falls 
short: in the case of narrative, the scale of iteration is 
all important. 
                     
84 Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in 
Narrative, 124. 
85 Stein, Lectures in America, 166. 
86 Ibid., 179. 
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      Rather than accept Stein’s insistence that repetition 
is simply her means of building up portraits of characters—
an assertion belied by reading the novel—we should turn away 
from the content of specific repetitions and look instead 
for the kind of figurative work that repetition does. I want 
to argue, with Patricia Tobin, that the narrative line of 
the realist novel figures for the genealogical line of 
patriarchal society. Realist narrative is concerned with a 
genealogy of events: “At its origin it fathers a progeny of 
words, sustains them throughout in orderly descent and 
filial obedience, and through its act of closure maintains 
the family of words as an exclusive totality.”87 In other 
words, genealogy might be thought of as the archetypal, or 
limit case, of narrative, as in the Book of Numbers, which 
offers the barest example of storytelling in the Bible. 
Sarah Ahmed makes a comparable argument, and one that I will 
turn back to in reading “Tender Buttons,” when she 
highlights the pervasiveness of linear metaphors in our 
commonplace descriptions of family and sexuality.88 
                     
87 Patricia Tobin, Time and the Novel: The Genealogical 
Imperative (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 18. 
88 Sarah Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, 
Others (Durham, NC, and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 
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      Hence the genealogical plot of The Making of 
Americans, and its gradual abandonment. The novel thus 
appears as a sort of experiment in narrative no longer 
governed by the end-directed means of sense-making 
fundamental to realism. Thus the novel concludes with the 
extinction of the family line it has so doggedly traced 
through the early death of the character at the end of its 
genealogical line: “David Hersland came to be a dead one 
before he came to be at the ending of the beginning of his 
middle living” (MoA, 740). At the same time, the novel 
extinguishes the Aristotelian expectation of a plot ordered 
by beginning, middle, and end. The final section of the 
novel, “History of a Family’s Progress,” merges the narrator 
with the narrative to produce unmediated diegesis, and as 
Tanya Clement notes, replaces the familiar “I” of the 
narrative voice with the universal “some” or “one.”89 This 
shift towards the universal completes a synecdochic 
reduction of the whole novel’s classificatory efforts: 
 
There are kinds of men and women. Many of each kind of 
them have been living. Many of each kind of them are 
living. Very many of each kind of them have come to be 
dead ones. Many of each kind of them are living. There 
                     
89 Clement, “The Story of One,” 437. 
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will be lists of kinds of men and women. There will be 
many lists of them. (MoA, 910) 
 
No single quotation can do justice to the final chapter’s 
self-referentiality: each of the lexical units making up 
this passage are combined and recombined almost ad infinitum 
in the surrounding text. Repetition suspends mimesis, and 
produces a wholly self-referential tissue of self-quotation. 
Thus Stein achieves a rhetoric of not having rhetoric. 
      The novel’s famous epigraph offers a glimpse of the 
novel’s radical innovations: 
 
Once an angry man dragged his father along the ground 
through his own orchard. “Stop!” cried the groaning old 
man at last, “Stop! I did not drag my father beyond 
this tree!” (MoA, 3) 
 
The source of this epigraph is Aristotle’s Nichomachean 
Ethics; in the novel it is followed by a second paragraph 
derived from a theme that Stein composed at Radcliffe. 
Aristotle had meant to illustrate the distinction between 
tolerance for “natural” and “unnatural” behavior: filial 
aggression is recognized, but must be confined within 
established limits. Stein pairs this anecdote with a 
paragraph that describes the difficulty of “living down the 
tempers we are born with,” concluding that with the passage 
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of time “we see that these our sins are of all sins the 
really harmless ones to own... so our struggle with them 
dies away” (MoA, 3). Richard Bridgman, who identified the 
sources of the epigraph, notes that by combining these two 
passages, Stein produces a third meaning: “Applied to 
Gertrude Stein’s own experience, it is possible to imagine 
what the irregularities of her young life were to which she 
had finally yielded as inevitable.”90 The parable might 
condense the novel’s themes, but it also anticipates a 
readers’ response to the text: dragged beyond the familiar 
environs of the realist novel, we experience exhaustion and 
not a little resistance. The Making of Americans thus 
ultimately rejects the whole metaphorical apparatus of 
realist narration, opening up possibilities for representing 
the ordinary which would only come to fruition in Stein’s 
next, and perhaps most influential, project: “Tender 
Buttons.” 
 
III. “Tender Buttons” and the Queer Ordinary. 
 
After the almighty struggle to defy generic conventions that 
shaped The Making of Americans, it isn’t surprising that 
Stein should then turn her efforts to a piece that is 
essentially without genre. Michael Sheringham has written of 
                     
90 Bridgman, Gertrude Stein in Pieces, 67. 
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the “tendency for everyday writings to evolve modes of 
enunciation that signal a crossing of generic boundaries, 
and in so doing reflect ‘mutations’ in the everyday world 
and the way it is perceived.”91 “Tender Buttons” is often 
described as poetry, if only because it adheres to none of 
the rules of prose, but nor is it lineated in a way that 
resembles even the most extreme free verse. “A sequence of 
prose-poems” might come closer, if only the term “sequence” 
could be stripped of its orderly connotations and made to 
describe a work adhering only to the bare necessity of there 
being an axis of succession in any work extended on the 
page.92  
      If the question of genre has little purchase on 
“Tender Buttons,” we can at least begin by noticing its 
concern with classification. Sheringham notes that 
classification is a way of generating observation, priming 
our attention to apprehend the overlooked, the ordinary 
phenomena that lurk beneath our notice.93 “Tender Buttons” is 
organized into three sections, Objects, Food, and Rooms, 
                     
91 Sheringham, Everyday Life, 345–6. 
92 For instance, Stein appears nowhere in Rosenthal and 
Gall’s extensive The Modern Poetic Sequence: The Genius of 
Modern Poetry (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
1983). 
93 Sheringham, Everyday Life, 263–4. 
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which together compose a sort of primitive ontology of the 
everyday. But as soon as classification seems to offer some 
purchase on the world of “Tender Buttons,” it dissolves into 
incoherence. Not, as in Borges’s Chinese Encyclopedia, as a 
self-aware comment on the hierarchies implicit in all 
listing; there is little in the way of priming and then 
subverting a reader’s expectations.94 “A Carafe, That is a 
Blind Glass” might suggest a teasing metaphor, but “A Method 
of a Cloak” is frankly obscure, and by the time the 
“Objects” section title repeats itself as a subheading, the 
text’s organization has become vertiginously self-reflexive. 
This is typical of the whole of “Tender Buttons”: means of 
interpretation suggest themselves, then just as quickly 
dissipate, without even allowing for their failure to be 
recuperated as a negative mode of interpretation. In other 
words, the piece delights in paradox, as its title suggests: 
buttons, on the whole, tend not to be tender. 
      Because “Tender Buttons” offers so little in the way 
of meaning on its surface, scholars have debated the proper 
approach to it extensively, and it has been subject to major 
reassessments in light of almost every new school of 
literary criticism. These debates have tended to break down 
                     
94 Jorge Luis Borges, “John Wilkins' Analytical Language,” in 
Selected Nonfictions, ed. and trans. Eliot Weinberger 
(London: Penguin, 1999), 231. 
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along lines that mirror the conflicting definitions of 
modernism invoked above: content-based approaches, and form-
based approaches. Of the former, the most extreme is almost 
certainly Lisa Ruddick’s account of “Tender Buttons” as a 
gnostic text, which can be “unlocked” by attending to its 
“woman-centered spiritual vision.”95 Ruddick offers a series 
of readings of passages from the text of varying degrees of 
persuasiveness, designed to show that “Tender Buttons” 
rewrites a founding western myth of sacrifice in an anti-
patriarchal fashion.96 The difficulty of Ruddick’s approach 
is that in the absence of specific cues in the text to 
invite her gnostic reading, the reader must be sympathetic 
to a thesis about Western culture and the pervasiveness of 
its “fundamental myths” in order to be persuaded of the 
elaborate interpretive contortions to which the text is 
subjected: the hermeneutic code is imposed from the outside. 
      Other critics have taken a more modest approach by 
emphasizing what they see as coded biographical content in 
the work. It is sometimes read as a celebration of the 
changes in Stein’s domestic circumstances during 1911, 
specifically Leo Stein’s departure from the Rue de Fleurus 
and Alice B. Toklas’s permanent installation in Gertrude’s 
life and household. Leo’s domineering personality, 
                     
95 Ruddick, Reading Gertrude Stein, 190–2. 
96 Ibid. 
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intensifying neuroses, and disdain for Gertrude’s creative 
efforts make him, in Leon Katz’s and John Malcolm Brinnin’s 
accounts, the early antagonist in the story of Gertrude’s 
artistic development.97 Some of the strength of this reading 
certainly derives from the presence of sexual insinuation 
throughout the text, as in: 
 
THIS IS THE DRESS, AIDER. 
      Aider, why aider why whow, whow stop touch, aider 
whow, aider stop the muncher, muncher munchers. 
      A jack in kill her, a jack in, makes a meadowed 
king, makes a to let.98 
 
“Aider,” it seems, should be read as a pun on “Ada,” one of 
Stein’s nicknames for Alice B. Toklas.99 Similar punning 
                     
97 Brinnin, The Third Rose, 194–96; Katz, “The First Making 
of The Making of Americans,” 261–64; Bridgman, Gertrude 
Stein in Pieces, 110–14; Ruddick, Reading Gertrude Stein, 
181. 
98 Gertrude Stein, “Tender Buttons,” in Modernism: An 
Anthology, ed. Lawrence Rainey (Malden MA, and Oxford: 2005), 
383. Hereafter cited in text as “TB.” 
99 Neil Schmitz, “Gertrude Stein as Post-Modernist: The 
Rhetoric of ‘Tender Buttons,’” Journal of Modern Literature 
3.5 (July 1974): 1121–22. 
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references to sex abound; even the title offers a sexual 
connotation: “tender buttons” in French, “tendres boutons,” 
being a metaphor for buds, and by extension, nipples or the 
clitoris.100 The text’s representation of sexuality reaches 
the peak of its frankness in “Rooms”: 
 
The sister was not a mister. Was this a surprise. It 
was. The conclusion came when there was no arrangement. 
All the time that there was a question there was a 
decision. Replacing a casual acquaintance with an 
ordinary daughter does not make a son. (“TB,” 395) 
 
Marjorie Perloff concludes that the work alludes to the 
private side of Stein’s domestic life with Alice, which, as 
distinct from the public life recorded in The Autobiography 
of Alice B. Toklas and Everybody’s Autobiography, “demands a 
different language.”101 
      Margueritte S. Murphy offers a reading that similarly 
stresses the work’s domestic setting, but proceeds from 
particular features of its language, like its frequent use 
of parataxis and the imperative mood. These characteristics 
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reveal the work’s indebtedness to “authoritative prose for 
women”: cookbooks, housekeeping guides, and books of 
etiquette like Mrs. Beeton’s Book of Household Management. 
The listing typical of cookbooks and the didacticism 
inherent in etiquette guides is reflected in the poem’s 
frequent uses of parataxis and the imperative mood: “The 
tone is that of authority, as if to establish order, 
decorum, and domestic stability.”102 The aim of Stein’s 
“counter-discourse” in “Tender Buttons” then is not to 
“renounce or trivialize” the world of cooking, housekeeping, 
fashion, and etiquette, but to use “its authority to value, 
explain, and stabilize her own domestic sphere.”103 Murphy’s 
argument amounts to one of the more original claims for 
Tender Buttons as a feminist text. 
      It is tempting to pair Murphy’s reading with Luce 
Giard’s contribution to the second volume of de Certeau’s 
Practice of Everyday Life. There she observes that the 
everyday routines of the kitchen are composed of “rites and 
codes, of rhythms and choices, of received usage and 
                     
102 Margueritte S. Murphy, “‘Familiar Strangers’: The 
Household Words of Gertrude Stein's ‘Tender Buttons,’” 
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103 Ibid., 400. 
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practiced customs.”104 Giard treats cooking and other 
everyday practices as repositories of a kind of tacit 
knowledge, constituting “the cumulative cultural memory of 
generations of women whose experiences have gone 
unrecorded.”105 Perhaps this could offer an explanation for 
the recognizably domestic setting of “Tender Buttons” as 
well as its syntactic transformations: there is a discourse 
of the everyday centered on the routines of the home so 
fundamentally at odds with the Western episteme and its 
traditional emphases that to give a true account of it 
requires the abandonment of traditional modes of expression. 
But if this kind of epistemological revolt did indeed 
motivate the experiments of “Tender Buttons,” it should be 
possible to adduce some principle according to which its 
deformations of orderly syntax operate. No such principle 
emerges; the poem does not so much transform syntax as 
reduce it to a very minimal level. Moreover, Giard saw the 
domestic sphere not as a bearer of potentially transgressive 
values, but rather as a site of resistance to the 
encroachment of modernity: “frenetic overmodernization,” as 
                     
104 Michel de Certeau, Luce Giard, and Pierre Mayol, The 
Practice of Everyday Life, Vol. 2, Living and Cooking, trans. 
Timothy J. Tomasik (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1998), 171. 
105 Sheringham, Everyday Life, 246. 
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she puts it.106 A version of the ordinary as an encounter 
with “altering alterity” is to be found instead in the 
original work of Michel de Certeau, for whom gender 
represents “a potentially damaging blind spot.”107 Finally, 
Murphy’s contention that Stein sets out to “stabilize” her 
domestic setting is blatantly at odds with the experience of 
reading the text: “Tender Buttons” seems less about 
stabilizing Stein’s domesticity than destabilizing everybody 
else’s. 
      Interpretive strategies like this one have a kind of 
appealing perversity, in that they deny the text’s opacity 
or incoherence outright: reality itself is difficult or 
obscure, and our habitual modes of representation falsify; 
this text, by contrast, represents that difficulty 
faithfully. This kind of argument finds its archetypal form 
in Bridgman. Whereas more recent critics have fixed on Three 
Lives and The Making of Americans as evidence of William 
James’s influence over Stein, for Bridgman “Tender Buttons” 
makes it “impossible to overlook.” James reminds us that 
customary usage vouchsafes linguistic meaning, but custom 
also causes us to forget their arbitrary nature. Likewise, 
the “substantive” parts of our consciousness, those 
                     
106 de Certeau, et al., The Practice of Everyday Life, Vol. 2, 
213. Cf. Highmore, Everyday Life and Cultural Theory, 153. 
107 Sheringham, Everyday Life, 243, 47. 
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available to linguistic articulation, are as boulders in a 
stream; the remainder passes by nearly unnoticed, “the 
transitive parts of thought’s stream.”108 The virtue of 
Stein’s style in “Tender Buttons” is that it forces the 
reader to confront the arbitrariness of discourse by 
wrenching words out of their habitual contexts.109 Michael 
Hoffmann and Norman Weinstein make essentially the same 
point in their respective monographs.110 Jayne Walker offers 
a later iteration of this argument when she describes 
“Tender Buttons” as a fundamentally “mimetic” text because 
it represents what James called the “‘concrete chaos’ of 
immediate sensory experience, in which ‘collateral 
contemporaneity’ is the only ‘real order.’”111 But mimesis, 
as we have seen, depends on a semiotic structure available 
to readerly recuperation; it isn’t at all clear that 
“immediate sensory experience” could offer such a structure, 
                     
108 Cited in Bridgman, Gertrude Stein in Pieces, 133–4. 
109 Similar arguments are to be found in Schmitz, “Gertrude 
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or that we would have any real grounds to recognize it as 
such if it did. In other words, the claim that a text 
engages in mimesis of an experience unavailable to ordinary 
consciousness is self-contradictory. 
      Similar claims cluster around Stein’s famous statement 
“Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose,” from “Sacred Emily.”112 
According to Harriett Scott Chessman, “The word, in 
appearing not once but many times, draws attention away from 
its status as a referential sign, which is so familiar to us 
that we can no longer experience the word’s freshness.”113 We 
are supposed, by dint of repetition, to see the sign 
divorced from its referent; the line is not about a rose at 
all, but rather about linguistic representation. To put it 
another way, these critics advance a Shklovskian 
interpretation of Stein’s style. According to Shklovsky’s 
theory of defamiliarization, “Art exists that one may 
recover the sensation of life.” The “work, clothes, 
furniture,” and so on that force of habit occludes from our 
perception are “rendered strange” by being shown back to us 
in literary representation, allowing us, ideally, to return 
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to the real world with our perception of it heightened.114 
Stein’s critics merely displace the Shklovskian procedure 
from the actual clothes, furniture, etc. to the linguistic 
token which represent them. But Liesl Olson has made an 
insightful objection to the aesthetics of defamiliarization 
in Modernism and the Ordinary: that moments of heightened 
consciousness or perception are largely empty in themselves, 
and depend on the surrounding context of the ordinary to 
give them meaning.115 In the case of “Tender Buttons,” 
however, it would be reasonable to ask whether Stein’s 
grammatical and syntactic deformations don’t carry out their 
defamiliarizing work too effectively, leaving no ordinary 
context for the reader to recuperate. 
      Stein, moreover, had rather different ideas about the 
significance of her procedures:  
 
Now listen! I’m no fool. I know that in daily life we 
don't go around saying “is a... is a... is a...” Yes, 
I’m no fool; but I think that in that line the rose is 
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red for the first time in English poetry for a hundred 
years.116 
 
Contrary to the view that Stein’s language divorces signs 
from their referents, Stein herself claims that she has 
achieved, if anything, an even higher degree of 
verisimilitude. Indeed, the rose is not just vivid again, 
it’s red, a detail wholly absent from the original poem. As 
her career developed, a more and more considerable part of 
Stein’s output was given over to explaining and justifying 
her earlier experiments. By 1946, in the so-called 
“Transatlantic Interview,” Stein aligns herself with the 
generalized reaction against nineteenth century literary 
norms that remains the most common, if inexact, definition 
of modernism: “You had to recognize words had lost their 
value in the Nineteenth Century, particularly towards the 
end, they had lost much of their variety.” As a result, “I 
took individual words and thought about them until I got 
their weight and volume complete and put them next to 
another word.”117 But despite the authority that critics 
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often attribute to them, Stein’s claims to have revitalized 
language in a text like “Tender Buttons” would be more 
credible if she had done so without virtually abandoning 
literature’s communicative function. 
      A related kind of self-justification is at work in 
Stein’s claims about her association with cubism, analogies 
with which are the main interpretive strategy of those 
critics who emphasize the formal characteristics of “Tender 
Buttons.” Despite being, as we have seen, one of the 
earliest attempts to give an account of Stein’s innovations, 
the notion of Stein as a “literary cubist” has been 
surprisingly tenacious.118 The strongest claim for an analogy 
here comes from Jayne Walker, who notes that “Within months 
after Picasso created his first collage [Still-life with 
Chair Caning, 1912], Stein invented the newly concrete, 
logically disjunctive style that culminated in Tender 
Buttons.”119 Still-life with Chair Caning includes a piece of 
oil-cloth painted with chair caning and a length of actual 
rope around the border of the canvas. For Walker, these 
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inclusions are “absolutely ‘real,’ literal pieces of the 
objects they signify, but they are starkly juxtaposed in an 
order that bears no resemblance to that of the everyday 
world.”120 Writing about the same Picasso canvas, however, 
William Rubin draws a crucial distinction: it is not the 
unfamiliar material of the oilcloth as against the canvas, 
but the clash “between the quasi-photographic illusionism of 
the chair caning and the abstract and painterly Cubist 
figuration of the rest of the still life” that draws the 
viewer’s attention.121 
      In other words, “what is collaged is not chair caning, 
which Picasso surely could have acquired and affixed to his 
canvas had he wished, but oilcloth picturing chair 
caning.”122 Far from being an irruption of the real into the 
artwork, the oilcloth reveals a vertiginous regress. The 
contrast is not between reality and illusion, but between 
“alternate ways of imaging reality”; “reality in Still Life 
with Chair Caning is a game played with smoke and 
mirrors.”123 Collage, too, is only a rhetoric of not having 
rhetoric. Thus, when Walker argues that “Tender Buttons” 
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ought to be read according to the principle of juxtaposition 
that animates cubist collage, we have good reason to suspect 
her claims that this introduces into Stein’s work a new 
“concreteness.”124 Nonetheless, her argument makes some 
headway by following Steiner and describing collage in 
structuralist terms. David Antin offers a useful summary of 
this approach by showing that the “stronger logical 
relations” that obtain in regular narrative or pictorial 
forms—“implication, entailment, negation, subordination and 
so on”—are suspended in favor of weaker ones: “similarity, 
equivalence, identity, their negative forms, dissimilarity, 
nonequivalence, nonidentity, and some kind of image of 
concatenation, grouping or association.”125 As Marjorie 
Perloff has pointed out, Antin’s definition accurately 
describes a great range of modernist experiments with 
form.126 
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      But Perloff also allows that Stein is “by no means a 
collagist.”127 What she means by this echoes the important 
distinction between cubist collage and the papier collé: the 
latter is defined by “the classical principle of the unity 
of medium,” while collage is defined by the mixture of 
mediums.128 It is debatable to what extent a “mixture of 
mediums” is even possible for writers to achieve. The 
closest parallel, and the one drawn by Perloff, is 
quotation. But quotation is wholly absent from “Tender 
Buttons,” which, like almost all of Stein’s experimental 
work, remains resolutely hermetic. By the end of her career, 
Stein had begun to re-situate herself as regards the 
cubists. No longer satisfied to be seen as a literary 
adaptor of their innovations, in the “Transatlantic 
Interview” she claims to have found the impetus in her 
experiments in Cézanne, widely acknowledged as a forerunner 
to the cubists. Stein is thus reinterpreting her 
relationship with cubism in fraternal, rather than filial, 
terms.129 Stein’s claims surrounding cubism amount to a self-
serving rhetoric, but are no less interesting for that. Even 
a generous reading of the claims made for an analogy between 
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“Tender Buttons” and cubism would have to concede that it 
amounts only to a shared effort to put pressure on the codes 
of representation that formerly obtained in their respective 
art forms. If the proximity and example of Picasso et al. 
did indeed have a determining influence on Stein’s aesthetic 
practice, then the exact lineaments of that influence will 
have to remain obscure, known only, if at all, to Stein 
herself.  
      “Tender Buttons” tempts critics to argue by 
synecdoche. The resolute opacity of the poem makes it 
expedient to take a part of the text, subject it to extended 
scrutiny, then allow the interpretation that emerges to 
apply to the whole of the text. Arguing by synecdoche, as 
many of the critics cited above have done, is a common 
tactic. The famous “sister was not a mister” line provides a 
perfect example because of its seeming frankness, yet 
nothing about its position within the text’s development 
seems to authorize treating it as especially significant. 
Synecdoches allow us to gain a handle on formidably 
difficult texts, and to find purchase when no obvious route 
in is available. It is also, to a certain extent, the modus 
operandi of historicism, in which a text or texts are made 
to stand in for a larger cultural formation about which they 
reveal certain salient features. This discussion has already 
drawn on this strategy, and will do so again. But “Tender 
Buttons” is best served by also attempting to describe its 
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overall linguistic texture. After all, it is one of the 
rhetorical ploys of the poem to solicit synecdochic readings 
while also refusing the whole to which that part might be 
thought to refer. A line from “Salad Dressing and an 
Artichoke” reads: “A whole is inside a part,” before 
concluding, “a part does not go away, a hole is red leaf” 
(“TB,” 394). If we take the sentence’s first clause alone, 
then it could be read as authorizing a synecdochic approach 
to the whole poem. But its next phrase seems to disavow that 
reading immediately, before transforming “whole” into 
“hole,” suggesting the former’s negation. The difficulty of 
arriving at a formal interpretation of “Tender Buttons” is 
that, as I have shown, the text thematizes its abandonment 
of even the pretense of formal organization. The best way to 
try and gain any purchase on the text, then, is to arrive at 
an accurate description of its salient features.  
      Monica Fludernik describes “Tender Buttons” as an 
example of “verbless writing,” and it is reasonably clear 
what she means: the text lacks a wide array of verbs 
describing movement, change, development, and so on.130 In 
reality, however, “Tender Buttons” is a verb-ridden text; 
it’s just that the most frequent verb in it is “to be,” in 
various of its forms (with the exception of the first 
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person), but usually in copular clauses.131 In fact, even 
though “to be” and its inflections are some of the most 
common words in the language, “Tender Buttons” takes their 
prevalence to an extreme.132 The percentage of the total word 
count of each section made up by “to be” and its inflections 
is: “Objects,” 8.1%; “Food,” 8.3%; and “Rooms,” 9.6%, for a 
total throughout the text of 9%. At first glance, these 
figures might appear modest or in line with expectations. 
But in fact, this is triple the usual rate of occurrence for 
“to be” in printed English.133 Whatever else “Tender Buttons” 
is, it is certainly a sustained meditation on assertions of 
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identity and the role of the copulative function in 
language. 
      A typical passage from “A Long Dress” in “Objects” 
reads: 
 
Where is the serene length, it is there and a dark 
place is not a dark place, only a white and red are 
black, only a yellow and green are blue, a pink is 
scarlet, a bow is every color. (“TB,” 377) 
 
“Roastbeef,” in “Food,” contains the passage: 
 
All the time that there is use there is use and any 
time there is a surface there is a surface, and every 
time there is an exception there is an exception and 
every time there is a division there is a dividing. Any 
time there is a surface there is a surface and every 
time there is a suggestion there is a suggestion and 
every time there is silence there is silence and every 
time that is languid there is that there… (“TB,” 383) 
 
A similar exercise in noting the appearance of “is” and its 
other inflections throughout “Tender Buttons” will reveal 
the extent to which its sentences depend on “to be” in 
either its ascriptive (“a pink is scarlet”) or specifying 
(“any time there is a surface there is a surface”) uses. 
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      Thus “Tender Buttons” manifests a fascination with the 
power of language to make assertions of existence (“there 
is”), as well as the transformative power of metaphor (“Cold 
coffee with a corn a corn yellow and green mass is a gem”) 
(“TB,” 389). Antin had aligned collage with the metonymic 
axis in language, stressing the side-by-side ordering of 
terms using “‘weaker’ logical relations” that allow “more 
degrees of freedom in the reading of the sign-objects and 
their ensemble relations.”134 It goes without saying that 
“Tender Buttons” applies the form of those logical relations 
illogically, but in doing so it also invokes the 
metaphorical axis. As in The Making of Americans, where 
ambiguity between gerunds and present participles arrests 
the grammatical movement of Stein’s sentences, so in “Tender 
Buttons” does the copula act both metonymically and 
metaphorically: linking the terms in a sentence in a weak, 
side-by-side relation, while at the same time inviting the 
reader to interpret metaphorical relations between those 
terms. In doing so, it arrests the ordinary operations of 
literary sense-making, which depend on the kind of “strong,” 
hierarchical logical relations that Antin identifies.135 
      Therefore, what thematics of the ordinary emerge from 
these syntactical games? How can such an extreme style 
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credibly claim to have a bearing on the ordinary? The 
answer, I think, must be in part to do with Stein’s choice 
of material: the range of diction she uses in the work, 
analysis of which demonstrates an unusual degree of 
plainness—the sort of delightful paradox to which Stein was 
much given.136 As Perloff notes, reading “Tender Buttons” 
requires no special knowledge, unlike (in her example) 
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Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock”: a consequence 
of its simplified diction as well as its imperviousness to 
intertextuality.137 If Stein’s diction remains well within 
the bounds of the ordinary, but her syntax strays far 
outside of it, it could be said that her complaint is not 
with the material of the ordinary world, but with its 
arrangement. If we were to indulge, for a moment, in a 
naively realist reading of the text, we might envisage a 
series of domestic spaces strewn with objects and 
foodstuffs; the home turned upside down. On these grounds, 
we should agree with Kathryn Kent when she argues that “the 
poem thoroughly queers domesticity.” “Queer,” in this case, 
obtains on every level of its various meanings: “Tender 
Buttons” does represent an ordinary, but a queer one.138 
      Kent situates the poem within the emerging commodity 
culture of the early twentieth century, arguing that “Tender 
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Buttons” offers an oppositional aesthetic of 
unproductiveness. In essence, Kent combines sexual 
dissidence with opposition to consumer capitalism by 
suggesting a metaphorical correspondence between literary, 
economic, and genealogical production. On this account, the 
poem offers “a complex theory of textuality and sexuality 
one that reclaims what have been labeled ‘unnatural’ sexual 
practices, and links it explicitly with a queer economy of 
writing and signification, Stein’s unique brand of modern 
poetics.”139 In fact, the features of the text that I have 
already described offer some support for Kent’s reading, if 
we take the text’s fascination with the copula as a play on 
copulation. The poem’s queer pairings, then, refuse to 
reproduce meaning according to traditional syntactic 
expectations, just as queer sexualities interrupt social 
reproduction of genealogical lines.  
      There are traces in the text to suggest this sort of 
interpretation, though they remain traces. Any 
interpretation of “Tender Buttons” that advances in a 
particular direction must accept that it will not attain 
comprehensiveness. The main objection I raise to Kent’s 
bravura discussion of the poem is that she attributes to 
Stein a “theory” of queer textuality, when theory is self-
evidently anathema to Stein’s procedures. But traces 
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persist, and these include the aforementioned evocation of 
sexual intimacy in “This is the Dress, Aider.” The reader 
who begins to search for sexual insinuations will find them 
throughout “Tender Buttons,” sometimes in conjunction with 
puns on the name of Alice B. Toklas, as in the second 
“Chicken” section: “Alas a dirty word, alas a dirty third 
alas a dirty third, alas a dirty bird” (“TB,” 391). The term 
“queer” does not appear in “Tender Buttons,” but it is an 
important term throughout The Making of Americans, where it 
appears 141 times, often in repetitive clusters: 
 
It is a completely queer feeling, this that I am 
describing. It is a completely queer feeling to be 
realizing that someone is seeing something... that one 
realizing another one’s feeling seeing remembering that 
thing cannot one’s self feel see and remember that 
thing. I can say that having such a feeling is 
completely having a queer feeling in being one being 
living. (MoA, 711) 
 
Queer, in other words, is also Stein’s figure for the 
unknowable, and it tends to crop up in the novel when she 
faces a character or characters who frustrate the narrator’s 
capacity to know. 
      “Tender Buttons” radicalizes these textual strategies 
of The Making of Americans. The novel gradually allows the 
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“I” of its narrator to dissolve amidst its increasingly 
insistent repetitions. “Tender Buttons” posits no organizing 
consciousness or narrative voice; it doesn’t contain a 
single instance of the pronoun “I.” In her seminal essay 
“Imitation and Gender Insubordination,” Judith Butler 
describes the form of oppression that queer theorists often 
describe as “erasure”: “Lesbianism is not explicitly 
prohibited in part because it has not even made its way into 
the thinkable, the imaginable, that grid of cultural 
intelligibility that regulates the real and the nameable.”140 
But erasure might also be a productive site from which to 
articulate a counter-discourse. Far from Kent’s claim that 
critics’ emphasis on the unintelligibility of “Tender 
Buttons” perpetuates that erasure, there is a politics and a 
metaphorical work undertaken by textual opacity.141 Even the 
pun, central to the poem’s economy of double meanings, is a 
figure that calls into question the author’s responsibility 
over meaning: is the double meaning intended, or is it just 
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an accidental effect of language’s incorrigible polysemy?142 
This is the sort of question that “Tender Buttons” 
deliberately leaves open. 
      Despite the absence of an authorial voice or figure, 
“Tender Buttons” does contain one particularly significant 
appearance of the first person objective pronoun “me” during 
the final section of “Food,” “A Centre in a Table”: “Next to 
me next to a folder, next to a folder some waiter, next to a 
foldersome waiter and re letter and read her. Read her with 
her for less” (“TB,” 394). This, I think, should be read as 
incorporating the scene of writing into the text itself. 
Earlier in the poem, “A Table” had been posited as “a whole 
steadiness... A table means necessary places and a revision 
a revision of a little thing” (“TB,” 381). But now, as the 
“Food” section gives way to “Rooms,” the table and its 
center are rejected: “Act so that there is no use in a 
center” (“TB,” 394). As Bridgman puts it, “There in the very 
conception of a center was a false reality.”143 The table is 
a significant object throughout the poem, and indeed, “holds 
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a kind of exemplary status in philosophical, and 
particularly modernist, discourse.”144 
      That significance is best encapsulated by Sara Ahmed’s 
Queer Phenomenology, which reads the table as a sort of 
primal scene for the western episteme, or more precisely, 
what she terms an “orienting device.” Ahmed proceeds from 
Dianne Fuss’s study of writer’s room, where she notes that 
“the theatre of composition is not an empty space but a 
place animated by the artifacts, mementos, machines, books, 
and furniture that frame any intellectual labor.”145 Ahmed 
argues that “being directed toward some objects and not 
others involves a more general orientation toward the 
world.” Thus the privileged space of the writer’s table, 
cleared of the domestic and the familiar for the sake of the 
work undertaken on it, figures for the biases inherent in 
the whole western intellectual tradition, which brackets the 
familiar and the domestic, allows the subject to “disappear 
under the sign of the universal.”146 Within this domestic 
background, concealed from view, is the apparatus of 
compulsory heterosexuality: the family unit reproducing 
                     
144 Randall, Modernism, Daily Time and Everyday Life, 116. 
145 Diana Fuss, Sense of an Interior: Four Rooms and the 
Writers That Shaped Them (New York and London: Routledge, 
2004), 1. 
146 Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology, 32, 34. 
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itself through particular orientations toward objects and 
ways of inhabiting space.147 
      But for Stein, the subject disappears as a willed act 
of erasure rather than under the sign of the universal. The 
distinction between background and foreground collapses in 
the absence of the subject whose deictic relationship with 
the objects around it would organize them into the apparent 
and overlooked. As the subject disappears, so do the strong 
logical relations of syntax that order the familiar world. 
Stein figuratively overturns the table, and with it, the set 
of histories and assumptions that reproduce themselves 
through habit. The absent center of the text alluded to by 
Bridgman is the “I” now submerged in the ordinary, the “I” 
seated at the table on which “Tender Buttons” itself is 
composed. The erasure of the authorial self and the refusal 
to make sense themselves take on metaphorical and political 
significance. Stein’s sense of the ordinary is rendered 
strange by the ordinary’s own acts of erasure. 
      The irony of Stein’s experiments in both The Making of 
Americans and “Tender Buttons” is that opacity has induced 
critics to try to restore the absent center, to mine out of 
the text the traces of Stein at her desk in the Atelier at 
27 Rue de Fleurus. The Aristotelian demand for plot, for the 
order of beginning, middle, and end, cannot be satisfied by 
                     
147 Ibid., 92–107. 
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the text itself, so Stein’s critics have sought to answer it 
using her life instead. In other words, most critical 
strategies for coping with Stein’s work resort to precisely 
the set of narrative conventions that it itself rejected. 
Stein becomes the hero of her own emancipation from any one 
of a number of oppressors: her brother, literary convention, 
societal expectation. Or, she becomes the protagonist of a 
bildungsroman, her education at the feet of William James or 
the cubists equipping her to reproduce their innovations in 
her own field and tying her to the ongoing genealogy of 
western art and thought.  
      By way of a conclusion, we should return to the 
troubled question of Stein’s institutional location, to 
observe that her queer politics of opacity depend on the 
relative isolation in which she composed her early work. 
Indeed, Stein used her institutional position within the 
emerging modernist constellation to avoid the necessity of 
writing for an audience, and with it, the necessity of 
making herself understood either in content or in form. To 
acknowledge her work’s opacity without trying to dispel it 
is not the same as surrendering to it. Instead, Stein 
challenges us to read without the help of our usual tools of 
sense-making. Her work shows that to depict the ordinary not 
only means to denature our usual modes of literary 
representation, but that having done so, we remain apt to 
fall back on these very modes to recuperate meaning. 
150 
 
 
 
 
 
151 
 
 
Chapter 2: James Joyce and the Text of the Ordinary 
 
On December 7, 1921, the French novelist and critic 
Valery Larbaud delivered a lecture on Joyce’s Ulysses, just 
over a month after the novel’s completion. Larbaud was, in 
fact, among the first to learn that the novel was complete.1 
To assist Larbaud in preparing his lecture, Joyce drew up a 
schema of the novel’s episodes, detailing their Homeric 
parallels and other symbolic layers. This is the schema that 
would eventually appear in Stuart Gilbert’s James Joyce’s 
Ulysses: A Study (1930), having circulated amongst Joyce’s 
friends for some time already.2 Gilbert summarizes the 
schema’s significance thus: “James Joyce is, in fact, in the 
great tradition which begins with Homer… the unities of 
Ulysses go far beyond the classic triad, they are as 
manifold and yet symmetrical as the daedal network of nerves 
and bloodstreams which pervade the living organism.”3 For 
Larbaud, the Homeric model is indispensable for readerly 
                     
1 Joyce, letter to Budgen, 6 November 1921, James Joyce, 
Letters, Vol. 1. (New York: Viking Press, 1957), 177. 
2 Richard Ellmann, James Joyce (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1966), 534; Stuart Gilbert, James Joyce's Ulysses; A 
Study, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1952), 41. 
3 Gilbert, James Joyce's Ulysses, 43. 
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comprehension: “The reader who approaches this book without 
the Odyssey clearly in mind will be thrown into dismay.”4 
Larbaud thus inaugurates a reading of the novel as a 
symbolist epic. 
      Larbaud’s lecture epitomizes the genius for self-
promotion that characterized modernism, and combines 
elements of affinity with two other moments from the history 
of the movement. The first is the impact of F. T. 
Marinetti’s activities in London on the nascent modernism of 
Ezra Pound. As Lawrence Rainey argues, the varied fortunes 
of Marinetti’s enterprises provoked Pound to acknowledge 
that industrial society had produced a situation in which 
art’s formerly autonomous status had become untenable, 
effecting “a perceptible and irreversible leveling of both 
within the single and amorphous category of the commodity.”5 
Pound’s eventual solution to this dilemma was  
 
to defer consumption into the future, to transform it 
into an investment; which is to say, to encourage or 
even solicit the ephemeral seduction of the consumer 
                     
4 Valery Larbaud, “Ulysses,” The Criterion: A Quarterly 
Review 1.1 (1922): 94.; Cf. Georges May, “Valery Larbaud: 
Translator and Scholar,” Yale French Studies, 6 (Autumn 
1950): 83–90. 
5 Rainey, Institutions of Modernism, 38–9. 
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economy, acknowledging the status of art as a 
commodity, but to sublimate its consumption by turning 
it into an object of investment whose value will be 
realized only in the future.6 
 
The result was the rise of a new network of patron-
investors, and a new infrastructure of publishers, presses, 
and reviews attendant upon them. By 1922, Eliot’s The Waste 
Land offered compelling evidence of this new constellation’s 
maturity, as a competition to publish the poem ensued, 
partly at Pound’s instigation, between two little magazines 
backed by patrons, The Little Review (John Quinn) and the 
Dial (Scofield Thayer), and the mass-market periodical 
Vanity Fair.7 Remarkably, none of the competitors had read 
the work in question whilst they haggled over it, seeming to 
offer confirmation that the mysterious character of the 
commodity form had definitively entrenched itself among 
works of literature at every cultural level. Selling The 
Waste Land represented “an unprecedented effort to affirm 
the output of a specific marketing-publicity apparatus 
through the enactment of a triumphal and triumphant 
                     
6 Ibid., 39. 
7 Ibid., 91. 
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occasion.” Publicity, in other words, had become “the surest 
commodity of the modernist economy.”8 
      Ellmann describes Larbaud’s lecture as a “way of 
presenting Joyce to public notice in France,” but in fact it 
was much more.9 Remarkably, Larbaud in effect set out to 
introduce a French public to an English-language novel by an 
Irish expatriate writer, which they could not, at that 
point, have read. Moreover, Larbaud was far from a neutral 
critic expressing an objective point of view of the work. 
“The last of a rich family,” Larbaud had become, largely 
through the agency of Sylvia Beach and Adrienne Monnier, a 
node in the network of modernist patron-investors. Larbaud’s 
contribution may have been financially modest—he allowed the 
Joyces to live rent-free in his apartment at 71 rue du 
Cardinal Lemoine while he travelled in Italy between July 
and October 1921—but he offered Joyce commodious 
surroundings in which to work on Ithaca and Penelope.10 His 
early praise for the novel, which he read in the Little 
Review and Joyce’s typescript for Oxen of the Sun during the 
first two months of 1921, was included in Beach’s prospectus 
for the Shakespeare & Co. limited edition.11 In other words, 
                     
8 Ibid., 99, 106. 
9 Ellmann, James Joyce, 515. 
10 Ibid., 514, 26–7, 33. 
11 Ibid., 521-2. 
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by the time Larbaud addressed the audience at Monnier’s 
bookshop on 7 December, he was speaking as an entrepreneur 
promoting an investment. Hence the extraordinary gesture of 
introducing a readership to an as-yet-unpublished novel: 
like the editors competing for the right to publish The 
Waste Land sight unseen, the members of Larbaud’s audience 
were being invited to invest in the emerging idiom of 
modernism. 
      The circumstances of Larbaud’s lecture are of profound 
and under-appreciated importance for the next stage of that 
idiom’s development. T. S. Eliot heard tell of Larbaud’s 
talk, and wrote to him on 12 March, 1922, proposing to 
publish it in the inaugural issue of the Criterion.12 In the 
event, Eliot also translated the lecture into English 
himself, an earlier arrangement having fallen through, in 
the sort of minor calamity that would become typical of the 
magazine.13 Eliot’s intimate acquaintance with Larbaud’s 
account of the novel would be borne out in his own statement 
on it, “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” published in the November 
1923 issue of the Dial. “I hold this book to be the most 
important expression which the present age has found,” Eliot 
                     
12 T. S. Eliot, The Letters of T. S. Eliot, Vol. 1, 1898-1922, 
Revised Edition ed. Valerie Eliot and Hugh Haughton (London: 
Faber and Faber, 2009), 643. 
13 Ibid., 757. 
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begins, before swiftly drawing attention to the novel’s use 
of Homeric parallels, which, he declares, “has the 
importance of a scientific discovery.” This “mythical 
method” offers artists a means “of controlling, of ordering, 
of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama 
of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history.” The 
novel’s power derives from “the parallel to the Odyssey, and 
the use of appropriate styles and symbols to each 
division.”14 In other words, Eliot extends Larbaud’s emphasis 
on the Homeric parallels into a vision of the novel as an 
elaborately-designed symbolist masterpiece, in which a 
chaotic surface will yield to a deep order in response to 
sufficient scrutiny. Further impetus would be given to this 
approach to the novel in Stuart Gilbert’s James Joyce’s 
Ulysses, which takes Eliot and Larbaud’s procedure to the 
extreme. 
      In the main topoi of this brief essay, “anarchy,” 
“order,” “myth,” and so on, we can see Eliot already at work 
evolving the rhetoric of “classicism” which he would later 
pair with his conversion to Anglo-Catholicism in the preface 
                     
14 T. S. Eliot, “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” in Selected Prose 
of T. S. Eliot, ed. Frank Kermode (New York: Farrar, Strauss 
and Giroux, 1923), 175-7. 
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to 1928’s For Lancelot Andrewes.15 But the origin of 
“Ulysses, Order, and Myth” in Larbaud’s performance at La 
Maison des Amis des Livres points to its position within a 
larger constellation of modernist strategies. Critics have 
frequently treated Eliot’s claim to a classicist aesthetic 
reverentially, perhaps neglecting what an astonishing 
rhetorical coup it is to have assimilated a work like 
Ulysses to an aesthetic founded on a sensibility of 
decorum.16 That said, a contemporary example of the same 
rhetorical sleight of hand from Eliot’s oeuvre can be found 
in Eliot’s notes for The Waste Land. Now so deeply 
entrenched in the poem’s reputation as to seem inextricable 
from it, the notes appear not to have been part of Eliot’s 
original design at all: they do not appear in either the 
Dial or Criterion texts of the poem, and were probably added 
                     
15 T. S. Eliot, For Lancelot Andrewes (London,: Faber & Gwyer, 
1928), vii. 
16 This is not to minimize the personal and idiosyncratic 
meanings Eliot assigned to the term, or Hulme’s rigid 
dichotomy between classicism and romanticism, but in order 
for it to have any critical currency at all the term must 
stand in some relation with its more widespread meanings. Cf. 
“Classicism,” in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and 
Poetics, 4th ed., ed. Roland Greene et al. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2012), 263–6. 
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to the American pamphlet edition partly at the insistence of 
Horace Liveright, who felt the poem as it stood too short 
for publication as a book. The notes profoundly shaped 
reception of the poem, which seemed, rightly, “bereft of the 
spatiotemporal and logico-causal connections typical of 
narrative.” “To read the notes,” on the other hand, “was to 
find reference to ‘the plan,’ an arcane but ultimately 
identifiable logic which was dictating the poem’s entangled 
movements, perhaps even a narrative structure discernible 
behind its unruly opacity.”17 In other words, the notes 
encourage the same strategy of reading which Eliot himself 
would go on to perform on Ulysses. If we strip away the 
layers of earnest rhetoric, we may well find that Eliot’s 
classicism amounts to a polemical claim on behalf of 
modernism, responsive to the imperatives of the movement’s 
marketing apparatus: the aesthetic value of modernist 
literature is of the same kind as the value attached to the 
classics, and the same pleasures can be found therein, 
assuming the reader is equipped with the appropriate 
hermeneutic key. This represented one possible solution to 
the problem of mediating between the conflicting demands of 
                     
17 T. S. Eliot, The Annotated Waste Land with Eliot's 
Contemporary Prose, 2nd ed. (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 75. 
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avant-garde aesthetics and the marketplace for commoditized 
literature. 
      Eliot’s vision of Ulysses would prove the most 
influential for criticism over the next several decades by 
providing a means to reconcile the novel with the ordered 
vision of modern literature set out by Cleanth Brooks and 
the New Critics. This outlook presupposes a certain attitude 
to the ordinary: that the stuff of everyday life, when it 
appears in the text, will be justified by sublimation to a 
higher unity. The paradigm case of the New Critic’s 
procedure must be Brooks’s reading of The Waste Land. Taking 
his cue from Eliot’s statement in the notes to the poem, 
“Not on only the title, but the plan and a good deal of the 
incidental symbolism of the poem were suggested by Miss 
Jessie L. Weston’s book on the Grail legend,” Brooks 
advances a reading of the poem as “a work of extraordinary 
structural, thematic, and poetic integrity.”18 Brooks posits 
a consistent protagonist for the poem, and strives to impart 
a sense of change and development throughout it, conjuring 
up the rudiments of narrative.19 But Brooks’s reading, 
however much it appeals to our cultural bias towards an 
“Aristotelian poetics of narrative,” flattens out the poem’s 
                     
18 Rainey, Revisiting The Waste Land, 117. 
19 Ibid., 118-20. 
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texture and specificity, denuding it of the uncanny force it 
seemed to have for its original readers.  
      The poem is frequently characterized by points of 
tension between conflicting means of devising moments of 
coherence. One such moment, which might stand as a figure 
for a New Critical style of interpretation, can be found in 
the opening of part III, “The Fire Sermon”: 
 
  Sweet Thames, run softly, till I end my song. 
The river bears no empty bottles, sandwich papers, 
  Silk handkerchiefs, cardboard boxes, cigarette  
ends 
  Or other testimony of summer nights. The nymphs  
are departed.20 
 
The “testimony of summer nights,” “empty bottles, sandwich 
papers, silk handkerchiefs, cardboard boxes, cigarette ends” 
are invoked in a paraleptic list, remarkable only by their 
absence. Their unstable status figures for the conflicting 
imperatives operating within this opening passage, which was 
Eliot’s final addition to the draft of part III. By 
anticipating the motifs that appear at the section’s end 
(the City setting, music, song, the nymph/Thames-daughters), 
the passage as a whole (lines 173-186) gives the section a 
                     
20 Eliot, The Annotated Waste Land, 62. 
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ring structure.21 However, as Lawrence Rainey argues, it also 
seems to “undermine the very assertion of connectedness 
which this passage was meant to achieve” because of a 
“transparent rupture in logical-causal relatedness”: the 
Thames-daughters or nymphs whose song takes up lines 292 to 
306 at the end of the poem are bid farewell in advance of 
their arrival.22 Moreover, what Rainey describes as a 
“factitious” use of repetition to intimate connectedness 
itself seems to undermine “claims to logical and 
spatiotemporal connectedness which are elsewhere being 
asserted,” as in the section’s frequent, detailed references 
to real City locales: “Along the Strand, up Queen Victoria 
Street…”23 A similar assertion could be made about listing 
trash, which surely performs a similar function to invoking 
real locales, grounding the poem in the particular and 
adding verisimilitude. But the list is present only under 
erasure (“The river bears no empty bottles…”), and is 
sublimated to the passage’s aim to establish coherence by 
using repetition and pattern with surrounding passages “to 
                     
21 Rainey, Revisiting The Waste Land, 44. 
22 Ibid., 44-45. Cf. Eliot, The Annotated Waste Land, 66, 73, 
110. 
23 Rainey, Revisiting The Waste Land, 45; Eliot, The 
Annotated Waste Land, 65. 
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invoke symbolic depth.”24 The New Critical reading makes the 
establishment of symbolic depth the only legitimate 
principle for reading the poem. 
      I use the term “sublimation” because I discern in the 
New Critical approach an echo of Hegelian aesthetics, 
particularly insofar as it concerns itself with the proper 
status of the detail in works of art. The New Critical 
emphasis on the unity and wholeness of the “well-wrought 
poem,” with its fealty to “the oneness of experience” and 
consequent aversion to the particular echo the Hegelian 
system’s orientation toward the absolute, manifestation of 
which is the proper goal of art (and, indeed, all human 
endeavor).25 For this reason, Hegel is hostile to mimetic 
art, which is inextricably bound up with nature, and thus 
falls short of the absolute: 
 
This is the prose of the world, as it appears to the 
consciousness both of the individual himself and of 
others:— a world of finitude and mutability, of 
entanglement in the relative, of the pressure of 
                     
24 Rainey, Revisiting The Waste Land, 45. 
25 Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the 
Structure of Poetry (London: Denis Dobson, 1968), 174. 
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necessity from which the individual is in no position 
to withdraw.26  
 
In her account of Hegel, Schor argues that “The detail as an 
aesthetic category undergirds the entire edifice of the 
Aesthetics.”27 The detail, in this account, clearly stands 
for an important aspect of the ordinary, and on Schor’s 
reading, the whole of Hegel’s aesthetic project is engaged 
with the question of how art—particularly, in this instance, 
Dutch realist painting—“succeeds in spiritualizing an 
initially vulgar matter.”28 Indeed, Schor’s contention is 
that a theory of the novel, famously absent from Hegel’s 
Aesthetics, is to be found in his analysis of that genre. 
      Thus, “in order for the ‘sum of insignificances’ which 
constitutes the décor of everyday life to have access to the 
world of art,” they must, according to Hegel, “acquire ‘the 
look of independent and total life and freedom which lies at 
the root of the essence of beauty.’”29 Hegel assumes that the 
“indifference or repulsion” that the prosaic inspires arises 
                     
26 G.F.W. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. 
M. Knox, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 150. 
27 Naomi Schor, Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the 
Feminine (New York and London: Methuen, 1987), 23. 
28 Ibid., 36. 
29 Ibid., 36-7; Hegel, Aesthetics, 149. 
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from the purposive view that we habitually bring to objects, 
purposiveness representing the opposite pole in Hegel’s 
system of values from the absolute, which is characterized 
as existing wholly for-itself.30 In this process, Schor 
discerns a sort of aesthetic forerunner of Shklovsky’s 
defamiliarization: only stripped of their habitual 
connotations and imbrication with the messy world of the 
ordinary can the detail find its place in artistic 
representation. 
      Surprisingly, perhaps, an alternative to the Eliotic 
approach to Ulysses was set out by Ezra Pound—before Eliot 
had the chance to express his own views in the Criterion.31 
In his “Paris Letter” of May 1922 for the Dial, Pound 
expresses a diametrically opposed view on the significance 
of the Homeric parallels: 
 
In this super-novel our author has also poached on the 
epic, and has, for the first time since 1321, 
resurrected the infernal figures… Telemachus, Circe, 
                     
30 Schor, Reading in Detail, 38. 
31 Ellmann notes that Pound pointedly declined to attend 
Larbaud’s lecture, speculating that he was “rather annoyed 
to have his discovery rediscovered.” Whether or not this has 
any bearing on his sharply divergent reading of Ulysses, we 
cannot know. Ellmann, James Joyce, 535. 
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and the rest of the Odyssean company, the noisy cave of 
Aeolus gradually place themselves in the mind of the 
reader, rapidly or less rapidly according as he is 
familiar or unfamiliar with Homer. These 
correspondences are part of Joyce’s mediaevalism and 
are chiefly his own affair, a scaffold, a means of 
construction, justified by the result, and justifiable 
by it only.32 
 
Far from making the Homeric parallels integral to reading the 
novel, Pound regards them (using the term “correspondences”) 
as little more than a distraction. The “Paris Letter” ends 
with a paean to accurate language, and a version of the 
perennial complaint about the obfuscatory kinds of language 
used by politicians. Ulysses, goes the implicit claim, is 
the kind of novel that promises to reinvigorate our common 
language by reasserting its connectedness with the ground of 
common experience. It is, in other words, a work of 
                     
32 Ezra Pound, “Paris Letter,” The Dial, June 1922, 626. 
Reprinted in Ezra Pound’s Poetry and Prose: Contributions to 
Periodicals, Vol. VI: 1920—1921, C522—C699a, ed. Lea 
Baechler, A. Walton Litz, and James Longenbach (New York & 
London, Garland Publishing: 1991).  
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hyperbolic realism as opposed to Larbaud and Eliot’s vision 
of a work of hyperbolic symbolism.33 
 Just as Eliot turned his encounter with Ulysses into a 
spur for his developing classicist rhetoric, so did Pound’s 
approach to the novel chime with the documentary aesthetic 
he was developing for the Malatesta Cantos. Pound’s “Paris 
Letter” bore the date May, 1922; on the fifteenth of that 
month, Pound visited the Tempio Malatesta in Rimini, Italy, 
for the first time. The next month, at Sirmione on the Lago 
di Garda, he began composing material for the Malatesta 
Cantos, drafts of which would be completed in May 1923.34 
Critics agree that the sequence represents a decisive turn 
in the development of Pound’s aesthetics, and respond to a 
variety of different literary imperatives, including his 
encounter with Ulysses, but also the legacy of his short-
                     
33 Ibid., 629. 
34 In Ezra Pound and the Monument of Culture, Rainey notes 
that the early Malatesta drafts “respond to his recent 
experiences with works by two of his contemporaries: the 
first publication of Ulysses (February 1922), and the 
composition and publication of The Waste Land (published 
October 1922). Lawrence Rainey, Ezra Pound and the Monument 
of Culture: Text, History, and the Malatesta Cantos (Chicago 
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 5, 229-30. 
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lived collaboration with Amy Lowell.35 In the Malatesta 
Cantos, Pound makes “conspicuous use of quotation from 
‘documentary’ or historical sources.”36 The particular style 
of quotation that Pound practices is conditioned by his 
complex relationship with the philological practices of his 
day, which he sometimes invokes in order to discredit by 
                     
35 By April 1917, Pound was ready to distance himself from 
Imagism and did so by collaborating with T. S. Eliot on what 
would become his Hugh Selwyn Mauberley and the quatrain 
poems of Eliot’s second volume. In other words, by 
distancing himself from what he characterized as Imagism’s 
“sloppiness, lack of cohesion, lack of organic center,” 
Pound had begun to commit himself to a counter-aesthetic 
with strong affinities for Eliot’s emerging concept of 
impersonality. The documentary aesthetic of the Malatesta 
Cantos could be interpreted as the logical extension of this 
effort to abandon the subjectivism of Imagist poetry. 
Lawrence Rainey and A. Walton Litz, “Ezra Pound,” in 
Modernism and the New Criticism, ed. A. Walton Litz, Louis 
Menand, and Lawrence Rainey, The Cambridge History of 
Literary Criticism (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 85. 
36 Rainey, Ezra Pound and the Monument of Culture: Text, 
History, and the Malatesta Cantos, 29. 
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juxtaposition with “a higher accuracy of the spirit.”37 
Nonetheless, there is in Pound’s use of quotation from 
historical sources a rhetoric of direct statement: an 
implicit claim that through being directly grafted into a 
poem, historical documents will speak for themselves 
independent of the agency or mediation of an author. It is, 
in other words, Pound’s own version of a rhetoric of not 
having rhetoric.  
      There is a powerful affinity between Pound’s 
documentary aesthetic, his reading of Ulysses, and at least 
one strand of Joyce’s various self-representations. “I 
want,” Joyce is reported to have told Frank Budgen, “to give 
a picture of Dublin so complete that if the city one day 
suddenly disappeared from the earth it could be 
reconstructed out of my book.”38 Likewise, Joyce remarked to 
Budgen on another occasion that “imagination was memory.”39 
                     
37 Rainey’s illustration of this point is centered on the 
(mis)quoted line “(buttato via)” from one of Sigismundo 
Malatesta’s letters, in Canto VIII. Ibid., 68. C.f. Ezra 
Pound, The Cantos of Ezra Pound (New York: New Directions, 
1996), 28. 
38 Frank Budgen, James Joyce and the Making of Ulysses 
(London and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 69. 
39 Quoted in Richard Ellmann, Ulysses on the Liffey (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1972), 79. 
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If Stuart Gilbert’s James Joyce’s Ulysses is the locus 
classicus of the symbolist reading of the novel, then 
Budgen’s account of Ulysses occupies the same position for 
the realist reading. Throughout his book, Budgen—himself a 
man of socialist convictions—is at pains to emphasize the 
novel’s celebration of the “the clay of common experience”: 
 
I found that for [Joyce] human character was best 
displayed—I had almost said entirely displayed—in the 
commonest acts of life. How a man ties his shoe or eats 
his egg will give a better clue to his differentiation 
than how he goes to war.40 
 
Budgen does not dispute the presence of the Homeric 
parallels, and frequently reports Joyce’s use of them as a 
heuristic when discussing the novel. But he disagrees with 
Gilbert’s account by making the primary material of the 
novel not its purported mythical substructure, but the stuff 
of everyday life that comprises its surface: “[Joyce] made 
Ulysses, the epic of the body, out of material regarded as 
unworthy or, sometimes, ignoble.”41 His achievement is to 
have found a means for literature to attend to dimensions of 
the ordinary hitherto overlooked. 
                     
40 Budgen, James Joyce and the Making of Ulysses, 75. 
41 Ibid., 320. 
170 
 
      In his magisterial biography of Joyce, Richard Ellmann 
modulates carefully between these two competing outlooks, 
but finally inclines toward a version of the realist 
viewpoint: “The final and determining act of judgment in his 
work is the justification of the commonplace.” “Joyce’s 
discovery,” he concludes, “so humanistic that he would have 
been embarrassed to disclose it out of context, was that the 
ordinary is the extraordinary.”42 Joyce’s lifelong 
fascination with the ordinary is thus on the order of a 
critical commonplace. The humanism to which Ellmann refers 
recalls “the affirmation of ordinary life,” to use Charles 
Taylor’s phrase, which Taylor traces to the reformation, and 
protestant theology’s growing emphasis on approaching all 
activities—not just liturgical ones—in a spirit of piety.43 
Taylor quotes from Paradise Lost, in what could be a Joycean 
motto: 
 
To know 
That which before us lies in daily life 
Is the prime wisdom.44 
                     
42 Ellmann, James Joyce, 3. 
43 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 226–7. 
44 John Milton, Paradise Lost: Authoritative Text, Sources 
and Backgrounds, Criticism, ed. Gordon Teskey (New York: 
Norton, 2005), 183. 
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According to this reading, Ulysses might exemplify a 
secularized extension of this cultural shift, which 
manifests itself within the novel in moments of Arnoldian 
pathos like Stephen’s famous remark in the Nestor episode: 
 
— That is God. 
Hooray! Ay! Whrrwhee! 
— What? Mr Deasy asked. 
— A shout in the street, Stephen answered, 
shrugging his shoulders.45 
 
Stephen’s invocation of an immanent God might be read as a 
distant, ironic echo of his artistic theory, the epiphany, 
defined as the realization of a special significance in the 
fleeting instant. 
      In the immediate context, however, Stephen is 
attempting to deflate Mr Deasy’s grandiloquent, teleological 
worldview: “All human history moves towards one great goal, 
the manifestation of God” (U, 2.380-1). Whether we are 
invited to greet this secularizing shift with or without 
irony is a question complicated throughout the novel, 
particularly in its opening motif, Buck Mulligan’s parodic 
                     
45 James Joyce, Ulysses (New York: Vintage, 1986), 2.383-6. 
Hereafter cited in text as “U.” 
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mass. One reading of this scene will make it a metonym for 
the novel as a whole, and see Mulligan’s mass as an ironic 
deflation of Christianity’s transcendental claims—a bowl of 
lather substituting for a chalice and an ungirdled robe for 
priestly vestments—just as the implied parallel between the 
events of the novel and the wanderings of Odysseus exposes 
the comic diminishment of modern life by comparison with the 
heroic age of Homer. This sort of reading is typical of the 
liberal humanist tradition that represented the mainstream 
of Joyce studies in the mid-twentieth century. Prominent 
examples include Robert Martin Adams, S. L. Goldberg, 
Patrick Parrinder, and Ellmann himself.46 What these 
interpretations share is an emphasis on Bloom as a gently 
ironized exemplar of modest virtues: “Bloom asserts a 
monistic decency”47; “Bloom’s rational and pacifistic 
                     
46 See Robert Martin Adams, Surface and Symbol: The 
Consistency of James Joyce's Ulysses (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1962); S. L. Goldberg, The 
Classical Temper: A Study of James Joyce's Ulysses (London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1963); Patrick Parrinder, James Joyce 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984); 
Richard Ellmann, The Consciousness of Joyce (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1977); Ellmann, Ulysses on the Liffey. 
47 Ellmann, Ulysses on the Liffey, 116.  
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attitude”48; “In Bloom, [Joyce] projects an image of what is 
still alive in the human spirit even among its most 
ambiguous manifestations.”49 These critics tend towards the 
view that part of Joyce’s accomplishment is to have 
transcended his material in writing Ulysses: “It is the 
wonder of this tremendous imaginative achievement that it 
builds, out of the commonest trash, and in perfect 
indifference to the reader, a movement which envelops and 
absorbs him.”50 Modernity, it is taken for granted, 
represents a diminished state, rendering Bloom’s modest 
virtues all the more poignant. 
      But liberal humanist accounts of Ulysses often seem to 
rest on a monumental misfit between form and content: the 
wild, epoch-defining prose experiments on which the mature 
Joyce’s reputation rests amount to anything but “ordinary,” 
“commonplace,” or “modest” literary achievements. Moreover, 
the dichotomy between symbolist and realist, Eliot and 
Pound, Gilbert and Budgen as I have developed it is 
altogether too neat, both as an account of the novel and of 
its critical history. Even as the liberal-humanist reading 
was in its ascendency, alternative approaches to the novel 
were developing. A. Walton Litz’s The Art of James Joyce 
                     
48 Parrinder, James Joyce, 172. 
49 Goldberg, The Classical Temper, 314. 
50 Adams, Surface and Symbol, 255.  
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(1961) launched a school of interpretation that looked to 
Joyce’s compositional methods as a means to gain purchase on 
the novel and to clarify its textual ambiguities. This 
analysis of the novel’s draft materials and note sheets 
helps to advance the terms of debate over the novel’s 
Homeric parallels for perhaps the first time since Eliot and 
Pound. Litz’s most forceful conclusions come out of his 
discussion of “Eumaeus,” where he notes the presence of 
vastly more Homeric allusions in Joyce’s notes for the 
episode than make it into the final version. Litz concludes 
that this excess reveals “how much more important the 
Homeric background was for Joyce than it is to the reader.”51 
But in an extraordinary statement from the preface to his 
book, Litz questions the ultimate usefulness of his methods:  
 
The irreducible gap between the creator and his work 
faces one at every turn. Indeed it now seems to me that 
the controlling design—the “figure in the carpet”—lies 
always in plain view, not in the dark corners explored 
by the genetic or biographical critic.52 
                     
51 At this point, Litz quotes Pound’s remark about the 
Homeric correspondences with approval. A. Walton Litz, The 
Art of James Joyce (London and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1961), 21. 
52 Ibid., v. 
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As works by Litz’s student, Michael Groden, and more 
recently, Hannah Sullivan, go to show, genetic methods still 
have much to tell us about Ulysses. But Litz’s conviction 
that the novel’s “controlling design” is to be found on the 
surface seems like a concession that genetic methods will 
not disclose, beneath the chaotic surface of the text, the 
kind of pervasive order posited by symbolist interpreters.53  
     In Ulysses in Progress, Groden gave considerably more 
credence than Litz to Joyce’s schemas and correspondences. 
But his investigation of the novel’s composition shows that 
rather than issuing from a predetermined plan, the structure 
of the novel was developed through a process of revision. In 
other words, during the extraordinary period during 1921 
when Joyce was revising proofs of the early episodes while 
writing the final ones, he was in a unique position to 
incorporate symbols, themes, and motifs that would knit the 
early and late sections of the novel together, while having 
both present at hand. The plan, too, is a product of the 
                     
53 Groden quotes Pound’s “Paris Letter” and notes that “Pound 
[and by extension Litz] greatly underestimated the 
importance the parallels and correspondences eventually 
assumed in Joyce’s mind.” Michael Groden, Ulysses in 
Progress (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 76.   
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process of composition.54 Genetic criticism offers reliable 
means to characterize that process. Moreover, Groden (and 
later Sullivan) point to the ways that Joyce’s methods share 
a certain affinity with the ordinary that makes his novel 
peculiarly apt for its representation.  
      First, all commentators agree that Joyce revises by 
adding: between the Rosenbach manuscript (replicating the 
typescript versions of each completed episode) and the first 
edition, the novel expanded by about a third.55 Hannah 
Sullivan identifies a dichotomy in modernist writers’ 
approach to revision between “deletive” and “additive” 
approaches, or excision and extension. The former, she 
notes, is frequently associated with the difficulty that 
arises from stripping out the connective tissue that makes a 
text comprehensible, while the latter fills in detail, 
presumably with the opposite effect on comprehension. But, 
as Sullivan argues with Joyce as a case in point, extension 
can pose interpretive challenges as formidable as excision. 
Excision “produces ellipses and asks the reader to fill in 
the missing syntax,” while extension tends towards 
“overdescription and the flat ‘and and and’ of parataxis.”56 
                     
54 Ibid., 194-200. 
55 Hans Walter Gabler, Forward to Joyce, Ulysses, xvii. 
56 Hannah Sullivan, The Work of Revision (Cambridge, MA, and 
London: Harvard University Press, 2013), 148. 
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The piling up of detail runs the risk of banality, an 
anxiety frequently voiced within Joyce studies: “Exegesis is 
not necessarily clarification, but extension and 
accretion.”57 But as Sullivan points out, Joyce’s additive 
procedure does not flatten out his prose, quite the 
opposite; that said, nor does it simply generate a higher 
degree of verisimilitude.58 The masses of accreted detail 
present particularly in the final episodes of the novel do 
not necessarily correlate with a realist style, a point that 
I will return to in greater detail later. 
      Second, Joyce consistently demonstrates a commitment 
to the productive value of error. In his work on the proofs, 
Joyce seems to discard any notion of an ideal text (the 
object of traditional philology and textual criticism) 
against which the proof at hand is to be compared. Instead, 
errors in the proof sometimes become spurs for innovation, 
as in a passage from “Wandering Rocks,” which, in the Gabler 
edition reads: 
 
 Blazes Boylan walked here and there in new tan 
shoes about the fruitsmelling shop, lifting fruits, 
                     
57 Finn Fordham, Lots of Fun at Finnegans Wake: Unravelling 
Universals (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 31. 
58 Sullivan, The Work of Revision, 192. 
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young juicy crinkled and plump red tomatoes, sniffing 
smells. (U, 10.307-9) 
 
The Critical and Synoptic Edition shows that the passage had 
initially read “lifting fruits, eying tomatoes, sniffing 
smells,” before a printer’s error on the proof rendered 
“eying” as “ying.” This prompted Joyce to revise the second 
clause, turning “ying” into “young,” and occasioning “juicy 
crinkled and plump.”59 Error becomes an opportunity to enrich 
the texture of the sentence: the prose’s sensuous attention 
toward the tomatoes mirrors Boylan’s sensuous attention 
toward “the blond girl” in the shop—“a young pullet,” 
according to the only snippet of his interior monologue we 
are afforded (U, 10.327). In other words, Joyce matches his 
fervor for schematizing with an openness to the aleatory 
possibilities of composition.  
These textual approaches to Ulysses had exposed Joyce’s 
compositional methods, but their significance for our 
interpretation of the novel remained uncertain. Groden, who 
                     
59 Matthew Creasy and Ronan Crowley, “Gablerizing Error: 
‘Wandering Rocks,’” in Errears and Erroriboose : Joyce and 
Error, ed. Matthew Creasy (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 
2011), 101–2. C.f. James Joyce et al., Ulysses: A Critical 
and Synoptic Edition, 3 vols. (New York: Garland, 1984), 
488-9. 
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had pushed back against Litz’s dismissal of the Homeric 
parallels, nonetheless concedes: 
 
Several major problems in interpreting Ulysses 
unfortunately gain little or no illumination from a 
study of Joyce’s work on the book. For example, the 
massive collection of notes, drafts, typescripts, and 
proofs reveals hardly anything about the Homeric 
parallel.60 
 
The textual approach was, in a sense, awaiting a theoretical 
paradigm that would situate its insights in the context of 
wider claims about the nature of literary texts, and found 
it in post-structuralism. Liberal humanist interpretations 
had relied on a variety of assumptions including a coherent, 
unified moral agent at the center of the novel, as well as a 
semblance of traditional plot through which character 
development can occur. But textual criticism had already 
confirmed a view of the novel as tending away from character 
and plot after about the eighth episode, with Joyce treating 
linguistic play increasingly as an end in itself.61 As a 
                     
60 Groden, Ulysses in Progress, 201. 
61 Groden makes the “Cyclops” episode the marker of an 
important textual break in Ulysses, as the exemplar of the 
“middle stage,” an approach he updates with reference to new 
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result, interpretations that wring major plot elements from 
the final episodes necessarily appear strained.62 But a 
method that privileges moments of internal self-
contradiction and discontinuity while viewing the text as 
emanating from an endlessly ramifying tissue of 
intertextuality will find much to applaud in Ulysses: in 
fact, the novel could be seen as the paradigm of 
poststructuralist textuality. 
 Derek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer’s introduction to 
Post-Structuralist Joyce acknowledges the Eliot- and Pound-
influenced streams of criticism (which they refer to as 
“transcendentalist” and “empiricist” respectively) as well 
as the “moralizing” or “humanist” approach, before 
                                                              
materials acquired by the National Library of Ireland in 
Michael Groden, “Joyce at Work on ‘Cyclops’: Toward a 
Biography of Ulysses,” James Joyce Quarterly 44.2 (Winter 
2007): 217–45. 
62 These might include Bloom forgiving Molly’s infidelity 
through identification with her in Circe, the spiritual 
meeting of Bloom and Stephen in Ithaca, or Molly’s internal 
reconciliation with Bloom in Penelope. See, for instance, 
the readings collected in James Joyce's Ulysses: Critical 
Essays, ed. Clive Hart and David Hayman (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1974).
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inaugurating their own.63 These arguments are difficult to 
generalize about, but suffice it to say they take a clear-
eyed approach to the ideological assumptions embedded in 
former approaches’ emphasis on the novel’s unity. Indeed, in 
the ensuing years, critical practice had tended towards 
treating the novel’s episodes discretely, with no obligation 
to locate signs of their putative unity. Moreover, debate 
within Joyce studies has shifted as a result from how best 
to defend Joyce’s inclusion in the canon to how Joyce’s 
texts might be read as a critique of the canon’s ideological 
assumptions.64 In other words, the poststructuralist account 
emphasizes the Joycean text as an active, dynamic 
participant in its own interpretation. 
 This view of the novel as a discontinuous, self-
contradictory, even self-deconstructing artifice has 
important implications for its engagement with the ordinary. 
Despite frequently being cited as the very archetype of the 
one-day novel, the real sense of the ordinary in Ulysses 
                     
63 Derek Attridge and Daniel Ferrer, “Introduction,” in Post-
Structuralist Joyce: Essays from the French, ed. Derek 
Attridge and Daniel Ferrer (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 5. 
64 Ibid., 8. 
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resides elsewhere.65 Placing a strong emphasis on the one-day 
conceit generates unsatisfactory interpretive choices, since 
a day made up of such a volume of events, most of which are 
linked together by elaborate concatenations of chance and 
coincidence, would strain against the canons of Aristotelian 
plausibility that the one-day conceit might otherwise be 
thought to bolster. Moreover, the one-day novel might be 
seen to undermine its “everydayness” by its very form: the 
twenty-four hour time period denies the reader firm grounds 
on which to tell apart routine from singular events, some 
admixture of both of which is surely constitutive of 
dailyness. 
The ordinary in Ulysses, then, despite its apparent 
ubiquity, is fugitive in the sense described by Maurice 
Blanchot: “Le quotidien, c’est le suspect (et l’oblique) qui 
toujours échappe à la claire décision de la loi.”66 
Blanchot’s sense of the quotidian as that which eludes the 
determination of the law, whether that be the law of the 
                     
65 See Robert Weninger, “Days of Our Lives: The One-Day Novel 
as Homage À Joyce,” in Bloomsday 100: Essays on Ulysses, ed. 
Morris Beja and Anne Fogarty (Gainesville: University Press 
of Florida, 2009). 
66 “The quotidian, is the suspect (and the oblique one) that 
always escapes the clear decision of the law.” Blanchot, 
L'entretien infini, 356. 
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state or the law of genre, is a further reminder that the 
realist mode cannot lay any special claim on its depiction. 
Likewise, conceiving of the novel’s symbolist aspects in 
terms of a comprehensive exclusion of the everyday might set 
up too stark a binary. It may be, then, that we are best 
served by proceeding from a de-centered view of the novel to 
consider the ordinary as a particular style of rhetoric that 
sometimes emerges from the interplay of realist and 
symbolist aesthetics. 
As an example, take the conclusion of “Aeolus,” where 
Stephen offers a response to Professor MacHugh’s disquision 
on the cultures of Greece and Rome and their bearing on 
Ireland and Britain in the form of a parable. It is the 
story of a pair of spinsters who climb to the top of 
Nelson’s Pillar on Sackville Street. At the top, they 
“settle down on their striped petticoats, peering up at the 
statue of the onehandled adulterer” (U, 7.1017-1018):  
 
—It gives them a crick in their necks, Stephen 
said, and they are too tired to look up or down or to 
speak. They put the bag of plums between them and eat 
the plums out of it, one after another, wiping off with 
their handkerchiefs the plumjuice that dribbles out of 
their mouths and spitting the plumstones slowly out 
between the railings. 
He gave a sudden and young laugh as a close. 
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       (U, 7.1023-28) 
 
MacHugh asks Stephen what he calls the story, to which he 
replies: “I call it A Pisgah Sight of Palestine or The 
Parable of The Plums” (U, 7.1057-1058). In an episode much 
given to doubling and reversal, Stephen’s reference to a 
“onehandled adulterer” naturally implies a “twohandled 
adulterer,” namely Charles Stuart Parnell, whose scandalous 
affair with Katharine O’Shea split the Irish Parliamentary 
Party and stymied the movement for Home Rule in 1890. 
 The spinsters take in the view of the city from atop 
the pillar: “They see the roofs and argue about where the 
different churches are: Rathmines’ blue dome, Adam and 
Eve’s, saint Laurence O’Toole’s” (U, 7.1010-12). With this 
in mind as well as the allusion to Parnell, the meanings of 
Stephen’s two titles become clearer: A Pisgah Sight of 
Palestine refers to the Book of Deuteronomy, in which  
 
Moses went up from the plains of Moab unto the 
mountain of Nebo, to the top of Pisgah, that is over 
against Jericho. And the Lord shewed him all the land 
of Gilead, unto Dan… 
And the Lord said unto him, This is the land which 
I sware unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, 
saying, I will give it unto thy seed: I have caused 
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thee to see it with thine eyes, but thou shalt not go 
over thither.67 
      (Deut. 34:1-12 KJV) 
 
The spinsters figure for the Irish people, who are granted a 
vision of an Ireland redeemed by the Catholic Church, the 
force responsible for Parnell’s downfall but cannot enter 
it, symbolically attributing Irish political paralysis to 
Ireland’s divided political and spiritual loyalties. Earlier 
in the episode, MacHugh had constructed an elaborate 
parallel between the Irish and the Greeks, united in 
MacHugh’s account by their “spiritual” nature and loyalty to 
“lost causes”: “Success for us is the death of the intellect 
and of the imagination” (U, 7.551-2). There is an explicit 
parallel with both nations’ imperial conquerors, the English 
and the Romans, who are posited as the embodiment of a crude 
materiality: “The Roman, like the Englishman who follows in 
his footsteps, brought to every new shore on which he set 
                     
67 It is also the title of a descriptive geography of the 
holy land, Thomas Fuller, A Pisgah-Sight of Palestine and 
the Confines Thereof, with the History of the Old and New 
Testament Acted Thereon (London,: Printed by J.F. for John 
Williams, 1650). 
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his foot (on our shore he never set it) only his cloacal 
obsession” (U, 7.491-3).68 
 MacHugh invokes a third and final analogy by quoting at 
length a speech by John F. Taylor advocating for the revival 
of the Irish language, in which Taylor figures the contest 
between Irish and English languages as a debate between 
Moses and an Egyptian priest: the latter touts the might of 
Egyptian culture as against that of the nomadic Israelites, 
but, Taylor argues, should Moses have acquiesced to these 
demands for assimilation, he would never have led the 
Israelites to the promised land. Stephen’s parable takes up 
the analogy set out in MacHugh’s recitation, but rather than 
aligning Parnell with Moses (the transgression that barred 
Moses from the promised land remained obscure, whereas 
                     
68 The irony of MacHugh’s disdain for Roman and English 
“materialism” as embodied in their amenities is that the 
“spiritual” inhabitants of Dublin would not have the benefit 
of a central sewer until 1906. MacHugh’s phrase “cloacal 
obsession” is also, of course, a neat jab at H. G. Wells, 
one of Joyce’s most strident critics, who had coined the 
phrase in a review of A Portrait of the Artist as a Young 
Man. Don Gifford and Robert J. Seidman, Ulysses Annotated: 
Notes for James Joyce's Ulysses, Revised and Enlarged ed. 
(Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1988), 
137. 
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Parnell’s was all too clear), he situates the Irish people 
themselves in sight of their goal but unable to reach it, 
precisely because of their spiritual commitment to the 
Catholic Church.69 In other words, Stephen’s parable reverses 
the terms of MacHugh’s argument, and implies that, in fact, 
MacHugh’s panegyric to Irish spiritualism represents the 
post-facto justification of the loser, an attempt to restore 
some dignity to the experience of defeat.  
 MacHugh, in short, who “mostly sees double” in the 
words of Lenehan’s limerick, will view the Irish as Greeks 
one minute, Hebrews the next, in short anything to absolve 
himself and his compatriots from the difficulty of living as 
Irishmen in the present (U, 7.580). It is fitting that Joyce 
should nominate “rhetoric” as the art of the “Aeolus” 
episode, since rhetoric in its modern, pejorative sense—
“mere,” “empty” rhetoric—is all that the men who are 
assembled in Crawford’s office are armed with to meet the 
Irish dilemma. Stephen’s second title, then, The Parable of 
the Plums, focuses attention on the limits of rhetoric, and 
                     
69 And, it must be said, due to their commitment to spirits, 
to activate one of the latent puns that shadow every lofty 
invocation of “spirit” in the episode. J. J. O’Molloy’s 
“hectic flush” and Myles Crawford’s “incipient jigs” are 
only the most outward manifestations of a general condition 
(7.293, 366). 
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by extension, the limits of figurative language. The 
“plumstones” that the spinsters spit between the railings 
are metaphors for not having metaphors, symbols of the naked 
reality that resists rhetorical transformation, despite the 
earnest efforts of those assembled at the Freeman’s Journal. 
From “Aeolus” on, Ulysses invokes the ordinary entirely from 
within the context of a consideration of the limits of 
figurative language. The episode thus represents a textual 
break within the novel, a decisive turn away from the 
symbolist and realist dialectic of the novel’s first section 
toward the promiscuous textual play of its later episodes.  
 
II. Transubstantiation of the Commonplace  
 
The interpretive flexibility offered by the post-
structuralist approach should not, however, obscure our 
sense of the novel’s development, and it is equally clear 
that the novel treats the ordinary differently in the early 
episodes than it does from the later ones. Ulysses declares 
its interest in the ordinary in the novel’s first spoken 
lines, as Buck Mulligan intones with mock-solemnity, 
“Introibo ad altare Dei”: “I will go up to God’s altar” (U, 
1.5).70 This “ordinary” is the ordinary of the Latin mass, 
that section of the Eucharist that remains largely unchanged 
                     
70 Gifford and Seidman, Ulysses Annotated, 13. 
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throughout the liturgical calendar. But the implements of 
Mulligan’s mass are also notable for their ordinariness: a 
bowl of lather for his chalice, a dressing gown for his 
priestly robe (U, 1.2-3). At the center of the Eucharist is 
the mysterious process known to theologians since the Fourth 
Lateran Council (1215) as transubstantiation: the mundane 
stuff of bread and wine is transformed by God’s power into 
the body and blood of Christ. The doctrine was elaborated in 
terms borrowed from Aristotle: substance and accident. 
Substance refers to the immaterial essence of the thing: 
“tableness,” in the classic example, and accident to its 
outward manifestations: its dimensions, state of repair, 
type of material, and so on. In the ceremony of the 
Eucharist, the accidents of the host remain unchanged while 
its immaterial essence is transformed into the body and 
blood of Christ.71 Ulysses, this opening scene seems to 
suggest, will be concerned above all with the sanctification 
of the ordinary: everyday life will maintain its outer 
appearance, but have its inner essence altered by the 
transformative power of artistic representation. 
      Transubstantiation was clearly an important trope to 
Joyce. Stanislaus Joyce recounts a disagreement with his 
                     
71 Diarmaid MacCullouch, A History of Christianity: The First 
Three Thousand Years (London and New York: Allen Lane, 2009), 
405–6. 
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brother over attending a Good Friday Mass wherein he uses a 
similar formulation:  
 
Don’t you think... there is a certain resemblance 
between the mystery of the Mass and what I am trying to 
do? I mean that I am trying in my poems to give people 
some kind of intellectual pleasure or spiritual 
enjoyment by converting the bread of everyday life into 
something that has a permanent artistic life of its 
own.72 
 
In A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Stephen comes to 
think of the artist as “a priest of eternal imagination, 
transmuting the daily bread of experience into the radiant 
body of everliving life.”73 Much later, in Finnegans Wake, 
Joyce’s affinity for linguistic pairings and substitutions 
continues to work on the metaphor of the Eucharist. If there 
can be transubstantiation, then according to Aristotle’s 
binary, there can also be transaccidentation: the 
transformation of outer appearance while the inner essence 
remains the same. Thus in “Shem the Penman” (1.7), 
                     
72 Stanislaus Joyce, My Brother's Keeper: James Joyce's Early 
Years (New York: Viking Press, 1958), 103–4. 
73 James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man 
(London: Penguin, 1992), 240. 
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transaccidentation is (slightly mockingly) evoked as Shem’s 
theory of art: “Reflecting from his own individual person 
life unlivable, transaccidentated through the slow fires of 
consciousness into a dividual chaos, perilous, potent, 
common to allflesh, human only, mortal.”74 Between A 
Portrait’s evocation of the Eucharist and its reversal in 
Finnegans Wake, we can discern the development of an 
increasingly playful attitude to these “Eucharistic” tropes, 
pushing their metaphorical potential ever further. 
      Joyce began borrowing from this particular cluster of 
ecclesiastical terms much earlier than A Portrait, already 
in some of his earliest writing: the “epiphanies” composed 
between 1900 and 1903. These pieces involved the search for 
“sudden spiritual manifestations,” moments when “the soul of 
the commonest object... seems to us radiant.” Some of these 
moments are even described as “Eucharistic.”75 The term 
epiphany, of course, denotes the announcement of God’s 
presence in the world through the person of Jesus Christ by 
his appearance to the Magi.76 And this wasn’t Joyce’s only 
                     
74 James Joyce, Finnegans Wake (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 186. 
75 Cited in Ellmann, James Joyce, 87. 
76 “Epiphany, n.1” OED Online. September 2013. Oxford 
University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/63446 
(accessed July 18, 2013). 
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such secular refashioning of a Christian concept in those 
early years. Following the commission from George Russell to 
write a short story for Irish Homestead that would lead to 
Dubliners, Joyce informed his university friend C. P. 
Curran, “I am writing a series of epiclets—ten—for a 
paper.”77 Ellmann explains that “epicleti, an error for 
epicleses (Latin) or epicleseis (Greek), referred to an 
invocation still found in the mass of the Eastern Church” 
calling on the Holy Spirit “to transform the host into the 
body and blood of Christ.”78 In other words, Joyce tended to 
frame the aim of his early work as the revelation of some 
kind of transcendent essence in the stuff of daily life. 
And, as Ellmann makes clear, the particular valence of the 
term, be it “epiphany,” “epicleti,” or “eucharist,” is less 
important than the generalized sense of transformation from 
the mundane into something higher. That said, it is 
important to bear in mind that where they reflect on Joyce’s 
                     
77 Ellmann, James Joyce, 169; James Joyce, Selected Letters 
of James Joyce (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), 22. 
78 Ellmann, James Joyce, 169. For a careful taxonomy of these 
terms in Joyce, see Robert Boyle, “Miracle in Black Ink: A 
Glance at Joyce's Use of His Eucharistic Image,” James Joyce 
Quarterly 10.1 (Fall 1972): 47–60. 
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earliest work, Stephen’s aesthetic theories in A Portrait 
are already being ironized.79 
      Tracing the development of this rhetoric, and in 
particular, the increasingly ironic manner in which Joyce 
invokes it, offers us a novel outlook on the vexed critical 
debate over the epiphany, which, having lain dormant for 
many years, has recently seen an upsurge of interest from 
critics concerned with the ordinary. Whereas Liesl Olson 
defines the aesthetic of the epiphany in opposition to the 
ordinary, Michael Sayeau reads them as “performative 
theorizations of modern narrative form and its limits.”80 
Both agree, however, that in Ulysses Joyce discarded the 
aesthetic of epiphany in favor of something else, giving 
                     
79 See the debate between Hugh Kenner, who views the 
treatment of epiphanies in A Portrait as an index of Joyce’s 
satirical intentions toward Stephen, and Robert Scholes, who 
disagrees with this reading. C.f. Scholes, “Joyce and the 
Epiphany: The Key to the Labyrinth?” in Critical Essays on 
James Joyce's a Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, ed. 
Philip Brady and James F. Carens (New York: G.K. Hall, 1998), 
274. 
80 Olson, Modernism and the Ordinary, 43; Michael Sayeau, 
Against the Event: The Everyday and the Evolution of 
Modernist Narrative (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 230. 
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rise in the novel to a new outlook on the ordinary. What 
that something else is can be explained by way of a 
different figure for the work of art drawn from a religious 
context, one evoked by Molly Bloom in “Calypso”: 
metempsychosis. Fittingly enough, Molly picks up the word 
from the book she is reading, and asks Leopold to define it: 
 
— Metempsychosis, he said, is what the ancient Greeks 
called it. They used to believe you could be changed 
into an animal or a tree, for instance. What they 
called nymphs, for example. (U, 4.375–7) 
 
Against the Christian doctrine of transubstantiation, with 
its unidirectional transformation of the mundane into the 
sacred, the pagan concept of metempsychosis evokes a 
perpetual cycle of transformation.81  
At least one metaphorical valence of this cycle becomes 
clear at the end of the episode, in the celebrated scene of 
Bloom’s defecation as he reads a “prize titbit” called 
Matcham’s Masterstroke: “Quietly he read, restraining 
                     
81 Cf. James Ramey, who reads metempsychosis as a figure for 
the novel’s intertextuality with Homer, et al. James Ramey, 
“Intertextual Metempsychosis in Ulysses: Murphy, Sinbad, and 
the ‘U.P.: Up’ Postcard,” James Joyce Quarterly 45.1 (Fall 
2007): 97–114. 
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himself, the first column and, yielding but resisting began 
the second. Midway, his last resistance yielding, he allowed 
his bowels to ease themselves quietly as he read, reading 
still patiently” (U, 4.506—8). After weighing the idea of 
collaborating on a story submission with Molly, Bloom 
completes his bowel movement: “He tore away half the prize 
story sharply and wiped himself with it” (U, 4.537). The 
exact simultaneity in this scene between defecation and the 
consumption of a “low” literary form has led many readers 
and critics to make the scene exemplary of modernist disdain 
for popular culture. But this reading neglects the cyclical 
motif at work throughout the episode. On his way to the 
jakes, for instance, Bloom stops to ponder his garden: “Want 
to manure the whole place over, scabby soil. A coat of liver 
of sulphur. All soil like that without dung” (U, 4.476–9). A 
certain faith that what might otherwise be considered waste 
can still be put to use animates the novel’s engagement not 
only with popular and ephemeral forms of art, but by 
extension, with the whole massive ephemera of the ordinary 
and the everyday. Rather than seek its transubstantiation 
into some eternal, spiritual, form, the novel rather locates 
the ordinary in endless circuits of use, exchange, and 
reuse. 
Kenner stresses that Bloom reorients the novel away 
from Stephen’s solipsistic tendencies. “So portentous,” 
writes Kenner, “is Bloom’s appearance that the sun in the 
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sky is set back, and the day of Ulysses commences over at 8 
a.m.”82 Bloom’s mind might be taken up with the events of his 
day and the personalities surrounding him to be sure 
(Dignam’s funeral and Molly’s infidelity loom large), but 
these preoccupations mingle promiscuously with a capacious 
interest in nearly everything, and moreover, a delight in 
the imaginative transformations that can be wrought on this 
heterogeneous material. It is Bloom, rather than Stephen, 
who can legitimately be called the novel’s artist of the 
everyday. In The Practice of Everyday Life, Certeau 
celebrates the bricoleur, the ordinary person who “makes 
do,” exercising his or her creativity through unexpected 
combinations of the stuff of daily life. Certeau reacts 
against a commonly held view of the consumer as a passive 
subject, particularly one who absorbs popular entertainments 
and consumer goods uncritically. We have come to accept this 
sort of account, he suggests, because of an over-reliance on 
empirical methods for studying consumer behavior: 
 
Once the images broadcast by television and the time 
spent in front of the TV set have been analyzed, it 
remains to be asked what the consumer makes of these 
images and during these hours. The thousands of people 
                     
82 Hugh Kenner, Ulysses, Revised ed. (Baltimore and London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 55. 
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who buy a health magazine, the customers in a 
supermarket, the practitioners of urban space, the 
consumers of newspaper stories and legends—what do they 
make of what they “absorb,” receive, and pay for? What 
do they do with it?83 
 
With that question, Certeau re-conceptualizes the consumer 
as an active participant in making meaning out of the 
objects and texts they encounter. Ulysses is set at the dawn 
of the social configuration we now call consumer capitalism: 
only four years, for instance, before Henry Ford began 
producing the Model T. But the novel already depicts a 
society much affected by the mass production and 
distribution of another kind of commodity: popular images. 
      The turn of the twentieth century saw an explosion in 
the image-world of the modern city. Peter Fritzsche has 
argued that “around 1900, the messy debris of print culture 
seemed to overwhelm the well ordered archive of economic and 
political power.”84 The metropolitan newspaper became the 
indispensable guide to the city, not merely reporting on, 
but directly influencing, the movements and patterns of 
daily life. Fritzsche is concerned to show that this was 
                     
83 de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, 31. 
84 Peter Fritzsche, Reading Berlin 1900 (Cambridge, MA and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1996), 5; ibid. 
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not, as some have assumed, a one-way process in which 
powerful interests orchestrated behaviors in service of a 
nascent consumer economy. Rather, in an era before mass 
consolidation of the press, the sheer variety of 
publications made the word-city a genuinely contested 
terrain:  
 
Words and narrative forms worked on the city in broad 
and unmistakable strokes, while they also generated 
countless alternative versions and editions. At every 
point, the word-city pointed out instability and 
inadequacy as well as predictability; it worked to 
startle and invite as well as to control movement; it 
showed the contradictory as well as the coherent.85 
 
In short, the metropolitan newspaper can be read as a 
modernist text, especially insofar as it could be haphazard 
and discontinuous, avoiding “the literary form’s claim to 
comprehensiveness, its narrative continuity, and its 
reliance on a stock of retrievable characters tended to 
enclose and harmonize the urban setting.” For Fritzsche, 
                     
85 Ibid., 49–50. 
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this makes the newspaper a better exemplar of modernism even 
than the novels of Döblin, Dos Passos, or Joyce.86 
      Part of Ulysses’ unique purchase on the ordinary is 
its ability to resist these harmonizing and enclosing 
tendencies. But Fritzsche’s description of the word-city as 
“an imaginary symbolic order that was as important as the 
city itself” and which encompassed a range of genres—“the 
novel, drama, vaudeville, photography, advertisements”—
reminds us what is at stake in modernism’s embrace of 
popular culture: not only the relationship between high and 
low art, but the character of everyday life in modernity. As 
such, Bloom is the avatar of a sort of counter-aesthetic to 
Stephen’s epiphanies. Far from seeking an experience of the 
divine or the transcendent in ordinary things, Bloom tends 
to relish things as they are, with a zest for the bodily and 
the material apparent from the first moment he is introduced 
to the reader. That said, Bloom also possesses a vibrant and 
active imagination, and is the exemplar of “the polytropic 
potential that Joyce found in everyday language.”87 
                     
86 Ibid.; See also Peter Fritzsche, The Turbulent World of 
Franz Göll: An Ordinary Berliner Writes the Twentieth 
Century (Cambridge MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 
2011). 
87 Fritz Senn, “Book of Many Turns,” James Joyce Quarterly 
10.1 (Fall 1972): 42. 
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Importantly, however, Bloom’s fantasies are less concerned 
with transfiguring the world around him than with combining 
and recombining the flotsam of his consciousness. Take this 
example from “Calypso”: 
 
Somewhere in the east... Walk along a strand, strange 
land, come to a city gate, sentry there, old ranker 
too, old Tweedy’s big moustaches, leaning on a long 
kind of spear. Wander through awned streets. Turbaned 
faces going by. Dark caves of carpet shops, big man, 
Turko the terrible, seated crosslegged, smoking a 
coiled pipe. Cries of sellers in the streets. Drink 
water scented with fennel, sherbet. Dander along the 
way. Might meet a robber or two. Well, meet him. 
Getting on to sundown. The shadows of the mosques among 
the pillars: priest with a scroll rolled up. A shiver 
of the trees, signal, the evening wind. I pass on. 
Fading gold sky. A mother watches me from her doorway. 
She calls her children home in their dark language. 
High wall: beyond strings twanged. Night sky, moon, 
violet, colour of Molly’s new garters. Strings. Listen. 
A girl playing one of those instruments what do you 
call them: dulcimers. I pass. (U, 1.84-98) 
 
Bloom’s moment of imaginative interiority is not an 
epiphany; it does not reveal any sacred essence or 
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fundamental truth within the sunlit street. Indeed, 
virtually nothing in Bloom’s reverie refers directly to his 
surroundings. Bloom imagines a scene in which fennel and 
sherbet scent the air; Molly’s father, “old Tweedy,” appears 
in the guise of a sentry; and a carpet seller adopts the 
guise of a pantomime character, Turko the Terrible; the 
color of the night sky is compared with that of Molly’s 
garters. Bloom’s fantasy mingles elements of orientalist 
stereotype, personal history, and popular culture, and is 
thus an example of the sort of combinatorial play that 
Certeau locates at the heart of the ordinary. 
      “Turko the Terrible” already appears with a more 
specific invocation in “Telemachus,” while Stephen thinks of 
his mother: “She heard old Royce sing in the pantomime of 
Turko the Terrible and laughed with others when he sang...” 
(U, 1.257-8). The difference between Stephen’s and Bloom’s 
invocations of Turko speaks to a difference between them as 
characters, as well as an incipient difference between the 
novel’s orientation in its opening episodes as against its 
later episodes. Stephen’s invocation is freighted with 
emotional significance, and easily recuperable for the 
reader as a token of verisimilitude. “Old Royce,” Edward 
Royce, did indeed perform the role of Turko in Dublin, 
according to an 1873 Irish Times review located by Cheryl 
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Herr.88 Displays of historical detail like this are available 
throughout the novel, waiting to be activated by a 
sufficiently curious reader, but by no means needing to be. 
These moments provide the evidence favored by those critics 
and readers who view Ulysses as a work of hyperbolic 
realism. Bloom’s fantasy, on the other hand, while not 
resistant to recuperation, is less freighted with 
characterological significance, and more available to the 
kinds of imaginative deformation that Bloom practices. 
Cheryl Herr argues that the pantomime offered Joyce a ready 
model for the sort of intertextuality he practiced 
throughout Ulysses:  
 
The theatre of Joyce’s day was highly and self-
consciously intertextual. Melodrama begat burlesque, 
pantomime begat extravaganza, pantomime quoted 
burlesque, and music hall interpenetrated the lot... 
Joyce exploits this intertextuality of form in 
composing characters, showing the presence in their 
                     
88 “Mr Royce was very amusing as King Turco; his get-up was 
extremely grotesque, and he infused an amount of spirit into 
his part that had much to do with the success of the 
pantomime.” Cited in Cheryl Herr, Joyce's Anatomy of Culture 
(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 
120. 
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thought and behavior of material that emanates from the 
self-quoting stage.89 
 
Pantomime, in other words, is another component of the word-
city that Joyce explores in Ulysses; moreover, it offers a 
model in miniature of the novel’s own procedures. 
      Ordinary life in Joyce’s Dublin is thus characterized 
by the rapid circulation of various communicative forms, 
some new (like the daily newspaper), some old (like the 
incessant stream of gossip that animates the city’s pub 
denizens). The novel frequently offers scenes of characters 
who read and/or quote from their reading: Molly Bloom is an 
avid reader of romantic fiction (such as the fictional 
Sweets of Sin, procured for her by Leopold in “Wandering 
Rocks” (U, 10.641)), and Gerty MacDowell identifies as a 
reader of the Princess Novelette and the Lady’s Pictorial 
(U, 13.110). The citizen reads snatches from a variety of 
newspapers in Barney Kiernan’s pub, while the whole “Aeolus” 
episode is, of course, set at the offices of the Freeman’s 
Journal, complete with mock newspaper headlines. In other 
words, Joyce’s characters are immersed in a thoroughly 
citational culture, and use the circuits of text that make 
up the modern word-city to orient themselves in it. As R. B. 
Kershner remarks of the chiastic description that opens 
                     
89 Ibid., 120–1. 
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“Aeolus,” the novel might be read as though “the circulation 
of mail, alcohol, and public transportation” are “the 
fundamental ‘story’ here and the business about Stephen, 
Bloom, and the newspaper hangers-on… mere detail.”90 As 
opposed to earlier writers working within the realist 
tradition, who were concerned to equip their characters with 
distinctive and memorable voices, disclosing their 
individuality, Joyce is alive to the extent to which his 
characters’ thought and speech are interpenetrated by 
cliché, borrowing, and quotation. Intertextuality becomes a 
principle of realism. Or, to put it another way, Ulysses 
discloses that realism is founded not on a particular 
relationship between text and an extra-literary world, but 
on a relation between texts.  
      In the realist tradition, there is a scene so 
recurrent that it could be described as the genre’s matrix: 
a scene of reading wherein a character encounters another 
genre of text. Erich Auerbach argues that Dante’s Commedia 
should be read as a precursor to the realist novel insofar 
as Dante uses its otherworldly setting to scrutinize the 
earthly society of which he was a part.91 For instance, Dante 
                     
90 R. B. Kershner, The Culture of Joyce's Ulysses (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 114–5. 
91 “In a spiritualist culture, where earthly happening was 
either disregarded or looked upon as a mere metaphorical 
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encounters the adulterous lovers Paulo and Francesca in 
Canto V of the Inferno. It is a commonplace of Dante 
criticism to assert that, in various ways, Canto V stands in 
a metonymic relationship to the Commedia as a whole.92 
Francesca da Rimini had been married to Giovanni Malatesta 
to settle a conflict between the Malatestas and the Lord of 
Rimini. Giovanni was a cripple, and Francesca soon fell in 
love with his brother, Paolo. When Giovanni discovered their 
affair, he killed them both, hence Francesca’s remark “The 
realm of Cain / waits for the man who quenched us of our 
                                                              
existence leading up to man’s real and final destiny, 
considered as the goal and meaning of earthly happening.” 
Erich Auerbach, Dante: Poet of the Secular World, trans. 
Ralph Manheim (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 
178. 
92 This is apparent in what Paolo Valesio describes as “the 
central axis of Inferno V”: “the esthetico-ethical 
reevaluation of a love story as instancing the problematic 
connection between the autonomy of passion and the 
heteronomy of sin” (a theme that resonates with Flaubert’s 
Madame Bovary). Paolo Valesio, "Canto V: The Fierce Dove," 
in Inferno: A Canto-by-Canto Commentary, ed. Allen 
Mandelbaum, Anthony Oldcorn, and Charles Ross, Lectura 
Dantis (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of 
California Press, 1998), 71, 73. 
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lives” (Inferno, V.106-7).93 The decisive moment in Dante’s 
encounter with Francesca occurs when he asks, 
 
“But tell me, in the season of sweet sighs, 
how did it happen, what made Love give way 
that you should know the truth of your desires?” 
(Inferno, V.118-20) 
 
Francesca replies, 
 
“One day we two were reading for delight 
about how love had mastered Lancelot; 
we were alone and innocent and felt 
No cause to fear. And as we read, at times 
we went pale, as we caught each other’s glance, 
but we were conquered by one point alone. 
For when we read that the much-longed-for smile 
accepted such a gentle lover’s kiss, 
this man, whom nothing will divide from me, 
Trembled to place his lips upon my mouth.” 
(Inferno, V.127-136) 
 
                     
93 Dante, Inferno, edited and translated by Anthony Esolen 
(New York: Modern Library, 2003). All references in text are 
to this edition. 
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It is the adulterous romance of Lancelot and Guinevere that 
tempts Paulo and Francesca to transgress. Dante’s invocation 
of the Lancelot and Guinevere legend encodes a rhetorical 
comparison between the Commedia and the genre of chivalric 
romance from which the legend derives. The latter, he seems 
to say, seduces its readers with lascivious appeals to base 
instincts; it is a literature of fantasy, while Dante’s 
work, by contrast, situates such transgressions in a morally 
serious world and deals with their consequences. Readers of 
chivalric romance are prone, like Paulo and Francesca, to 
forget the line that divides reality from representation, a 
line firmly entrenched in Dante’s world; the Commedia is 
aligned rhetorically with the real. In Charles Singleton’s 
phrase, “The fiction of the Divine Comedy is that it is not 
fiction.”94 
      Three centuries later, Cervantes’ Don Quixote employs 
a variety of metafictional devices to claim its descent from 
actual events. One of the most well known is Cervantes’ 
insistence throughout the novel that he is relating actual 
events at second hand, by translating and assembling 
accounts from first hand witnesses. The most important of 
these is the Moorish chronicler Cid Hamet Ben Engeli, whose 
“History of Don Quixote de la Mancha” falls into the 
                     
94 Charles S. Singleton, Commedia: Elements of Structure 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), 62. 
208 
 
author’s hands in Part 1, Chapter 9 of the novel, after his 
first source breaks off. Paradoxically, the claim not to 
have witnessed the events he describes directly helps 
Cervantes make a subtle claim for their authenticity:  
 
If there is any objection to be made about the 
truthfulness of this account, it can only be that its 
author was an Arab, and it’s a well-known feature of 
Arabs that they’re all liars; but since they’re such 
enemies of ours, it’s to be supposed that he fell short 
of the truth rather than exaggerating it.95  
 
By blaming any lack of fealty to events on an intermediary 
author rather than himself, of course, Cervantes smuggles in 
the premise that those events actually happened in the first 
place. 
      As many critics have noted, the comedy of Don Quixote 
is of the second order: unlike, say, Ariosto, whose parody 
of the chivalric romance takes place in a thoroughly comic 
universe, Cervantes keeps the relationship between 
                     
95 Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, The Ingenious Hidalgo Don 
Quixote De La Mancha, trans. John Rutherford (New York and 
London: Penguin Books, 2001), 76. 
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representation and the real in a constant state of tension.96 
Another way that the novel does this is through its 
explanation for Don Quixote’s madness: that he has somehow 
internalized the chivalric romances that dominate his 
library, mistaking them for true accounts:  
 
Our hidalgo was soon so absorbed in these books that 
his nights were spent reading from dusk till dawn, and 
his days from dawn till dusk, until the lack of sleep 
and excess of reading withered his brain, and he went 
mad.97  
 
Following his catastrophic first sally, Don Quixote’s 
friends, the priest and the barber, ransack his library with 
the intention of burning the books responsible for his 
madness. However, they quickly find themselves caught up 
trying to adjudicate between the books’ capacity to beguile 
                     
96 Singleton also compares the world of the Commedia with the 
world of Orlando Furioso, noting that “one meets that voice 
of the poet speaking out to declare, within the work and 
with his peculiar irony, that these deeds are invented, that 
they are spun out of a poet’s brain.” Commedia: Elements of 
Structure, 63. 
97 Cervantes Saavedra, The Ingenious Hidalgo Don Quixote De 
La Mancha, 26–7. 
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and their literary merit. Quixote’s housekeeper gives the 
most direct expression to the fundamental distrust of 
representation in her reaction to Quixote’s books:  
 
As soon as the housekeeper saw them, she ran out of the 
room and back again clutching a bowl of holy water and 
some hyssop, and said: 
“Here you are reverend father, take this and 
sprinkle the room with it, just in case there’s one of 
those hoards of enchanters from those books in here, and 
he puts a spell on us as punishment for the torments 
they’ll undergo once we’ve wiped them off the face of 
the earth.”98 
 
Thus, Don Quixote, too, draws a rhetorical distinction 
between the world according to chivalric romance, in which 
credulous readers are seduced by fantasy, and that of the 
novel, which, by treating its own relationship to the real 
as problematic, makes a stronger claim to realism. 
      Finally, another three hundred years later and with 
the realist novel in full flower, Flaubert’s Madame Bovary 
repeats a version of this rhetorical gesture when it 
describes the influence of her reading over the formation of 
Emma’s personality. During her convent schooling, Emma 
                     
98 Ibid., 52. 
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becomes a voracious reader of romance novels supplied by an 
“old maid who came for a week each month to mend the linen.” 
These novels 
 
Were all about love, lovers, sweethearts, persecuted 
ladies fainting in lonely pavilions, postilions killed 
at every relay, horses ridden to death on every page, 
somber forests, heart-aches, vows, sobs, tears and 
kisses, little boatrides by moonlight, nightingales in 
shady groves, gentlemen brave as lions, gentle as 
lambs, virtuous as no one ever was, always well 
dressed, and weeping like fountains.99 
 
The narrator’s sarcastic tone alerts the reader that the 
vision of life that Emma imbibes from these novels will lead 
to inevitable disappointment. Meant as an escape from the 
tedium of convent life, Emma’s reading only exacerbates her 
boredom during the provincial, married life that follows. 
      In his classic statement on realism in the literary 
tradition, Auerbach reads Madame Bovary as an attack on “the 
hollowness of nineteenth-century bourgeois culture”: 
 
                     
99 Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary, ed. and trans. Paul de 
Man (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1965), 26. 
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The essence of the happenings of ordinary contemporary 
life seemed to Flaubert to consist not in tempestuous 
actions and passions, not in demonic men and forces, 
but in the prolonged chronic state whose surface 
movement is mere empty bustle.100 
 
But to push this reading too far would elide one of the 
central ambiguities of the novel, not to mention Flaubert’s 
famous (and famously problematic) identification with his 
heroine. If a straightforward condemnation of bourgeois 
mores was all that was intended, much of the psychological 
exposition devoted to Emma would be incidental, and she 
could be allowed to play the part of a victim of 
circumstance unambiguously. Likewise, if Emma were to be the 
novel’s unique object of condemnation, the social critique 
that Auerbach identifies in the passage quoted above would 
be superfluous. Auerbach, like the novel itself, refuses to 
relinquish this ambiguous confection of individual blame and 
social critique.101 Flaubert provides the impetus for the 
particular ethical torque Auerbach gives to the ordinary:  
                     
100 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in 
Western Literature, trans. Willard R. Trask (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1953), 490–1. 
101 “A real tragic heroine she is not... the very 
wretchedness of that life, in which she remains immersed... 
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The serious treatment of everyday reality, the rise of 
more extensive and socially inferior human groups to 
the position of subject matter for problematic-
existential representation, on the one hand; on the 
other, the embedding of random persons and events in 
the general course of contemporary history, the fluid 
historical background—these, we believe, are the 
foundations of modern realism, and it is natural that 
the broad and elastic form of the novel should 
increasingly impose itself for a rendering comprising 
so many elements.102 
 
If Emma’s culpability is at issue throughout the novel, then 
the scene of reading, in which she willingly acquiesces to 
fantasies that are nonetheless (in their mild way) illicitly 
supplied, can be read as a metonym for the book as a whole. 
Those romances, historical and otherwise, set in motion the 
whole gamut of fantasies that determine Emma’s fate, and 
thus signify a maladjusted relationship with the real. 
      In each of these three instances, the scene of reading 
has functioned metonymically in relation to the work in 
                                                              
excludes the idea of true tragedy... But neither is she 
comic.” Ibid., 490. 
102 Ibid., 491. 
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which it occurs. Equally, the scene of encounter between 
realism and its others functions metonymically relative to 
the whole realist tradition. Throughout its history, realism 
has defined itself by excluding various generic others, 
ranging from the chivalric romances invoked by Dante and 
Cervantes to the historical romances of Walter Scott, cited 
by Flaubert.103 This is one of realism’s distinctive 
rhetorics of not having rhetoric: other genres produce 
illusions, while realism offers transparent, unmediated 
access to the real. By aligning literary artifice with other 
genres, realism disclaims its status as a convention-bound 
literary practice, naturalizing its own codes of 
representation and disguising its basic fact: realism is a 
relation of texts to other texts, not a relation to the 
real. Ulysses, however, refuses to cast out putatively 
inferior genres. Instead, recognizing their imbrication in 
ordinary life, it incorporates them into a new textual 
economy of recycling and citation.  
 
III. “Cyclops” and the Two Economies of the Ordinary 
 
 In the “Cyclops” episode, the latent metaphors of text 
as economy and words as tokens in circulation are activated 
by elevating the contrast between the novel’s earlier, 
                     
103 Flaubert, Madame Bovary, 26. 
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predominantly realist, style and the mode of linguistic 
excess favored by the later episodes to a structural 
principle. The episode’s story is contained in the discourse 
of “Nameless,” who reports on events in Barney Kiernan’s pub 
in the manner of a classic unreliable narrator, whose 
prejudices and biases seep into his account of events in 
subtle ways: the “realism” of his discourse consists in its 
verbal and psychological acuity. But Nameless’s narration is 
interrupted by thirty-two passages written in a variety of 
different styles, and clearly not issuing from Nameless. 
Scholars have tended to follow Don Gifford in referring to 
these interpolations as “parodies,” highlighting their 
affinity with the pastiche of historical styles that makes 
up “Oxen of the Sun,” but that term seems to me to 
presuppose too much about their role in the episode. 
      In the Gilbert schema, Joyce indicated “politics” as 
the art specific to this episode, and critics’ discussions 
of it have tended to center on the Irish nationalism 
espoused by the citizen and his companions. Critics have 
tended to agree that how one reads the citizen’s 
provocations, and more importantly, Bloom’s responses to 
them, will determine much about the novel’s politics. For 
Joyce’s liberal humanist interpreters, Bloom’s mild, pacific 
response condemns the citizen’s bombast and the nationalist 
violence it endorses. But for more formally-oriented 
critics, the episode’s politics are complicated by what we 
216 
 
might call its verbal dynamics: against the energetic 
invective of the citizen and the vituperative asides of 
Nameless, Bloom can only muster meek platitudes. Emer Nolan 
summarizes the debate thus: 
 
Does Joyce satirize the invective of the citizen which 
is a kind of exaggerated version of the community’s 
compulsive gossip, in order to side with the ungossipy 
Bloom, or does his implication in the same community’s 
language make impossible the critical distance which 
the conventional reading implies?104 
 
For Nolan, the question is not as simple as aligning Joyce’s 
approval with one side of the argument or another, because 
“his depiction of this vernacular as the medium of 
communication in a well-defined social group… obliges him to 
engage with the associated demands made from within that 
community for political recognition and autonomy.”105 While 
Nolan seems right to draw attention to Joyce’s authorial 
complicity in the languages of Nameless and the citizen, her 
reading does not give sufficient weight to the 
interpolations and the structural conflict they introduce 
                     
104 Emer Nolan, James Joyce and Nationalism (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1995), 93. 
105 Ibid., 113. 
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with the episode’s realist discourse. Moreover, Nolan draws 
a contrast between the “multivocal, playful and dialogic” 
discourse of the interpolations, as against the “monological 
stream of ‘Fenian shibboleths’ associated with the citizen,” 
but counter-intuitively aligns Bloom’s speech with the 
interpolations.106 
 Andrew Gibson reverses Nolan’s focus on the citizen’s 
discourse by locating the episode’s satirical thrust in the 
interpolations instead. In a reading that represents the ne 
plus ultra of New Historicism, Gibson identifies the 
interpolations as an attack on Celtic Revivalist 
historiography. This is a view that was originally put 
forward by Hugh Kenner, who identified them as parodies of 
the “translatorese” that migrated from nineteenth-century 
translations of the Greek epics to revivalist translations 
of Irish sagas.107 Gibson goes a step further in making the 
Anglo-Irish revivalist history of Standish O’Grady the 
“determining context” for the chapter’s themes.108 Hence the 
listing that characterizes several of the interpolations; 
O’Grady identified Irish culture with the “annals and 
                     
106 Ibid., 118. 
107 Kenner, Ulysses, 95. 
108 Andrew Gibson, Joyce's Revenge: History, Politics, and 
Aesthetics in Ulysses (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 107-8. 
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chronology” of scholasticism, and thus paratactic modes of 
organizing experience in general. Joyce responds by 
valorizing that which O’Grady rejects: “[his] historical 
imagination establishes itself partly in idealizing reaction 
to Catholic historiographers… By contrast, the Joyce of 
Ulysses clearly asserts a certain kinship with them.”109 The 
price of Gibson’s historical precision is fidelity to the 
range of linguistic textures present in the interpolations, 
which are flattened out almost to the same extent in 
Kenner’s and Nolan’s readings.  
Each of these critics tend to treat the interpolations 
as irritants, irruptions in the narrative flow of the 
episode that must be recuperated to that narrative somehow. 
But if we do try to describe the interpolations in a way 
that doesn’t neglect their varying styles and textures, 
their defining characteristic must be their superfluousness: 
they do no narrative work whatsoever. Joyce nominated 
“politics” as the art of the episode, but it also returns to 
the questions about the status of rhetoric and figurative 
language that had animated “Aeolus” and “Sirens.” But rather 
than aligning the interpolations with the empty speechifying 
in the offices of the Freeman’s Journal or the nostalgic 
miasma of the Ormond Hotel, their superfluousness points to 
another reading: that they signify above all the generative 
                     
109 Ibid., 109. 
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properties of language, marking what Derek Attridge has 
described as an aesthetic of “potentially limitless 
profusion.” Realist narratives, constrained by “the illusion 
that their language is tied to a set of events which 
predetermine their length and structure it,” is being 
deliberately juxtaposed with a form of writing that 
celebrates the primacy of language over non-linguistic 
reality.110 
The episode begins by figuring this juxtaposition quite 
directly as a kind of textual economy. Nameless is, after 
all, “a collector of bad and doubtful debts” (U, 12.24—25), 
and the first interpolation adopts the fussy, legalistic 
diction of a contract that Nameless has been tasked with 
enforcing: 
 
For nonperishable goods bought of Moses Herzog, of 13 
Saint Kevin’s parade in the city of Dublin, Wood quay 
ward, merchant, hereinafter called the vendor and sold 
and delivered to Michael E. Geraghty, esquire, of 29 
Arbour hill in the city of Dublin, Arran quay ward, 
gentlemen, hereinafter called the purchaser… (U, 12.33—
7). 
                     
110 Derek Attridge, Joyce Effects: On Language, Theory, and 
History (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), 81. 
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In the first instance, “Cyclops” associates linguistic 
excess with kinds of economic exchange. Nameless’s discourse 
is characterized by two kinds of meanness. The first is the 
sort of petty prejudice apparent in his discussion of Moses 
Herzog’s Jewishness—“Jesus I had to laugh at the little 
jewey getting his shirt out”—that culminates in the 
citizen’s confrontation with Bloom (U, 12.30–1).111 The 
second is the economy of stinginess that governs social 
interaction at Barney Kiernan’s, in which the buying of 
rounds—often using borrowed or otherwise committed funds—is 
a social obligation.112 
                     
111 For a consideration of “Jewish mercantilism” as a 
stereotype throughout the novel, see Amy Feinstein, "Usurers 
and Usurpers: Race, Nation, and the Performance of Jewish 
Mercantilism in Ulysses," James Joyce Quarterly 44.1 (Fall 
2006): 39–58. 
112 For an account of the pub’s treating culture as a 
“microcosmic version of the potlatch ceremony, an orgy of 
property destruction and gift giving found in many archaic 
societies,” see Mark Osteen, The Economy of Ulysses: Making 
Both Ends Meet (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
1995), 262–71. See also Daniel Shea’s account of the social 
significance of gambling in the Dublin social scene, “‘A 
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 Mark Osteen regards the textual excess of the 
interpolations as a reflection of and satire upon “the 
political and economic excesses of the drinkers in barney 
Kiernan’s pub.” But by identifying excess on both sides of 
the textual equation, he neglects how robustly this set of 
social obligations is policed. In Nameless’s view, “everyone 
is a con-man, thief or sponger.”113 Since he is privy to 
secret information about his fellow drinkers, he is able to 
reveal their hypocrisy to the reader, as in the case of Joe 
Hynes, who accompanies him to the pub, and proceeds to treat 
Nameless and the citizen to three rounds (U, 12.147; 749; 
1410). Hynes nonetheless owes three shillings to Bloom: 
“Three bob I lent him in Meagher’s. Three weeks. Third 
hint,” he recalls in “Aeolus” (VII.119). Indeed, it is 
likely that the money Hynes spends at Barney Kiernan’s was 
drawn at Bloom’s suggestion, in a failed hint for Hynes to 
pay off his debt (U, 7.112–7). Ultimately, it is Bloom’s 
refusal to engage in the ritual of exchanging rounds—“he’d 
let you pour all manner of drink down his throat till the 
Lord would call him before you’d ever see the froth of his 
pint” (U, 12.684–6), an accusation more suited to the 
citizen than Bloom—that precipitates their confrontation, 
                                                              
Rank Outsider’: Gambling and Economic Rivalry in Ulysses,” 
James Joyce Quarterly 41.1 (Fall 2010): 75–88.  
113 Osteen, The Economy of Ulysses, 255. 
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underscoring that “the treating in Kiernan’s is actually 
compulsory and self-interested.”114 Indeed, in that 
confrontation both forms of the episode’s meanness coincide, 
as in Lenehan’s malicious lie that Bloom is out “defrauding 
widows and orphans” when in fact he is trying to help 
persuade a lender to whom Dignam had mortgaged his life 
insurance to relinquish his claim on the policy (U, 
7.1622).115 
 Osteen’s potlatch interpretation of the drinker’s 
economy has the advantage of pointing out its difference 
from a system wherein social prestige attaches to saving and 
acquisition, the remoteness of these bourgeois mores 
underscoring Dublin’s economic disenfranchisement.116 But the 
city-wide economy of debt and social obligation nonetheless 
rests on the expectation that there will be an eventual 
settling of debts, however long it is deferred or whatever 
the means necessary to bring it about; hence Nameless’s 
occupation as debt collector. Nameless’s anonymity, his 
                     
114 Ibid., 263. 
115 Gifford and Seidman, Ulysses Annotated, 339. 
116 For a reading inspired by an alternative anthropological 
paradigm—Girard’s theory of the scapegoat—that nonetheless 
dovetails with Osteen quite well, see Michael Spiegel, “‘The 
Most Precious Victim’: Joyce's ‘Cyclops’ and the Politics of 
Persecution,” James Joyce Quarterly 46.1 (Fall 2008): 75–95. 
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insight into the private affairs of his fellow citizens, and 
above all his role as the episode’s narrator, make him a 
figure for authorship in general. Moreover, his discourse 
figures the textual economy of realism, in which words are 
held to correspond to an extra-linguistic reality, just as 
tokens of currency are held to correspond to some external 
source of value. As a narrator, Nameless is at pains to 
assure his audience that he is “good for it,” so to speak: 
that his account can be redeemed for the set of events it 
purports to describe. Hence his frequent asides emphasizing 
its veracity: “As true as I’m telling you,” “Faith, he was,” 
and constant invocations of “Gob” and “Begob” (U, 12.207–8; 
382; 496; 1060). These, in their way, amount to Nameless’s 
own rhetoric of not having rhetoric: he anticipates his 
audience’s incredulity in order to avert it. 
All this is worth bearing in mind when we consider an 
interpolation of a slightly different kind, one on which a 
liberal humanist reading of the novel might hang. As 
conversation in Barney Kiernan’s turns from British cruelty 
to the nature of nationhood, hostility to Bloom builds 
amongst the drinkers. First, Bloom makes an analogy between 
the Irish and the Jews: “I belong to a race too, says Bloom, 
that is hated and persecuted. Also now. This very moment. 
This very instant” (U, 12.1477–8). Bloom inadvertently 
restates an analogy made by MacHugh in “Aeolus,” but rather 
than deploying it in service of bromides about Irish 
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spirituality, he points precisely to the historical fact of 
persecution that MacHugh’s rhetoric had obscured. “We’ll put 
force against force,” the citizen declares, while John Wyse 
exhorts the Irish/Jews to “stand up to it then with force 
like men” (U, 12.1364; 1475), but Bloom demurs: 
 
— But it’s no use, says he. Force, hatred, history, all 
that. That’s not life for men and women, insult and 
hatred. And everybody knows that it’s the very opposite 
of that that is really life. 
— What? says Alf. 
— Love, says Bloom. I mean the opposite of hatred. 
        (U, 12.1481–1487) 
 
Bloom departs, and the drinkers, led by the citizen, mock 
him, before an interpolation breaks in: 
 
Love loves to love love. Nurse loves the new chemist. 
Constable 14 A loves Mary Kelly. Gerty MacDowell loves 
the boy that has the bicycle. M. B. loves a fair 
gentleman. Li Chi Han lovey up kissy Cha Pu Chow. 
Jumbo, the elephant, loves Alice, the elephant… You 
love a certain person. And this person loves that other 
person because everyone loves somebody but God loves 
everybody. (U, 12.1493–1501) 
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The novel’s whole attitude toward Bloom’s “monistic 
decency,” or his “rational and pacifistic attitude” seems 
implicated in the relationship between his statement and the 
interpolation. 
Bloom’s “philosophy of universal love” is bound to 
strike many readers as banal, the sort of well-meaning 
platitude that a knave might substitute for serious thought 
about matters of politics and history. According to this 
view, the interpolation mocks Bloom with its sickly-sweet 
gloss on his statement; love’s commonality across cultures 
and even species degrades it, rendering it incapable of 
doing the political work that Bloom desires. On the other 
hand, perhaps Bloom’s statement is deliberately and usefully 
utopian. Gilbert, for instance, describes the interpolation 
as “a little homily on love’s sweet ubiquity.”117 The 
question of how much political weight such a vague principle 
as love can bear is also the question of how much value we 
accord to the ordinary. Bloom, after all, does not have 
access to the elaborate models of political and social 
change invoked by the novel’s critics. The relationship 
between his statement and the interpolation is a deliberate 
challenge to our habitual association between triteness and 
                     
117 Gilbert, James Joyce's Ulysses, 270. 
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falsehood.118 Far from being an unambiguous endorsement of 
the ordinary, though, the episode nonetheless ends with an 
act of violence, however trivial: the citizen hurls a 
biscuit tin after the retreating Bloom (U, 12.1854–7). The 
philosophy of universal love has failed to move the apostles 
of nationalist violence. 
 The difficulty of resolving these sorts of hermeneutic 
cruxes is that the interpolations operate according to an 
entirely different textual economy than that of the realist 
passages, one that aligns the aesthetic itself with 
expenditure, excess, and prodigality: “Joyce’s defiance of 
organic unity and the economic relationship of words to 
meaning violates that Jamesian ‘sublime economy’ of realism 
and replaces it with one of splendid waste.”119 Or, as Goethe 
described it: 
 
Bin die Verschwendung, bin die Poesie; 
  Bin der Poet, der sich vollendet, 
  Wenn er sein eigenst Gut verschwendet.120 
                     
118 For a defense of Bloom’s limited “verbal and mimetic 
repertoire,” see Senn, “Book of Many Turns,” 33. 
119 Osteen, The Economy of Ulysses, 273. 
120  [I am prodigality, I am poetry; 
I am the poet, who completes himself 
In the act of wasting his belongings.] 
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It is fitting that Goethe’s boy charioteer should deliver 
these lines during a triumph, precisely the kind of list-
based form that Joyce deploys throughout the interpolations. 
Notable topics of lists in “Cyclops” include heroes 
(nominally Irish, but often not, U, 12.176–99), mourners (U, 
12.556–69), clerics (U, 12.927–38), kinds of tree (U, 
12.1268–78), geographical features (U, 12.1451–61), and 
saints (U, 12.1689–1719).121 As I’ve said about the 
interpolations generally, these lists do no narrative work 
whatsoever; moreover, as Osteen argues, their “sheer excess” 
overshadows the parodic effect that they are often 
attributed with.122  
The status of the lists in Ulysses has lately become 
the focus of discussion about the ordinary in the novel. In 
Modernism and the Ordinary, Olson describes lists as “a 
method of recording fact that becomes realism’s endgame, 
enacting the limitations of a purely factual style.”123 Lists 
                                                              
  
Goethe, Faust: Der Tragödie Ester Un Zweiter Teil Urfaust, 
ed. Erich Trunz (München: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1972), 173; my 
translation. 
121 C.f. Osteen, The Economy of Ulysses, 272. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Olson, Modernism and the Ordinary, 35. 
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do indeed form a sort of test-case, but not only for 
realism. Rather, they mark the limits of literature as a 
whole: what minimal level of syntactical organization 
qualifies as a literary text? By abandoning the syntactical 
markers of causal coherence and spatial arrangement, they 
seem to offer us the real unmediated by literary artifice. 
There is a temptation to forget this rhetorical dimension 
and assert instead that the list’s suspension of normal 
syntactic and semantic structures, which corral attention in 
certain predetermined ways, opens literature out to the 
real. Moreover, the list’s potentially infinite 
extendibility is held to have a democratizing effect: no 
potential object of representation is too insignificant to 
be subsumed by it. 
But the literary list remains fundamentally within the 
limits of literature, however much it promises to transcend 
them: “the list form may suggest the idea of inclusivity and 
expansive accretion, but literary compilations have a limit 
to the number of items they can hold, beyond which the 
addition of further units becomes detrimental.”124 Through 
the ambiguous phrase “realism’s endgame,” Olson frames lists 
as an extension of realism, its ne plus ultra. But realism, 
as I have argued in the previous chapter, depends on the 
                     
124 Robert E. Belknap, The List: The Uses and Pleasures of 
Cataloguing (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 31. 
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artful manipulation of forms of logico-causal and spatio-
temporal coherence. Rather than “project[ing] a semiotic 
structure which the reader recuperates in terms of a 
fictional reality,” lists reduce all semiotic structure to 
the most minimal level possible.125 Rather than realism, the 
list offers a rhetoric of not having rhetoric. Olson chooses 
to focus on the materialism of the Joycean list, 
particularly apparent in the “Ithaca” episode. But to align 
the list straightforwardly with extra-literary reality is to 
elide the fact that there are multiple genealogies of the 
literary list, all of which are active to varying degrees in 
Ulysses. In other words, rather than leading back to 
materiality, the lists in fact point in precisely the other 
direction. 
Finally, we can better characterize these two textual 
economies by extending the currency analogy. Whereas 
vraisemblance represents the gold standard backing the 
currency of realism, the mode of textual excess resembles a 
fiat currency, in which value is determined only by 
exchange. Late capitalism is commonly said to have provoked 
a crisis in representation, but it might equally be 
described as a crisis confined to criticism, which has 
struggled to find a language adequate to Joyce’s aesthetic 
of excess. Ulysses suggests that a speculative textual 
                     
125 Fludernik, Towards a “Natural” Narratology. 
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economy is an ordinary feature of modernity, and thus that 
the value of the ordinary is to found there, and not through 
redemption by an ordered symbolist aesthetic, or by the 
increasingly narrow confines of realism. Above all, the 
ordinary can offer the material for that mode of linguistic 
superfluousness we know as the aesthetic. This is the side 
of Joyce that gave the profligate Gracehoper the final word 
over the prudent Ondt in his reworking of Aesop from 
Finnegans Wake: 
 
 Your feats end enormous, your volumes immense, 
 (May the Graces I hoped for sing your Ondtship  
song sense!), 
  Your genus its worldwide, your spacest sublime! 
  But, Holy Saltmartin, why can’t you beat time?126 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
126 Joyce, Finnegans Wake, 419. 
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Chapter 3: T. S. Eliot’s Ordinary Ambivalence 
 
 Recent accounts of modernism and the ordinary have yet 
to address T. S. Eliot’s works in detail, which might come 
as a surprise given the ongoing centrality of his work to 
the modernist canon. But the surprise is lessened somewhat 
if we consider those aesthetic and critical commitments to 
which Eliot was drawn beginning in the 1920s, and which I 
discussed in the previous chapter. Broadly classifiable 
under the rubric of classicism, though to varying degrees 
discernable in Eliot’s work since well before his 
“conversion” as a “classicist in literature, royalist in 
politics, anglo-catholic in religion” in 1927, this 
constellation of ideas seems to signify an aesthetic 
aversion to the ordinary.1 Eliot sought, in Lyndall Gordon’s 
phrase, “an escape from the sordid reality of daily life 
through ‘aetherial rumours.’”2 What this rhetoric was never 
fully able to efface, however, is the deviant streak in 
Eliot’s aesthetic, the lurid attraction to terror, surprise, 
and spectacle that pervades his work, and which he himself 
                     
1 Eliot, For Lancelot Andrewes, vii. 
2 Lyndall Gordon, T. S. Eliot : An Imperfect Life (New York: 
Norton, 1999), 547. 
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expressed, echoing Aristotle, thus: “The strange, the 
surprising, is of course essential to art… The craving for 
the fantastic, for the strange, is legitimate and perpetual; 
everyone with a sense of beauty has it.”3 These formulations 
leave us at some remove from the aesthetic of decorum he 
articulates during his classicist mood, notably in “Ulysses, 
Order, and Myth.” But whereas, for instance, Joyce critics 
embrace multiple, contradictory Joyces, Eliot critics—even 
those who emphasize the latter Eliot over the former—have 
been concerned to show an underlying continuity and order to 
his career.  
 
I. Sweeney Agonistes and Melodramatic Modernity 
 
 If, however, as Michael Sheringham argues, the ordinary 
is a matter of “hybrid indeterminacy” and therefore to be 
sought in writings that “signal a crossing of generic 
boundaries,” the obvious place to look in Eliot’s oeuvre is 
Sweeney Agonistes (1924).4 Critics have commented at length 
on the poem’s strange amalgam of genres, foremost among them 
                     
3 T. S. Eliot, “London Letter,” The Dial (July 1921), 
reprinted in Eliot, The Annotated Waste Land with Eliot's 
Contemporary Prose, 186.  
4 Sheringham, Everyday Life, 345–6. 
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David Chinitz, who hears traces of “Vaudeville, music hall… 
burlesque, jazz, and minstrelsy”5 at work in it, and Rachel 
Blau DuPlessis, who detects “tabloid shock, working-class 
sentimental poetry, true-crime confession, [and] bartender’s 
parable.”6 Chinitz et al. have helped to reverse the received 
understanding of Eliot’s (and modernism’s) relationship with 
popular culture, showing that, throughout his career, Eliot 
not only appreciated popular forms himself, but recognized 
and coveted their appeal to larger audiences. Chinitz’s 
approach, however, reconstructs a coherent Eliot by making 
his admiration of past cultural configurations the basis, 
not the antithesis, of Eliot’s affection for popular forms: 
“Sweeney attempts to reground high art in popular culture, 
and popular culture in ritual.”7 The whole project of looking 
to atavistic cultural forms as a model for contemporary 
literature, after all, casts ordinary life in the condition 
of modernity as degraded.8  
                     
5 David E. Chinitz, T. S. Eliot and the Cultural Divide 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 107. 
6 Rachel Blau DuPlessis, Genders, Races and Religious 
Cultures in Modern American Poetry, 1908-1934 (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 99.  
7 Chinitz, T. S. Eliot and the Cultural Divide, 15. 
8 Critics have typically drawn attention to F. M. Cornford’s 
The Origin of Attic Comedy, which locates that origin in 
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      Chinitz’s aim is, in a sense, to find a point of 
reconciliation between the two terms of the piece’s 
subtitle: “An Aristophanic Melodrama”; In January 1922, Ezra 
Pound wrote in reply to a letter from Eliot mentioning 
Aristophanes: 
 
Aristophanes probably depressing, and the native negro 
phoque melodies of Dixee more calculated to lift the 
ball-encumbered phallus of man to the proper 8.30, 9.30 
or even ten thirty level now counted as the crowning 
and alarse too often katachrestical summit of human 
achievement.9 
 
                                                              
“primitive vegetation rites” associated with fertility and 
the harvest. Eliot wrote to Cornford on 29 May, 1923, to 
solicit a contribution to the Criterion which never 
materialized. See Francis Macdonald Cornford, The Origin of 
Attic Comedy (Gloucester, MA, P. Smith, 1968); T. S. Eliot, 
The Letters of T. S. Eliot, Vol. 2, 1923-1925, ed. Valerie 
Eliot and Hugh Haughton (London: Faber and Faber, 2009), 
161–2.   
9 Ezra Pound to T. S. Eliot, 28(?) January 1922 in Eliot, ed. 
The Letters of T. S. Eliot, Vol. 1, 630. 
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Chinitz comments, “Pound’s hint apparently inflected Eliot’s 
reading, with the result that Sweeney Agonistes became a 
jazz Aristophanes.”10 Pound might thus have contributed to 
the inclusion of songs in the poem, and by August 1923, 
Eliot was referring to the work as a “jazz drama.”11 Critics 
have often cited Eliot’s 1933 letter to Hallie Flanagan, who 
was then directing a production of Sweeney at Vasser, in 
which Eliot comments: “I had intended the whole play to be 
accompanied by light drum taps to accentuate the beats (esp. 
the chorus, which ought to have a noise like a street 
drill).”12 Debate over whether that intention was formed at 
the time of the poem’s composition or retrospectively can be 
                     
10 Though it is far from clear that Pound’s comment 
represents in any sense an endorsement of those “native 
negro phoque melodies.” Chinitz, T. S. Eliot and the 
Cultural Divide, 111. Cf. Morris Freedman, “Jazz Rhythms in 
T. S. Eliot,” South Atlantic Quarterly 51 (1952): 419–35. 
11 Letter to Alfred Kreymborg, 23 August, 1923, in Eliot, The 
Letters of T. S. Eliot, Vol. 2, 192. For a comprehensive 
account of the poem’s composition and critical debate over 
Eliot’s process of writing it, see Benjamin Madden, "Arnold 
Bennett and the Making of Sweeney Agonistes," Notes and 
Queries 58.1 (March 2011): 106–110. 
12 King's College Archive, Cambridge, Papers of the Hayward 
Bequest, V/7A. 
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settled by a letter of 6 November, 1923, to Gilbert Seldes, 
in which Eliot states, “My play, if it is ever written, will 
certainly appear as a text, although I intend it for 
production with an orchestra consisting exclusively of 
drums.”13 Seldes, Eliot’s friend and editor of The Dial, was 
a perspicacious commentator on 1920s popular culture, and 
his remarks on jazz offer much more explicit encouragement 
than Pound’s. Seldes was an unabashed fan: “If... we give up 
jazz we shall be sacrificing nearly all there is of gaiety 
and liveliness and rhythmic power in our lives.”14 Seldes 
draws a suggestive analogy between jazz and the machine age:  
                     
13 Eliot, The Letters of T. S. Eliot, Vol. 2, 268.; the 
influence of Diaghilev, Stravinsky, and the Ballet Russes 
cannot be underestimated here; see Ronald Schuchard, Eliot's 
Dark Angel: Intersections of Life and Art (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 110. Eliot’s 
attendance at Ballet Russes performances in London is well 
attested to in his letters. See Eliot, The Letters of T. S. 
Eliot, Vol. 1, 380, 666. 
14 Gilbert Seldes, "Toujours Jazz," The Dial (August 1923): 6. 
The primitivism that other critics have discerned in Sweeney 
Agonistes also appears in Seldes’s enthusiasm for the 
African-American origins of jazz, marred though it is by his 
assumption of an opposition between African-American culture 
and “civilization,” however typical of its time: “He has 
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All the free, the instinctive, the wild in negro jazz 
which could be integrated into [the bandleader Paul 
Whiteman’s] music, he has kept; he has added to it, has 
worked his material, until it runs sweetly in his 
dynamo, without grinding or scraping. It becomes the 
machine which conceals machinery.15 
 
Seldes is assiduous about distinguishing between individual 
composers, performers, and bandleaders. Nonetheless, many 
contemporary commentators used the term “jazz” to refer to 
popular music generally, usually as an avatar of generalized 
anxieties about modernity. Theodor Adorno is exemplary in 
this respect, when he characterizes jazz as 
 
                                                              
kept alive things without with our lives would be 
perceptibly meaner, paler, and nearer to atrophy and decay... 
[But] to any one who inherits several thousand centuries of 
civilization [sic], none of the things the negro offers can 
matter unless they are apprehended by the mind as well as 
the body and the spirit” (9-10). 
15 Ibid., 13. 
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Music which fuses the most rudimentary melodic, 
harmonic, metric, and formal structure with the 
ostensibly disruptive principle of syncopation, yet 
without ever really disturbing the crude unity of the 
basic rhythm, the identically sustained metre, the 
quarter note.16 
 
“The lowbrow sects declaring themselves to be highbrow” he 
argues, cannot solve the “reprehensible” division of culture 
into low-, middle-, and highbrow. Jazz enthusiasts, he 
ironically declares, mistakenly conflate jazz with “Eliot’s 
poetry and Joyce’s prose.”17 According to Adorno, jazz has 
“in its essence remained static,” making it an “enigma that 
millions of people seem never to tire of its monotonous 
attraction.”18 The simultaneous attraction to and repulsion 
from monotony is, we might note, one of the major themes of 
Sweeney Agonistes.  
     If Adorno’s attack on jazz is altogether too dour to 
account fully for Eliot’s engagement with the genre, 
                     
16 Theodor Adorno, "The Perennial Fashion—Jazz," in The 
Adorno Reader, ed. Brian O'Connor (Malden, MA and Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2000), 268. 
17 Ibid., 274. 
18 Ibid., 269. 
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Chinitz’s account is almost certainly too optimistic. The 
attractions of jazz for its listeners are figured in the 
poem as intoxicating: 
 
 We’re gona sit here and drink this booze 
 We’re gona sit here and have a tune 
 We’re gona stay and we’re gona go 
 And somebody’s gotta pay the rent.19 
 
Intoxication, in all of its metaphorical valences, was 
connected with jazz throughout the 1920s, especially in the 
United States, as a consequence of the jazz-fueled speakeasy 
scene created by prohibition. This representation of America 
was much remarked upon in the press, even in its 
limitations.20 This connection comes to a comical—if macabre—
                     
19 T. S. Eliot, The Complete Poems and Plays (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1969), 125. Hereafter cited in text as “CPP.” 
20 The Times, for instance, reports the complaint of the 
American journalist Robert Barry that Americans are 
regularly depicted in the European press as “a nation of 
‘gun-toting bootleggers, Jazz-mad idlers, immoral-divorcees, 
and bloodthirsty lynchers.’” “Distorted Pictures of America: 
European Press Methods Condemned,” The Times, Jun 14, 1922. 
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culmination two years after Eliot abandoned Sweeney, with 
the case of Dorothy Ellington. Dorothy, a sixteen-year old 
jazz aficionado, shot her mother after being forbidden to 
attend a party. “Jazz-Gin Craze Drives Girl of 16 to Kill 
Mother,” screamed the Chicago Tribune.21 The trial occasioned 
an enormous amount of press attention on both sides of the 
Atlantic. The Daily Mirror, for instance, ran images of 
Dorothy Ellington and her mother on its front page on 
Saturday, January 31, 1925.22 The murder provided an early 
inspiration for F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Tender is the Night, 
but the matricide plot that he explored in early drafts 
largely fell away from the final novel.23 But it is clear 
that jazz was frequently figured in the 1920s as more than 
just an accomplice to more direct forms of intoxication like 
alcohol, but as an intoxicating agent in itself.  
                     
21 “Jazz-Gin Craze Drives Girl of 16 to Kill Mother: Shoots 
When Parties Are Forbidden,” Chicago Daily Tribune, Jan 16, 
1925;. 
22 “‘Jazz Maniac’ Shoots Mother For Scolding Her,” Daily 
Mirror, Saturday, January 31, 1925; no. 6625; pg. 1. 
23 See James L. W. West, “Tender Is the Night, ‘Jazzmania,’ 
and the Ellingson Matricide,” in Twenty-First Century 
Readings of Tender Is the Night, ed. William and Laura 
Rattray Blazek (Liverpool Liverpool University Press, 2007), 
34–50.  
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      The first of three songs in “Fragment of an Agon” is 
“Under the Bamboo Tree,” by the famous song-writing trio of 
Bob Cole, J. Rosamond Johnson, and his brother, the future 
civil rights leader James Weldon Johnson. The song was 
immensely popular, so much so that Eliot could, according to 
Chinitz, “rely on an audience over twenty years later and in 
another country to remember the tune.” Chinitz shows that 
the songwriters were able to fit a sly message of racial 
equality into an otherwise predictable love song by inviting 
the audience to identify with a “Zulu from Matabooloo” 
conducting a “modest and decorous”24 courtship of a lady. It 
is difficult to overstate how thoroughly Eliot subverts this 
message in his revision of the song: 
 
 Tell me in what part of the wood 
 Do you want to flirt with me? 
 Under the breadfruit, banyan, palmleaf 
 Or under the bamboo tree? 
 Any old tree will do for me 
 Any old wood is just as good 
 Any old isle is just my style… 
                     
24 Chinitz, T. S. Eliot and the Cultural Divide, 115. 
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       (CPP, 123) 
 
Far from “modest and decorous,” this seduction is wanton in 
its indifference, an effect underlined by the listing 
(breadfruit, banyan, palmleaf, bamboo) and repetition (Any 
old…). The song evokes a sort of dehumanized sexuality 
reminiscent of the typist and the young man carbuncular in 
The Waste Land, whose affectless sexual encounter is 
expressed metonymically in the typist’s “automatic hand” as 
she “puts a record on the gramophone” following her lover’s 
departure.25 
Eliot’s re-writing transforms the chaste (if winking) 
sexuality of the song into a peon to promiscuity. The 
substitutability of various locales mirrors the 
substitutability of participants in the seduction, setting 
up an analogy between the modern subject and the objects of 
mass-production in the next song: 
 
 Well that’s life on a crocodile isle. 
 There’s no telephones 
 There’s no gramophones 
                     
25 See Rainey, Revisiting The Waste Land, 68–9. 
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 There’s no motor cars 
 No two-seaters, no six-seaters, 
 No Citröen, no Rolls Royce. 
       (CPP, 121) 
 
The poem’s characters—already rendered substitutable by 
their organization into pairs (Doris and Dusty, Wauchope and 
Horsfall, Klipstein and Krumpacker)—see their own 
substitutability reflected in a parade of actual commodities. 
Despite its blandishments, the songs seem to argue, 
modernity is fundamentally as empty as life on the 
“crocodile isle”:  
 
 My little island girl 
 I’m going to stay with you 
 And we wont worry what to do 
 We won’t have to catch any trains 
 And we won’t go home when it rains 
 We’ll gather hibiscus flowers 
 For it won’t be minutes but hours 
 For it won’t be hours but years. 
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       (CPP, 123) 
 
Doris is prompted to cry out: “That’s not life, that’s no 
life / Why I’d just as soon be dead” (CPP, 123). The 
“crocodile isle” offers no escape from the repetitive 
rhythms of the ordinary: “That’s all, that’s all, that’s all, 
that’s all, / Birth, and copulation, and death.” Says Doris: 
“I’d be bored” (CPP, 122). Jazz, then, as the mass-produced 
output of the culture industry, enacts a formal critique of 
the ordinary under the condition of modernity.26 
Pound’s aside that the “native negro phoque melodies of 
Dixee” are “more calculated to lift the ball-encumbered 
phallus of man” reminds us of one of the poem’s more 
striking choices of diction: its repetition of the word 
“copulation.” All in all, the phrase “Birth, and copulation, 
                     
26 For the currency of this constellation, see the New York 
Times Magazine article entitled “Jazz is Linked to the 
Factory Wheel”: “Above the hum of machinery in a German 
factory loud-speakers are blaring American jazz. 
Involuntarily, so the reports say, the thousands of workers 
quicken their speed as their hands begin to move to 
ragtime... The principle of the old spontaneous work-songs 
of hand labor is being artificially applied to the machine 
age.” The New York Times Magazine, December 30, 1928. 
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and death” occurs in the poem five times (CPP 122). 
“Copulation” is far from an ordinary synonym for “sex.” It 
is probably the poem’s only conspicuously “learned” word, 
heavy with overtones of legal or scientific discourse. The 
OED notes—comically, in this connection—that it is now 
“chiefly a term of zoology.”27 Copulation’s other significant 
appearance in Eliot’s oeuvre is in his 1930 essay on 
Baudelaire. Discussing Baudelaire’s Journaux Intimes, Eliot 
seizes on this line: “la volupté unique et suprême de 
l’amour gît dans la certitude de faire le mal.” Eliot 
writes: 
 
This means, I think, that Baudelaire has perceived that 
what distinguishes the relations of man and woman from 
the copulation of beasts is the knowledge of Good and 
Evil… Having an imperfect, vague romantic conception of 
Good, he was at least able to understand that the 
sexual act as evil is more dignified, less boring, than 
                     
27 “copulation, n.” The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 
1989. OED Online. Oxford University Press. 25 June 2010. 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50049896>. 
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as the natural, “life-giving”, cheery automatism of the 
modern world.28 
 
The “cheery automatism of the modern world” emphatically 
evokes the themes of Sweeney Agonistes, and the sarcastic 
scare quotes around “life-giving” seem to underscore the 
point.29 Under the condition of modernity, then, individuals 
are condemned more than ever to replicate involuntary modes 
of behavior conditioned by systems that exceed individual 
volition. 
      The songs in Sweeney Agonistes are therefore indexes 
of their own production. Churned out by the kind of song-
writing factories epitomized by Tin Pan Alley, then 
disseminated by means of mass-produced scores (“Under the 
Bamboo Tree” sold 400,000 of them in six months) and 
gramophone records, the popular song becomes a microcosm of 
modernity’s tendency to extend the principles of mass-
                     
28 T. S. Eliot, “Baudelaire,” in T. S. Eliot, Selected Essays 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1934), 428–9. 
29 In this sense, Sweeney echoes the dismal view of human 
sexuality presented in the two Sweeney lyric poems, “Sweeney 
Erect” and “Sweeney Among the Nightingales” from Poems, 1920 
(CPP, 42–3, 56–7).  
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production into cultural life.30 In this account, the endless 
repetition of the gramophone record spinning around on its 
plate figures for the endless mechanical reproductions of 
capitalist society. Adorno argues that  
 
Although the symbol of technology may be the uniformly 
revolving wheel, its intrinsic energies develop to an 
incalculable extent while remaining saddled by a 
society which is driven forward by its inner 
tensions.31 
 
Sweeney Agonistes reflects the repetitiousness of popular 
music production in the diminuendo of “My Little Island 
Girl”: “And the morning / And the evening / And noontide / 
And night / Morning / Evening / Noontime / Night” (CPP, 123). 
The diminuendo almost mimes the motion of the gramophone 
needle coasting towards the edge of the record. Popular 
culture, in other words, offers no escape from that mode of 
production; instead, it embodies it. 
                     
30 Eugene Levy, James Weldon Johnson: Black leader, Black 
voice; cited in Chinitz, T. S. Eliot and the Cultural Divide, 
115. 
31 Adorno, “The Perennial Fashion—Jazz,” 272. 
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 But the influence of jazz in Sweeney Agonistes extends 
well beyond the actual songs in the form of the poem’s 
striking rhythm. It is comprised mainly of four-beat lines 
with variable numbers of unstressed syllables. The four-beat 
line is quite distant from the rhythms of ordinary speech, 
but it is nevertheless deeply ingrained in most readers 
though its use in such popular forms as the ballad and the 
nursery rhyme. This both underscores and undermines the 
poem’s effort to invoke a demotic idiom. The poem’s 
“stichomythic” technique has been noted before; this 
involves dividing lines into two halves of two beats each, 
voiced by separate speakers, creating a lively 
conversational effect: 
 
   /  \ /    x /  x 
  How about Pereira? 
        /  \ /    x /  x 
      What about Pereira? 
  /  x     /   
  I don’t care. 
       /   x     / 
      You don’t care! 
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    /  /     x  / 
Who pays the rent? 
       \   /  /     x  / 
      Yes he pays the rent 
 
   x    /    /   /    x    /    /   / 
  Well some men don’t and some men do 
   
   /    /   /    x    /    /    / 
  Some men don’t and you know who. 
         (CPP, 115)32  
 
Put simply, the hallmark of the poem’s metrical arrangement 
is its repetition. Even when the poem departs from its 
rhythmic pattern, it does so in a way that sets up a 
suspension of the reader’s expectation that is immediately 
resolved to satisfying metrical effect, redoubling the 
                     
32 See Derek Attridge’s Poetic Rhythm: An Introduction for an 
account of the system of scansion used here. (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).  
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poem’s regularity. But what kind of figurative work does 
this rhythm do? 
     First, the rhythm underscores the banality of the 
characters’ conversation. “Fragment of a Prologue,” for 
instance, is taken up with a mode of speech between Doris 
and Dusty best characterized as gossip, an unusual subject 
for poetry but one prefigured by the speaker at the end of 
“A Game of Chess” in “The Waste Land.” Maurice Blanchot has 
described gossip as a ubiquitous kind of everyday speech: 
 
What is essential is not that one particular person 
speak and another hear, but that, with no one in 
particular speaking and no one in particular listening, 
there should nonetheless be speech, and a kind of 
undefined promise to communicate, guaranteed by the 
incessant coming and going of solitary words.33 
 
In other words, this stichomythic technique effects a sort 
of dramatic irony: the poem marks out the form of a 
conversation with line-breaks on the page, while in terms of 
sheer banality, the “conversation” is hardly a conversation 
at all. Hence the repetitiousness of Doris and Dusty’s 
                     
33 Blanchot, “Everyday Speech,” 14. 
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speech: “I don’t care. / You don’t care!”; “I like Sam / I 
like Sam,” etc. Doris and Dusty’s gossip has a performative 
effect, displacing the reader’s attention and the poem’s 
focus from the meanings conveyed by language to the texture 
of language itself.  
      Second, the presence of the same rhythm throughout the 
whole poem gives the characters’ speech a doubled quality; 
it emphasizes the sociality of their shared idiom, but at 
the same time emphasizes its likeness to the point of 
effacing the differences between characters. Indeed, had 
Eliot seen the work through to completion as the “jazz 
oratorio” he had envisioned, the drumming accompaniment 
would have given the characters’ speech an undifferentiated 
substrate of sound, linking and flattening it out. Hence 
readings like Christine Buttram’s, who sees the poem as 
testimony that “the modern world had become so mechanized 
that its rhythmical sensibility fused everyday language with 
the ‘internal combustion engine’ or ‘street drill.’”34 In the 
same letter to Hallie Flannagan that mentions the drumming, 
Eliot suggests that “the action should be stylized as in the 
Noh drama,” and directs Flannagan to W. B. Yeats’s 
introduction to Ezra Pound’s Certain Noble Plays of Japan 
                     
34 Christine Buttram, “Sweeney Agonistes: A Sensational 
Snarl,” in A Companion to T. S. Eliot, ed. David E. Chinitz 
(Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 183. 
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(1916).35 There, Yeats praises the rhythmic sensibility of 
the Noh plays: “The interest is not in the human form but in 
the rhythm to which it moves, and the triumph of their art 
is to express the rhythm in its intensity.”36 Not only that, 
but the actors in the Noh plays (like those in the Ancient 
Greek theatre, including Aristophanes’ comedies) wear masks 
that identify them as their character. Stylization of the 
kind Eliot recommends dissolves individual differences and, 
perhaps, thereby the larger social fabric.  
      Third, the rhythm in Sweeney Agonistes departs from 
modernism’s usual reputation for “roughened verbal textures 
and often startling juxtapositions.”37 Instead, it seems to 
epitomize what Stanley Cavell has called “the uncaniness of 
the ordinary.” Cavell describes this as “the possibility or 
threat of what philosophy has called skepticism, 
understood... as the capacity, even desire, of ordinary 
language to repudiate itself, specifically to repudiate its 
power to word the world, to apply to the things we have in 
                     
35 King's College Archive, Cambridge Papers of the Hayward 
Bequest, V/7A. 
36 W. B. Yeats, “‘Introduction’ to Certain Noble Plays of 
Japan,” in Modernism: An Anthology, ed. Lawrence Rainey 
(Malden, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 367. 
37 Felski, “Introduction,” 608. 
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common.”38 This fear of communicative failure haunts Sweeney 
Agonistes, from Klipstein and Krumpacker’s awkward 
introductions with Doris and Dusty: 
 
    KLIPSTEIN: Well, no, Miss—er—you haven’t quite got it 
(I’m afraid I didn’t quite catch your name— 
But I’m very pleased to meet you all the same) 
(CPP 119) 
 
to Sweeney’s refrain in the second part of the poem: “I 
gotta use words when I talk to you” (CPP 125). In his essay 
on “The Uncanny,” Freud departs from his lengthy 
etymological exploration of the unheimlich with a sharp 
extension of the concept, now defined as “vague notions of 
automatic—mechanical—processes that may lie hidden behind 
the familiar image of a living person.”39 The leveling effect 
of the poem’s rhythm hints that the characters themselves 
are like automatons. Do they really speak of their own 
accord, or does the rhythm speak through them? Autonomy 
                     
38 Cavell, “The Uncaniness of the Ordinary,” 154. 
39 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” in The Uncanny, ed. David 
McLintock (London: Penguin, 2003), 135; Cavell, “The 
Uncaniness of the Ordinary,” 155–6. 
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becomes a kind of automatonomy; by immersing its characters 
in the uncanny, the poem raises the question of agency: in 
other words, the rhythm extends the question of agency and 
volition that we first encountered in the guise of popular 
song. 
     The first section of Sweeney Agonistes, “Fragment of a 
Prologue,” raises the kinds of question we have just posed 
of the poem’s rhythm in another way. Whilst cutting the 
cards for the evening’s entertainment, Doris and Dusty use 
the deck for an impromptu tarot reading, a figure for the 
act of literary interpretation: 
 
 DORIS: Now I’m going to cut the cards for to-night. 
    Oh guess what the first is 
 DUSTY:        First is. What is? 
 DORIS: The King of Clubs 
 DUSTY:        That’s Pereira 
 DORIS: It might be Sweeney 
 DUSTY:        It’s Pereira 
 DORIS: It might just as well be Sweeney 
 DUSTY: Well anyway it’s very queer. 
       (CPP, 117) 
 
The cards, which already function as symbolic tokens, are 
made to represent other characters, and by extension, 
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linguistic signs. In this way, the card game plays with the 
status of literary language. We can push this analogy 
further: the cards represent a system of paradigmatic 
substitution—the characteristic mechanism of poetry—in 
opposition to a system of syntagmatic progression—the 
hallmark of narrative. This system of substitutions and the 
basic question Doris and Dusty bring to bear on it through 
the game of divination—systematic, or aleatory?—figure for 
the ambiguous status of the ordinary under the condition of 
modernity: a zone of chance, as the surrealists would have 
it, or territory colonized by deterministic systems? 
     The card game quickly takes a turn, though, when Doris 
declares, “It all depends on what comes next,” and what 
comes next is most unwelcome: 
 
DUSTY:         The two of spades! 
 “THAT’S THE COFFIN!!”  
DORIS:        THAT’S THE COFFIN? 
  Oh good heavens what’ll I do? 
  Just before a party too! 
DUSTY: Well it needn’t be yours, it may mean a friend. 
DORIS: No it’s mine. I’m sure it’s mine. 
 I dreamt of weddings all last night. 
 Yes it’s mine. I know it’s mine. 
 Oh good heavens what’ll I do. 
        (CPP 117) 
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Suddenly, the cards’ status as literary artifice is 
foregrounded as they foreshadow Sweeney’s grisly tale of 
murder later in the poem. But for Doris, the question of 
order versus fortuity is paramount. The specter of the 
uncanny reoccurs in the card game: is the appearance of the 
coffin truly aleatory, as Doris argues, or is it governed by 
a larger system, as Dusty insists? 
     Eliot is cunningly using the artifice of a game 
(“aleatory,” after all, comes from the Latin for rolling 
dice) to figure the problem of genre that haunts Sweeney: 
its indecision between lyric and narrative forms. This in 
turn figures for the larger set of reconciliations that the 
poem tries to effect, between Aristophanes and melodrama, 
between modernity as dulling repetition and modernity as the 
aleatory or marvelous, and between an aesthetic of decorum 
and one of the histrionic.40 Frank Kermode argues that “we 
are in love with the idea of fulfillment,” and thus we 
“labor to reduce fortuity first, before we decide that there 
is a way of looking which provides a place for it.”41 Perhaps 
                     
40 Rainey, Revisiting The Waste Land, 50–1. 
41 Frank Kermode, “The Man in the Macintosh, the Boy in the 
Shirt,” in The Genesis of Secrecy: On the Interpretation of 
Narrative (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 
64–5. 
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the easiest way of reducing fortuity in a text is to make 
the fortuitous event into a symbol of fortuity, rendering it 
a metaphor for not having metaphors, like Kermode’s reading 
of the man in the mackintosh.  
      Sweeney Agonistes, then, articulates a critique of the 
ordinary that marshals diffuse cultural anxieties 
surrounding those aspects of modernity discussed in my 
introduction. And, indeed, the poem associates itself in its 
subtitle with melodrama, a quintessentially modern genre. 
Theatrical melodrama came into existence in the aftermath of 
the French Revolution, pioneered by a French playwright 
named René-Charles Guilbert de Pixerécourt, whose Cœlina ou 
l’Enfant du mystère, written in 1800, was translated into 
English as A Tale of Mystery, A Melo-Drame two years later, 
by Thomas Holcroft. The rudiments of the genre are already 
established in this play. Characters do not develop; they 
embody fixed archetypes: the innocent heroine, her heroic 
lover, the villain who conspires to separate them, and so on. 
These archetypes represent subject positions in a fixed 
moral universe into which audiences can insinuate themselves, 
as a means of carrying out moral reflection on their own 
circumstances.  Melodramatic plots, therefore, are often 
“about virtue made visible and acknowledged, a drama of 
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recognition.”42 So-called “sensational melodramas” in 
particular frequently revolve around a hero or heroine who 
possesses an unusual, indeed irrational, degree of trust in 
the virtue of his or her love object. The melodrama invites 
the audience to partake in this extreme conviction, which 
will then be tested by a series of obstacles as the plot 
develops, before being sensationally vindicated at the end 
of the narrative. These static conventions are repeated 
throughout the history of the genre with mechanical 
insistence.43  
      Brooks argues that a social context in which 
transcendental sources of value and assurance are missing 
necessitates ritualistic and hyperbolic affirmations of 
belief: 
 
The heightening and hyperbole, the polarized conflict, 
the menace and suspense of the representations may be 
made necessary by the effort to perceive and image the 
                     
42 Peter Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination: Balzac, Henry 
James, Melodrama, and the Mode of Excess (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1995), 27. 
43 See Lawrence Rainey, “Pretty Typewriters, Melodramatic 
Modernity: Edna, Belle, and Estelle,” Modernism/modernity 
16.1 (January 2009): 105–22. 
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spiritual in a world voided of its traditional Sacred, 
where the body of the ethical has become a sort of deus 
absconditis which must be sought for, postulated, 
brought into man’s existence through the play of the 
spiritualist imagination.44 
 
Brooks argues that the emergence of the genre ought to be 
read against the background of the nineteenth-century 
political and social upheavals, particularly the French 
Revolution. These changes, so the argument goes, 
necessitated reaffirming a moral world order after the 
traditional loci of moral authority had collapsed. Eliot 
continued to perceive a need for that reaffirmation in the 
twentieth century; in the essay “Wilkie Collins and Dickens,” 
he observes that “melodrama is perennial and… the craving 
for it is perennial and must be satisfied.”45 
      Perennial though it might be, melodrama has also been 
adapted by various authors to changing socio-economic 
conditions. The office melodramas of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries exemplify these adaptations. With 
the development of the modern office, melodramatic plots 
                     
44 Brooks, The Melodramatic Imagination, 11. 
45 T. S. Eliot, “Wilkie Collins and Dickens,” in Selected 
Essays (London: Faber, 1932), 460. 
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begin to center around a new class of young women empowered 
to live alone in the city, much like Doris and Dusty. Rainey 
argues that these melodramas confront a specific feature of 
modernity: the pervasiveness of what Anthony Giddens has 
called “abstract systems.”46 Trust is, according to Giddens, 
“involved in a fundamental way with the institutions of 
modernity. Trust here is vested, not in individuals, but in 
abstract capacities.”47 In other words, the semantic cluster 
that Rainey identifies around “trust” in the sensational 
melodramas is mirrored in Sweeney Agonistes by Doris’s 
pessimistic refrain, “A woman runs a terrible risk” and 
associated moments in the poem (CPP, 124). Giddens’s central 
example of an abstract system is money, which, even prior to 
the introduction of fiat currency requires us to invest 
symbolic tokens with what Georg Simmel famously called “an 
element of social-psychological quasi-religious faith.”48  
      According to Rainey’s reformulation of Brooks, then, 
this psychological structure is analogous to the plot 
structure of melodrama, in which 
 
                     
46 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 83. 
47 Ibid., 26. 
48 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, 3rd. enlarged ed., 
trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 192. 
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Readers… can expect a positive outcome only if they 
bypass inductive knowledge and reasonable inference, 
our everyday sense of trust and confidence; their 
belief, instead, must consist of strong trust, a faith 
in and a commitment to that abstract goodness whose 
revelation is, at one and the same time, the unfolding 
of the melodramatic plot and the disclosure of the 
world, to which it claims to be a counterpart.49 
 
Sweeney Agonistes inverts this central characteristic of the 
melodramatic genre. Far from presenting an exemplary display 
of conviction as a means to assuage its audience’s 
existential uncertainties, the poem presents a world in 
which even the “everyday sense of trust and confidence” has 
collapsed. The deus absconditus that Brooks identifies as 
the hidden subject of melodrama is also that of Sweeney 
Agonistes: the network of abstract systems that pervades 
modernity. In Giddens’s words, “attitudes of trust towards 
abstract systems are usually routinely incorporated into the 
continuity of day-to-day activities.”50 Sweeney achieves its 
uncanny effects by dramatizing the disruption of that 
continuity.  
                     
49 Rainey, “Pretty Typewriters, Melodramatic Modernity,” 116. 
50 Giddens, Consequences of Modernity, 90. 
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     The poem concludes with a figure for the literary 
stasis that arises from its incomplete generic amalgam in 
the form of Sweeney’s anecdote of the Lysol bath murder. 
Sweeney wants to illustrate to Doris the point that “Life is 
death,” and does so with a story that begins: “I knew a man 
once did a girl in.” He describes a murderer who preserves 
his victim’s corpse, “with a gallon of Lysol in a bath” (CPP, 
124). The murder is foreshadowed earlier by the appearance 
of the coffin card in Doris and Dusty’s tarot game. But just 
as the coffin card causes the girls to recoil and continue 
to play the game in the hopes of “break[ing] the spell,” so 
the murder that Sweeney describes leads only to a state of 
uncanny repetition. Rather than a predictable story of crime 
and detection, the murderer remains immersed in the 
repetition of ordinary habits: “Nobody came / And nobody 
went / But he took in the milk and he paid the rent” (CPP, 
124). After the murder, the residual ordinariness of daily 
routines—taking in the milk and paying the rent—adopts a 
sinister aspect. 
In the midst of Sweeney’s story is an object that 
epitomizes this duality: the Lysol in which the corpse is 
preserved. Lysol is “a solution of coal-tar oil in soap,”51 
                     
51 “lysol,” n. OED Second edition, 1989; online version March 
2012. <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/111706>; accessed 25 
March 2012. 
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commonly used as a cleaning agent or household disinfectant. 
An advertisement in The Times from 1920 describes the 
product as “indispensable” for “daily personal hygiene” (Fig. 
1). Even more striking in the context of Sweeney Agonistes 
is the ad’s claim that “Used in the bath [Lysol] provides a 
perfect skin tonic.”52 In other words, Lysol exemplifies the 
ordinary, everyday practices associated with cleaning and 
personal hygiene. In its undiluted form, however, Lysol was 
highly poisonous. Sweeney’s story gives us no reason to 
assume that Lysol was the murder weapon, but contemporary 
newspaper archives give a sensational context to its 
appearance in the poem in that it featured in a rash of 
suicides during the 1920s.  
 
                     
52 “Lysol Limited,” The Times, Thursday, 22 April, 1920. 
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Fig 4.: Advertisement for Lysol Limited. The Times (22 April 
1920): 7, Col. F.  
 
No fewer than thirteen articles in The Times between 
1920 and 1927 record suicides who poisoned themselves with 
Lysol. Titles like “A Chance Acquaintance: Nurse’s Suicide 
in Mayfair Flat”53 and “Major’s Death in a Club: Suicide Due 
                     
53 “A Chance Acquaintance: Nurse’s Suicide in Mayfair Flat,” 
The Times, Wednesday, 24 March, 1920. 
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to Betting Losses”54 underscore that this phenomenon also cut 
across class lines. Lysol, then, figures the ordinary as a 
kind of poison. The intoxication associated with jazz 
becomes literal. Monotony, routine, and habit become 
embodiments of the repetition that Freud describes as the 
essence of the death drive.  
      For the unnamed murderer, even such an extreme act as 
this is not enough to distinguish his personality from 
others: “Any man might do a girl in / Any man has to, needs 
to, wants to / Once in a lifetime, do a girl in” (CPP, 124). 
This deep propensity towards violence is figured as a 
precise response to the deadeningly repetitive circumstances 
of modernity. The sense of looming threat—“Any man might do 
a girl in”; “A woman runs a terrible risk”—is suggestive of 
a genre identified by Rachel Blau DuPlessis as “tabloid 
shock,” the prurient fascination with violence of the 
sensationalist press.55 “These fellows always get pinched in 
the end,” says Swarts, but Snow demurs:  
 
 Excuse me, they don’t all get pinched in the end. 
                     
54 “Major’s Death in a Club: Suicide Due to Betting Losses,” 
The Times, Saturday, 18 December, 1926. 
55 Blau DuPlessis, Genders, Races and Religious Cultures in 
Modern American Poetry, 1908-1934, 99. 
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 What about them bones on Epsom Heath? 
 I seen that in the papers 
 You seen it in the papers 
 They don’t all get pinched in the end. 
       (CPP, 124) 
 
Snow’s comment underscores the fact that the poem always 
defers narrative closure: like the card game, like the body 
in the bath, and like the poem itself, Sweeney’s story 
trails off without a conclusion. 
 There is an obvious perversity in Eliot’s account of 
the ordinary, which comes to the fore in his essay on Marie 
Lloyd (about which I concur with Chinitz, who argues that 
the essay is more central to Eliot’s project than critics 
typically allow):  
 
In an interesting essay in the volume of Essays on the 
Depopulation of Melanesia, the psychologist W. H. R. 
Rivers adduced evidence which has led him to believe 
that the natives of that unfortunate archipelago are 
dying out principally for the reason that the 
‘Civilization’ forced upon them has deprived them of 
all interest in life. They are dying from pure boredom. 
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Having indulged his proclivity for fairly wild 
anthropological theories, Eliot launches into a scabrous 
attack on the direction of Western culture: 
 
When every theatre has been replaced by 100 cinemas, 
when every musical instrument has been replaced by 100 
gramophones, when every horse has been replaced by 100 
cheap motor-cars, when electrical ingenuity has made it 
possible for every child to hear its bedtime stories 
from a loudspeaker, when applied science has done 
everything possible with the materials on this earth to 
make life as interesting as possible, it will not be 
surprising if the population of the entire civilized 
world rapidly follows the fate of the Melanesians.56 
 
Fairness to Eliot demands that we acknowledge the 
qualification he adds in a footnote at the end of the essay: 
“These lines were written nine years ago.” Nonetheless, the 
“Marie Lloyd” essay captures the paradox of modernity for 
Eliot which is a source of awe, wonder, shock, and the whole 
“machinery of extremism” that animates his work up to and 
including Sweeney Agonistes, and at once, an “immense 
                     
56 Eliot, “Marie Lloyd,” 459.; See Chinitz, T. S. Eliot and 
the Cultural Divide, 14. 
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panorama of futility,” which, without the spiritual 
significance it was in Eliot’s nature to seek, must seem, in 
a word, boring. Sweeney’s lysol figures for this ambiguity. 
The next phase of Eliot’s career would take shape around one 
side of this binary only, activating and extending those 
conservative currents of his thought that had hitherto been 
ameliorated by the other. 
 
II. The Four Quartets and Nostalgia for the Ordinary 
 
 Bryony Randall claims that everyday life studies has 
given too little consideration to the questions of 
temporality despite their obvious affinities.57 In modernist 
studies more generally, however, discussions of temporality 
are ubiquitous; within Eliot studies alone, the influence of 
Henri Bergson’s philosophy has been debated for decades.58 
                     
57 Randall, Modernism, Daily Time and Everyday Life, 30–1. 
58 Cf. A. D. Moody, Thomas Stearns Eliot, Poet (Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 26–9; Louis 
Menand, Discovering Modernism : T.S. Eliot and His Context, 
2nd ed. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
32–5; Peter Ackroyd, T. S. Eliot: A Life (New York: Simon, 
1984), 40–1; Gordon, T. S. Eliot : An Imperfect Life, 55. 
Discussions of modernist temporality generally owe something 
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The Four Quartets have been traditionally interpreted as, in 
Ronald Bush’s words, “Eliot’s own meditation on the ‘central 
mystery of the Incarnation,’” that is, the union of timeless 
divinity and time-bound man in the person of Jesus Christ.59 
In fact the real neglect, I would argue, has been of the 
connection between the condition of modernity and place. The 
field of human geography has added to our understanding of 
modernity by focusing scholarly enquiry on the ways that 
meaning becomes invested in a landscape. Much of this work 
has been organized around a simple dichotomy between place 
and space: “When humans invest meaning in a portion of space 
and then become attached to it in some way (naming is one 
such way) it becomes a place.”60 Space does not necessarily 
                                                              
to Stephen Kern’s controversial The Culture of Time and 
Space, 1880-1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1983). 
59 Ronald Bush, T. S. Eliot: A Study in Character and Style 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 224. 
60 Tim Cresswell, Place: A Short Introduction (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2004), 10. See also the foundational text in the 
field of human geography, Yi-Fu Tuan’s Space and Place: The 
Perspective of Experience (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1977). 
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precede place, and it is not strictly non-place.61 By the 
seventeenth century, the concept of space had taken on a new 
practical importance, having been “geometrized” in the 
philosophies of Newton, Descartes, and Leibniz, and in the 
expansion of global trade and exploration.  
     The association between space and freedom is clear; 
movement over large geographical distances requires a system 
of navigation that does not depend on local knowledge. 
Mastering space sets the scene for those features of 
modernity that I have discussed in terms of Giddens’s 
concept of disembedding mechanisms. “The dynamism of 
modernity,” we recall, “derives from the separation of time 
and space and their recombination in forms which permit the 
precise time-space 'zoning' of social life [and] the 
disembedding of social systems.”62 Modernity, in other words, 
reorganizes time and space along systematic and 
epistemologically open lines. The standardization of time 
                     
61 Edward S. Casey offers an exhaustive account of these 
concepts’ development in Western philosophy from the 
Hellenistic and Neo-Platonist philosophers to the present. 
See Hellenistic and Neo-Platonist philosophers see Edward S. 
Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 
1998), 76–7. 
62 Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 16. 
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telling and navigation produces a model upon which other 
abstract systems of knowledge can be built. Dependence on 
local knowledge to order the world is a barrier to every 
kind of exchange over geographical distance: commercial, 
cultural, linguistic, etc. One way of describing modernity 
is the condition under which systems of exchange begin to 
transcend the local, allowing disparate kinds of individual 
to come together in a social space constructed so that 
exchange between diverse groups on the basis of some common 
footing is possible. Disembedding is “the 'lifting out' of 
social relations from local contexts of interaction and 
their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space.”63 
     Giddens offers a gloss of Casey’s reflections on the 
philosophical history of place by way of clarifying its 
transformation by modernity: 
 
“Place” is best conceptualized by means of the idea of 
locale, which refers to the physical settings of social 
activity as situated geographically. In pre-modern 
societies, space and place largely coincide, since the 
spatial dimensions of social life are, for most of the 
population, and in most respects, dominated by 
“presence”—by localized activities. The advent of 
                     
63 Ibid., 21. 
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modernity increasingly tears space away from place by 
fostering relations between “absent” others.64 
 
Giddens, however, passes over an integral facet of our 
historical experience of modernity: that the triumph of 
space is never absolute. Space constantly butts up against 
the intransigence of place. The security, familiarity, and 
comfort of embeddedness make it as much a human need as the 
freedom and expansiveness of space. And, as modernity’s 
process of disembedding proceeds, a political and 
philosophical reaction against it develops. This process is 
still underway around the world. From local building 
conservation efforts to movements for national self-
determination, the tension between place and space, 
embeddedness and disembedding, is at issue whenever the 
prerogatives of local experience come into conflict with 
systemic forces from above or outside.  
     One of the more controversial applications of these 
ideas in twentieth century thought can be found in the later 
writings of Martin Heidegger. Despite their questionable 
politics, works like “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” “The 
Question Concerning Technology,” and “The Age of the World-
Picture” have had an enormous impact on fields including 
                     
64 Ibid., 18. 
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architecture, human geography and ecology. The late 
Heidegger builds on the anti-Cartesian precepts of his 
earlier philosophy: there-being (Dasein) presupposes the 
inextricable unity of mind and body. The Cartesian model, on 
the other hand, grants our physical substance its 
emplacement, but locates our mental or spiritual substance 
elsewhere, or to be more precise, nowhere (i.e. it is not 
included amongst res extensa.) But for Heidegger, extension 
is neither an a priori idea that organizes our experience, 
nor an ontological category; rather it is a way of being in 
the world. “Space is not in the subject, nor is the world in 
space. Space is rather ‘in’ the world in so far as space has 
been disclosed by that Being-in-the-world which is 
constitutive for Dasein… [which] if well understood, is 
spatial.”65 
     Heidegger later elaborates upon his description of 
being-in-the-world through the concept of dwelling. “To be a 
human being means to be on the earth as a mortal. The old 
word bauen, which says that man is insofar as he dwells, 
this word bauen, however, also means at the same time to 
cherish and protect.”66 The cultivation and preservation of 
                     
65 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie 
and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962), 146. 
66 Martin Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking” in Martin 
Heidegger, Basic Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to the 
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place is thus essential to people as human beings, a fairly 
commonplace observation. Heidegger’s mystical vocabulary, 
however, and his late emphasis on the “call” that language 
exercises on us, point to the negative connotations of place. 
Cherishing and protecting a locale also connotes excluding 
outsiders, and privileging cultural homogeneity. Heidegger’s 
position is set against one of the most emancipatory (but 
for some, bewildering) features of modernity: unparalleled 
freedom of movement for millions around the world. The 
modern concept of public space—open to all, entered on the 
basis of an equality that disregards social, cultural, and 
economic distinctions—is anathema to Heidegger’s world-view. 
Despite the overtly retrograde thrust of Heidegger’s 
political beliefs, his assertion that dwelling is central to 
human beings must be taken account of. He has also outlined 
a connection central to the argument of this chapter between 
dwelling and poetry, in the essay “…Poetically Man Dwells…”67 
By insisting on the active power of language in his reading 
                                                              
Task of Thinking (1964), Rev. and expanded ed. (San 
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993), 349-50. 
67 Martin Heidegger, “…Poetically Man Dwells…” in Martin 
Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert 
Hofstadter (New York: HarperCollins, 1971), 209. 
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of Hölderlin’s Germania, Heidegger marks out the poem as a 
powerful means through which to build and dwell.68  
     Some of the affective qualities of space are shared by 
its opposite, enclosure. Both experiences can be 
characterized by temporal and spatial disorientation, and 
their various analogies with literature are treated in depth 
by Frank Kermode’s essay “Solitary Confinement” in The Sense 
of an Ending.69 Separated from ordinary markers of time and 
space, the subject faces an infinite and undifferentiated 
expanse; the natural response is terror. Casey borrows the 
term horror vacui from architecture to describe this 
experience, which Kermode seizes on in order to demonstrate 
“certain characteristic fictions in a pure state.” Kermode 
hypothesizes that in such an extreme state, the imagination 
takes on a vitally important role. The smallest indications 
of regular change (in this case “the shadow cast by a gable 
                     
68 Timothy Clark, Martin Heidegger, 2nd ed. (Oxford and New 
York: Routledge, 2011), 118-19. For an application of 
Heidegger to Eliot that takes a sympathetic view of the 
former, see Dominic Griffiths, “‘Now and in England’: Four 
Quartets, Place, and Martin Heidegger's Concept of Dwelling,” 
Yeats Eliot Review 29.1/2 (Spring 2012): 3–18. 
69 Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the 
Theory of Fiction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 
155-80. 
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on a wall”) take on the function of a clock. “Burney,” the 
prisoner whose account of confinement Kermode refers to, 
“Needed to apprehend the increasing pressure of an 
approaching end… If time ceases to be felt as successive, 
this end ceases to have effect; without the sense of passing 
time one is virtually ceasing to live, one loses ‘contact 
with reality.’”70 As it is for time, so it is for space. The 
pressure of an imminent end allows the succession of moments 
to be meaningful, just as the boundedness of locales allows 
us to invest them with meaning. 
     To a certain extent, however, the idea of an ideal, 
comforting embeddedness in place preceding the alienating 
onset of space is a prelapsarian fable. It is at this point 
that the intersection between text and space becomes clear. 
Kermode uses Burnley’s experience to insist (using a 
vocabulary deeply indebted to Wallace Stevens) that the 
imagination must assert control over these myths, and remake 
them itself. Kermode glosses the series of historical 
transformations that separate modernity from pre-modernity 
differently from Giddens: 
 
George Herbert, making metaphors for prayer, called it 
that which in an hour transformed the six-days world… 
                     
70 Ibid., 160. 
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It was a six-days world because God made it in six days. 
Music had six notes, one for each day of the creation, 
of which every tune reflected the harmony…  In much the 
same way, encyclopaedists used to arrange the whole of 
human knowledge as a commentary on the six days of 
creation. To arrange it in terms of an alphabet is to 
make it conform to an arbitrary human formulation… The 
grand universal order of Genesis gave way to the 
spacious firmament of Newton, and this in turn yields 
to the subtle complementarities of modern physics… 
medieval randomness is transformed by the logic of 
Aristotelian plot, which is modified by the counter-
logical devices of the modern novel.71 
 
Kermode applies his description to the novel, but it holds 
equally well for lyric, as we shall see. Kermode, virtually 
paraphrasing Stevens, summarizes this transformation thus: 
“From a literature which assumed that it was imitating an 
order to a literature which assumes that it has to create an 
order, unique and self-dependent.”72 
     Verse has a unique potential to ruminate on a topic or 
set of propositions; to put them forth, circle around them, 
                     
71 Ibid., 165. 
72 Ibid., 166. 
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depart from them and return; verse is so named from the 
Latin vertere (to turn) for the act of “turning to begin 
another line.”73 And, after all, “stanza” is Italian for 
“room” or “stopping-place,”74 suggesting the importance of 
structural succession in the poem to impart a sense of 
movement. That said, the main vessel for expressing movement 
in a poem, as in all writing, is the verb. At the outset of 
the modernist era, Ernest Fenollosa considered the role of 
transitivity in poetic syntax in his essay “The Chinese 
Written Character as a Medium for Poetry” (published 
posthumously by Ezra Pound). Fenollosa argues that the 
“transference of power” is the basic act of nature: “term 
from which ⇒ transference of force ⇒ term to which.” The 
sentence, ideally, should mimic this natural set of 
relations as such: “agent ⇒ act ⇒ object.” This basic form 
“brings language close to things, and in its strong reliance 
                     
73 “verse, n.” The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. 
OED Online. Oxford University Press. 29 September 2010 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/> 
74 “stanza” The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED 
Online. Oxford University Press. 29 September 2010 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/> 
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upon verbs it erects all speech into a kind of dramatic 
poetry.”75 Davie summarizes Fenollosa’s prescriptions thus: 
 
The good poet will use, wherever possible, the full 
sentence driving through a transitive verb; that he 
will avoid, wherever possible, the copula; that he will 
rearrange, wherever possible, negations, so as to use a 
positive verb of negation; that he will avoid 
intransitive verbs; that he will be fond of verbs and 
cut down as far as possible the use of other parts of 
speech.76 
 
Fenollosa’s essay is written in a prescriptive mode, and 
there is no reason why poetry that takes this approach is 
necessarily better than poetry that doesn’t, and Fenollosa’s 
rhetoric of “closeness to nature” is deeply suspect. Davie 
is able to adduce several examples of canonical poems that 
are positively verb-averse. But Fenollosa’s dichotomy 
between passive syntax and active syntax does highlight a 
distinctive difference between poetry and prose. Active 
syntax may be thought of as the ordinary mode for prose. It 
                     
75 Quoted in Donald Davie, Articulate Energy: An Inquiry into 
the Syntax of English Poetry (London and Boston: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1955), 36. 
76 Ibid., 39. 
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is certainly the most expedient mode for a forward-moving 
narration (hence its almost exclusive use in journalism). A 
prose piece that deliberately eschewed active syntax 
throughout would strike most readers as extraordinary. 
Contra Fenollosa, lyric poetry often tends towards just this 
state: the still and the purely descriptive. Description and 
rumination are often thought to be quintessential features 
of lyric (as opposed to both prose and epic). Aristotle, in 
Chapter 24 of the Poetics, draws just this distinction 
between epic and drama, citing the scene in Homer’s Iliad 
where Achilles pursues Hector while the armies of Greece and 
Troy watch, not intervening. “The circumstances… would be 
patently absurd if put on the stage, with the men standing 
and refraining from pursuit… but in epic the effect is not 
noticed. The marvelous gives pleasure.”77 Aristotle is 
describing the distinctive kind of pleasure offered by lyric 
poetry; its ability to dwell on an image, a moment, or a 
motif unfettered by the demands of narrative progression or 
plausibility. The ordinary and the extraordinary are more 
emphatically related in lyric poetry. 
     Having looked briefly at structure and syntax, we must 
also consider the poem’s materiality. Poems themselves are 
embodied objects when printed or written; they take up space. 
The arrangement of a poem on the page is integral to its 
                     
77 Aristotle, The Poetics, 123. 
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nature as poetry, and to its repertoire of formal devices: 
the line break, for instance, usually depends on spatial 
arrangement. Georges Perec plays brilliantly on the 
physicality of writing in his Species of Spaces:  
 
This is how space begins, with words only, signs traced 
on the blank page. To describe space: to name it, to 
trace it, like those portolano-makers who saturated the 
coastlines with the names of harbors, the names of 
capes, the names of inlets, until in the end the land 
was only separated from the sea by a continuous ribbon 
of text. Is the aleph, that place in Borges from which 
the entire world is visible simultaneously, anything 
other than an alphabet?78 
 
The written work, like geographical place, is defined by a 
kind of boundedness: it delineates a certain set of 
possibilities from the linguistic infinite. In Perec’s view, 
the paradox of the writer is that even though he remains 
always situated, always embodied—“Sitting deep in thought at 
their tables, writers are forming lines of words”79—he takes 
                     
78 Georges Perec, Species of Spaces and Other Pieces, trans. 
John Sturrock (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 13. 
79 Ibid., 15. 
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on an aspect of what Casey identifies as “kenotic models of 
the self-emptying creator-God.”80 
As we have seen, the lyric poem helps us to dwell on 
its subject, exploiting ambiguity to draw together 
conflicting arguments and complex sentiments. Is it capable, 
though, Stevens and Eliot ask, of helping us dwell in 
another sense: by imparting or embodying a sense of place, 
and of the everyday, amid the confusion and chaos of 
modernity? Eliot and Stevens both confront the problem of 
modern placelessness by insisting on the particular 
pertinence of lyric form to this question. That said, while 
Stevens insists on the arbitrariness and individuality of 
these imagined orders, Eliot’s post-conversion poetry is 
often marked by a nostalgia for “the six-days world.” Eliot, 
after all, may have been describing a similar shift in 
different terms with his notion of the “dissociation of 
sensibility.” Both would agree, however, that the processes 
of social transformation animating their work do not cease. 
The purpose of this chapter then is to articulate the 
particular responses to these changes that Eliot and Stevens 
elaborate late in their poetic careers, and to examine the 
poetic means that they adopt in doing so. 
 
                     
80 Casey, The Fate of Place, 16. 
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     The languages that describe space and place differ from 
one another. The first is essentially geographic, relying on 
cardinal directions to describe the relationship of spaces 
and objects to one another. The second is egocentric, its 
axes dependent on the orientation of our bodies (in front, 
behind, right, left). Egocentric directions turn with us 
when our bodies rotate; geocentric directions do not. 
Geographical directions guide us through space by means of 
an abstract system. As we have seen, a way to read the 
cardinal directions and navigate by them was the condition 
of possibility for the European Age of Discovery, and to 
that extent, of modernity itself. The system of geographical 
direction transcends the individual, while there are as many 
iterations of the egocentric system as there are people. 
Both of these orientations can be drawn on to figure for 
philosophies of the self. Geographical direction emphasizes 
the systemic to the detriment of the individual, while 
egocentric direction emphasizes subjectivity and 
embeddedness in place.  
     How might these two kinds of direction operate in the 
space of a poem? Eliot begins “Burnt Norton” with a sequence 
that mimes movement but produces only confusion, partly by 
manipulating an egocentric vocabulary of direction (my own 
emphasis): 
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 Footfalls echo in the memory 
 Down the passage which we did not take 
 Towards the door we never opened 
 Into the rose-garden. 
  
   Other echoes 
 Inhabit the garden. Shall we follow? 
 Quick, said the bird, find them, find them, 
 Round the corner. Through the first gate, 
Into our first world, shall we follow 
The deception of the thrush? Into our first world. 
        (CPP, 171) 
 
The bird addresses readers in the imperative, coaxing us 
through an imagined landscape that we are assumed to 
recognize. “The passage,” “the door,” “the rose-garden,” 
“the corner,” and “the gate” are each appear with a definite 
article, suggesting familiarity, rather than the indefinite 
articles that would ordinarily attend descriptions of a new 
landscape. But we are not familiar with this landscape, nor 
can we be, despite the inclusive sense imparted by the 
first-person plural. The poem evokes a sense of frenetic 
movement, but in fact it only mimes it. In the absence of 
reliable co-ordinates, the reader is adrift in the realm of 
the uncanny: the spatial equivalent of the poem’s 
preoccupation with the circularity of time. The first 
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section of “Burnt Norton” applies the grammar of place to an 
alien landscape, signaling placelessness as one of the 
poem’s chief concerns. 
     Casey describes the experience of horror vacui thus: 
“the unbridled terror occasioned by the mere contemplation 
of an entirely vacuous space.”81 Locke describes infinite 
space as “the undistinguishable inane”; Newton describes 
infinite time as flowing “equably without relation to 
anything external.”82 Moreover: “If the time-line is spatial 
in its continuity and homogeneity, it is at the same time 
‘placial’ in its constitution by means of positions, that is, 
a series of points arranges on the line and grasped, all 
together, as the line.”83 One consequence of this is that 
being lost in time bears comparison to being lost in space; 
the sense of being unmoored in the infinite, lacking 
coordinates, is much the same. The famous opening to “Burnt 
Norton” has often puzzled readers: 
 
 Time present and time past 
 Are both perhaps present in time future  
                     
81 Edward S. Casey, Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed 
Understanding of the Place-World (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), xi. 
82 Cited in ibid., 22. 
83 Ibid., 9. 
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     And time future contained in time past. 
 If all time is eternally present 
 All time is unredeemable. 
      (CPP, 171) 
 
One possible reading of the passage is to see the “eternal 
present” of time as analogous to an infinite expanse of 
space. Criticism has fastened upon the element of time in 
the poems, to the extent that Eliot’s interest in place and 
space has been largely obscured. 
     One exception to this consensus is Nancy Hargrove, who 
considers the theme of place in her Landscape as Symbol in 
the Poetry of T. S. Eliot.84 But she does so from a 
fundamentally anti-modern, and anti-Modernist, perspective. 
As her title suggests, she reads Eliot as a symbolist poet 
in an attempt to recuperate those moments of dissonance and 
contradiction that otherwise set Eliot’s aesthetics apart. 
However, Hargrove’s argument wholly ignores the aesthetic 
ruminations of “East Coker” II, which follow a passage 
satirizing just the symbolist garden motif that she seizes 
on frequently: 
 
                     
84 See Nancy Duvall Hargrove, Landscape as Symbol in the 
Poetry of T. S. Eliot (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 1978). 
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 That was a way of putting it—not very satisfactory; 
 A periphrastic study in a worn-out poetical fashion, 
 Leaving one still with the intolerable wrestle 
 With words and meanings. The poetry does not matter. 
         (CPP, 179) 
 
The periphrastic nature of symbolism is precisely the 
problem, and this passage takes an implicit case for plain 
speech to a radical extreme. The second line above, mocking 
in tone and itself circumlocutory, right down to the 
obsolete “poetical”, precedes the surprising declaration 
“The poetry does not matter.” In the ongoing struggle 
between the poetic and the prosy throughout the Quartets, 
this represents the clearest statement of the argument for 
the latter.85 
     Despite the astuteness of her source-hunting, Hargrove 
makes a mistake to take passages like that beginning 
“Scorpion fights against the Sun…” at face value (CPP, 178-
9). Lines like these ask to be read as parody in light of 
their uncharacteristically excessive rhetoric. As Gardner 
points out, Eliot adapts “Thunder rolled by stars / 
                     
85 Cf. Barbara Everett, “Eliot’s Four Quartets and French 
Symbolism,” English, 29 (1980): 1–27; Ruth Abbott, “T. S. 
Eliot’s Ghostly Footfalls: The Versification of Four 
Quartets,” Cambridge Quarterly 34.4 (December 2005): 374–5. 
288 
 
Stimulates triumphal cars” from Mallarmé’s “Tonnere et rubis 
aux moyeaux” and “Du seul vespéral de mes chars,” suggesting 
that symbolism is the object of that parody.86 Gardner goes 
on to argue that “The degeneration of this way of writing in 
lines 68-9 [‘That was a way of putting it…’] is a rejection 
of symbolism in favor of a poetry that wrestles with 
meanings.” She neglects the fact that lines 51-67 perform 
that rejection themselves by satirizing the symbolist style. 
     What I mean is that the syntax of the stanza 
degenerates line by line, producing an incoherent succession 
of images. Incoherent, that is, without the determined 
hermeneutic work of the reader, and the product of that work 
will not likely amount to a fair return on his investment. 
As Gardner rightly points out, the passage is clearly 
modeled on the beginning of “Burnt Norton,” section 2, but 
in fact there is also a marked difference between them.87 
Both begin with a figure for the effect of the stanza as a 
whole. In “Burnt Norton,” the key term is “clot”: “Garlic 
and sapphires in the mud / Clot the bedded axle tree.” The 
stunning effect of the juxtaposition between “Garlic and 
sapphires” (and the series of juxtapositions that unfold as 
the stanza progresses) arrests both the reader’s attention 
                     
86 Helen Louise Gardner, The Composition of Four Quartets 
(London: Faber, 1978), 101. 
87 Ibid. 
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and the flow of the lyric—a perfect example of the lyric 
stillness discussed earlier.88 In “East Coker,” however, the 
equivalent stanza begins “What is the late November doing / 
With the disturbance of the spring…” The mystery is 
announced in explicit terms, as the reader begins to wonder 
what the stanza is doing with the “disturbance” of its 
various images. Whereas “Burnt Norton” proceeds immediately 
from its first, two-line, sentence to a second of equal 
strength—“The trilling wire in the blood / Sings below 
inveterate scars / Appeasing long forgotten wars.”—“East 
Coker” obfuscates. The first sentence continues for a 
further five lines, the first three joined by the weakest 
conjunction in the English language: “And creatures of the 
summer heat, / And snowdrops writhing under feet / And 
hollyhocks that aim too high…” (CPP, 178). One is tempted to 
suggest that the hollyhocks figure for the aspirations of 
this deliberately overworked passage, which cannot help but 
appear rhetorically strained. 
     Later in the stanza, this kind of syntactic disconnect 
recurs with greater force. The stanza as a whole contains 
only two sentences, the second of which begins with the 
borrowing from Mallarmé mentioned above. It continues: 
“Deployed in constellated wars / Scorpion fights against the 
                     
88 Fisher, Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare 
Experiences, 23. 
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Sun,” clearly writing back to “the boarhound and the boar” 
of “Burnt Norton,” who “Pursue their pattern as before / But 
reconciled among the stars” (CPP, 172). Whereas “Burnt 
Norton” makes the stars a site of reconciliation, “East 
Coker” invokes war as a figure for its disintegration of 
symbolist technique. The stanza continues:  
 
 Until the Sun and Moon go down 
 Comets weep and Leonids fly 
 Hunt the heavens and the plains 
 Whirled in a vortex that shall bring 
 The world to that destructive fire 
 Which burns before the ice-cap reigns. 
       (CPP, 178-9) 
 
The heightened rhetoric in evidence here is underlined by 
the passage’s syntactical complexity. “The heavens and the 
plains” seem on a first pass to be the object of the verb 
“hunt,” while “Whirled,” positioned at the start of a new 
line, presents itself as an intransitive verb waiting for a 
subject that will appear later in the sentence. “Plains” 
seems as though it ought to be followed by a comma. But a 
plausible subject never arrives, and the reader is forced to 
re-read “Whirled” as a past participle modifying “the 
heavens and the plains” in the line before. “The heavens and 
the plains,” then, equivocates between its roles as 
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grammatical subject and object. The same pattern occurs 
twice earlier in the stanza, around the verbs “tumble” and 
“deployed.” “Vortex” is thus the key figure of the passage, 
alluding both to a grammatical vortex and a vortex of 
symbolist imagery that reaches its culmination in the 
paradoxical juxtaposition of “destructive fire” with the 
reign of the “ice-cap.” 
     “Ice-cap,” as it happens, has an interesting history 
according to the OED. While its familiar present-day meaning, 
“A permanent cap or covering of ice over a tract of country,” 
dates to 1875, it is preceded by an earlier meaning: “A 
bladder or elastic bag containing pounded ice, for 
application to the head in congestion of the brain, etc.” 
dates from 1854.89 Eliot, who was no stranger to treatments 
for neurasthenic conditions, might have appreciated the 
gesture of concluding such an overheated passage with the 
application of remedy for headache, if he did not intend 
this dual meaning himself. After all, there is no plausible 
reference to Christian eschatology that draws the two images 
of fire and ice, the second coming after the first. The King 
James Bible contains only three references to ice, all of 
them in the Old Testament, while there are five hundred and 
                     
89 “ice-cap” The Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. OED 
Online. Oxford University Press. 1 September 2010 
<http://dictionary.oed.com/>. 
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six references to fire.90 The Book of Revelation abounds with 
references to “fire and brimstone,” but nowhere is this 
culmination followed by a new ice-age. The passage clearly 
does not seek to evoke Christian eschatology. Pace Hargrove, 
this invocation of celestial space does not “skillfully 
convey the disorder and ultimate destruction of human 
existence confined totally within the boundaries of time.”91 
Rather, it uses hermeneutic incompleteness to deride the 
symbolist project of apportioning stable meaning to every 
poetic landscape. 
     This chapter focuses heavily on “East Coker” for a 
number of reasons. The poem is faced with a peculiar 
rhetorical task: it has to effect the transformation of 
“Burnt Norton” from the isolated coda of Eliot’s Collected 
Poems to the opening poem of a longer sequence. As Donoghue 
observes: “The first readers of ‘Burnt Norton’ did not know 
that they were rehearsing a quartet… Or that the poem was 
the first of a sequence rather than what it appeared to be, 
the last poem of Collected Poems, 1909-1935.”92 In order to 
                     
90 James Strong, Strong's Concordance of the Bible, A popular 
ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1977), 351—2, 506. 
91 Hargrove, Landscape as Symbol in the Poetry of T. S. Eliot, 
152.  
92 Denis Donoghue, Words Alone: The Poet T. S. Eliot (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 251. 
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open the poem out into a larger sequence, “East Coker” needs 
to undo each figure of reconciliation, symmetry, and 
resolution found in “Burnt Norton,” setting up an aesthetic 
and philosophical problem upon which to elaborate. “East 
Coker,” then, is one of the richest portions of the Quartets 
to read for aesthetic dicta. So, as Gardener and Hargrove 
note, “East Coker” II does indeed posit a war amongst the 
stars in reference to the outbreak of the Second World War, 
but it also rewrites “The completion of its partial ecstasy, 
/ The resolution of its partial horror” from “Burnt Norton” 
II into the “fear and frenzy” of old men in “East Coker” II 
(CPP 173, 179). 
 That “fear and frenzy” signals Eliot’s continued 
interest in an aesthetic of surprise and of the 
extraordinary throughout the Quartets, harking back to the 
“aesthetics of the histrionic” that animated much of The 
Waste Land.93 The long verse paragraph following the lyric 
stanza in section II of “East Coker” is a case in point. The 
passage begins in a state of poetic confusion, having 
denounced the symbolism of the previous stanza. 
Philosophical confusion follows, as the poem’s faith in the 
wisdom of tradition falters: “What was to be the value of 
the long looked forward to, / Long hoped for calm, the 
autumnal serenity / And the wisdom of age?” Then follows one 
                     
93 Rainey, Revisiting The Waste Land, 50—1. 
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of the poem’s signal declarations: “There is, it seems to us, 
/ At best, only a limited value / In the knowledge derived 
from experience” (CPP 179). The faltering syntax of the 
sentence redoubles the sense of confusion it expresses; 
saturated with commas and line breaks, its point is 
annoyingly deferred.  
     But this train of thought quickly gathers momentum; the 
next sentence is equally marked, but this time by its 
assurance: 
 
 The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies, 
 For the pattern is new in every moment 
 And every moment is a new and shocking 
 Valuation of all we have been. (CPP, 179) 
 
The strident rhythm of these lines imparts philosophical 
certainty, but it is certainty of a humble kind, a 
vindication of flux and all of its creative potential. These 
lines mark a shift in rhetorical register through the 
arresting appearance of “shocking,” the strongest adjective 
yet encountered in the passage. “The pattern is new in every 
moment,” suggesting that each moment of the Quartets as they 
unfold holds the possibility of a “new and shocking 
valuation” of Eliot’s poetics. At the same time, however, 
Eliot writes back to some of the signal features of his 
earlier work. In a late essay on “Eliot and the Shudder,” 
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Frank Kermode outlined a pattern that is also at work here: 
“‘The bewildering minute’ is the one during which the reader 
submits to the thrill—frisson, shudder—of the passage, and 
after which the critic must emerge from the spell and 
consider his or her experience.”94 The bewildering minute is 
ambiguous; its momentary frisson can open up new avenues of 
thought, but just as quickly, our critical faculties 
intervene and distance us from it. Eliot captures the pathos 
of this moment in the next line of “East Coker”: “We are 
only undeceived / Of that which, deceiving, could no longer 
harm” (CPP, 179). Each “new and shocking valuation” is an 
opportunity as well as a risk. 
     Eliot intensifies the point by pursuing it through a 
metaphorical landscape, bringing us back to the realm of 
place and space: 
 
 In the middle, not only in the middle of the way 
 But all the way, in a dark wood, in a bramble, 
On the edge of a grimpen, where is no secure foothold, 
 And menaced by monsters, fancy lights, 
 Risking enchantment. 
       (CPP, 179) 
 
                     
94 Frank Kermode, "Eliot and the Shudder," London Review of 
Books, 13 May 2010, 15. 
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Just like the earlier lines beginning “There is, it seems to 
us…,” the syntax of this passage lacks a main verb, seeking 
out a secure foothold where none is available. The “dark 
wood” becomes a “bramble,” becomes an even more obscure 
“grimpen”; then, like foliage parting to reveal an 
unexpected clearing, the aesthetic argument of the passage 
appears. “Menaced by monsters, fancy lights, / Risking 
enchantment” transforms the rhetoric of disorientation into 
that of surprise and delight. These lines almost achieve an 
objective correlative for the “bewildering minute”: “menaced” 
though we might be, we are enticed by “fancy lights,” and 
the risk after all amounts to “enchantment.” The experience 
of being lost and disorientated, adrift in space, opens up 
the possibility of surprise and discovery. As Fisher has it: 
 
In a world not yet sufficiently familiar, the 
predictable response to the extraordinary is a feeling 
of alarm that the novelty will turn out to be dangerous 
to the fragile order that maintains the self.95 
 
Like Fisher, Eliot recognizes that the “enchantment” a poem 
might offer (“enchantment” itself being etymologically 
related to the Latin incantare, “to sing”) comes at the cost 
                     
95 Fisher, Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare 
Experiences, 48. 
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of a vertiginous moment of self-forgetting. By situating 
that moment in the context of geographical displacement, 
Eliot draws a link between dislocation and enchantment.  
     Four Quartets is surprisingly ambivalent on the 
question of space and place. “East Coker” II gives an 
eloquent account of disembeddedness as a route to the 
aesthetics of surprise, but it joins on either side two 
emphatically conservative approaches to the problem. There 
are two master metaphors (or, indeed, metaphorical locales) 
in the Quartets for the notions of embeddedness and 
disembeddedness. The first we encountered at the beginning 
of this discussion; it is the country, particularly the 
manor house and its village. The second, which I will turn 
to now, is the city, synecdochally rendered as the London 
underground. Two of the Quartets are named after manors: 
“Burnt Norton” and “East Coker”. Both begin with elegiac 
descriptions of the manor as place. As we have already seen, 
“Burnt Norton” sets out from the start to give an account of 
the locale centered on the relationship between the poet’s 
voice and the reader. “East Coker,” however, takes a broader 
social view. The abandoned or destroyed manor houses that 
give their names to “Burnt Norton” and “East Coker” echo 
other, similar metaphors for social change in modernism. 
Woolf, for instance, turns the Ramsay family’s decaying 
holiday house into a vivid symbol of the transformations 
brought on by the First World War, and the family’s losses. 
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Like Woolf, Eliot is deeply concerned by what seems like the 
passing of a social order.  
     The distance of the idealized past to which Eliot looks 
back becomes fully apparent in the celebrated passage where 
he adopts seventeenth-century diction that refers to his 
forebear, Sir Thomas Elyot, a resident of the town of East 
Coker: 
 
 The association of man and woman 
 In daunsinge, signifying matrimonie— 
 A dignified and commodious sacrament. 
 Two and two, necessarye coniunction, 
 Holding eche other by the hand or the arm 
 Whiche betokeneth concorde… 
         (CPP, 178) 
 
Bush seems surprised to find himself in agreement with A. D. 
Moody that this passage, rather than conveying reverence and 
“solemn dignity,” intimates only “the pastness of the 
past.”96 In fact, Eliot has already signaled that the past 
depicted here is no longer attainable. The stanza containing 
the Elyot passage begins with the warning “If you do not 
come too close, if you do not come too close…” (CPP, 177), 
                     
96 Bush, T. S. Eliot, 212–13; Moody, Thomas Stearns Eliot, 
Poet, 209–10. 
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giving a sense of the scene as a kind of fairy apparition 
that will dissipate should the reader step too close. It is 
difficult not to feel as well that Eliot’s choice to revert 
to seventeenth-century diction reflects less a reluctance to 
“violate Renaissance wisdom with the inflections of his own 
age,”97 than an impulse to confound and startle the reader. 
Eliot also uses two instances of direct address to startling 
effect: 
 
     …Now the light falls 
 Across the open field, leaving the deep land 
 Shuttered with branches, dark in the afternoon, 
 Where you lean against a bank while a van passes, 
 And the deep lane insists on the direction 
 Into the village, in the electric heat 
 Hypnotised. 
         (CPP, 177) 
 
This passage acts out the spatial work of the poem, as the 
“deep lane” figures the lines of the stanza as they insist 
on the reader’s direction. But in contrast to the urgency of 
“Burnt Norton” 1 (“Go, go, go, said the bird”) this passage 
winds languidly on with “heavy feet in clumsy shoes,” almost 
in a state of “hypnosis” (CPP, 177-8). 
                     
97 Bush, T. S. Eliot, 213. 
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     Even when the poem insists most clearly on forward 
momentum it undoes itself by falling back on the necessary 
recurrences of lyric form. It is as though linear movement 
figures the traversal of space, while the recurrences of 
lyric figure a kind of rumination on place: a rhythm of 
constant departures and returns. “In my beginning is my end,” 
says “East Coker’s” repeated refrain. “Hypnosis,” the onset 
of artificial sleep, but also a kind of fixation, figures 
the affect of place, the experience of embeddedness, as a 
primal comfort reflected in the “warm haze” and the “sultry 
light” of the scene. The opening stanza of “East Coker” 1 
might appear to move forward through historical time at 
great speed: “Houses rise and fall, crumble, are extended, / 
Are removed, destroyed, restored, or in their place / Is an 
open field, or a factory, or a by-pass” (CPP, 177). The 
poem’s syntax, however, persistently undermines the forward 
momentum of its temporal movement. Each of the last four 
lines of the stanza is introduced by a repeated conjunction 
(“And… / And… / And… / And…”). The weak conjunction “and” 
differs from other conjunctions by being purely connective; 
the two terms joined by it exist in no more specific or 
active a relation than simple parataxis. Despite their 
frequent invocations of time, these final lines lay out an 
immobile landscape. Earlier in the stanza, too, all of the 
action is conveyed through prepositions rather than verbs: 
“Old stone to new building, old timber to new fires, / Old 
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fire to ashes, and ashes to the earth” (CPP, 177). The 
“Houses” shift from grammatical subject of three 
intransitive verbs (“rise and fall, crumble”) to the object 
of “extended,” “removed,” “destroyed,” and “restored.” None 
of these verbs even have a subject; human agency is nowhere 
to be found in this passage. Thus the “hypnosis” of the 
second stanza takes on a deeper meaning: the syntax of the 
opening stanza evokes a vortex of historical change in which 
no sure footing or stable perspective can be found. 
     Each of these syntactic features play into the dynamic 
of ordinary and extraordinary in “East Coker” I. The 
stanza’s sweeping evocation of historical change, 
extraordinary in its scope, is rendered ordinary in relation 
to the Thomas Elyot passage, which contains the only 
instances of human agency expressed by transitive verbs. Men 
and women are “Holding eche other by the hand or the arm / 
Which betokeneth concorde” (CPP, 178). By adopting Elyot’s 
diction, Eliot does more than signal the pastness of the 
past: he makes the “commodious sacrament” of marriage, 
usually an ordinary institution, one of the foundations of 
our social order, extraordinary. At this point it becomes 
clear that the romance of the manor house for Eliot is how 
it figures for a seemingly harmonious, hierarchical social 
order embedded in place. The conspicuous absence of 
transitivity elsewhere in the section suggests that agency 
itself, like the “commodious sacrament” here depicted 
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belongs to the past, visible only in a kind of reverie, and 
only “if you do not come too close.” Both modernity and 
nature, on the other hand, grind on in their impersonal, 
systemic cycles of destruction and recycled creation. 
     “East Coker” III turns its focus to the modern malady 
of spiritual vacuity, invoked through a simile with the 
London Underground, which functions as a deliberate 
counterpoint to the manor house of section I. The setting 
invites a departure from the wistfulness of “East Coker” I 
towards a darker mood: 
 
 O dark dark dark. They all go into the dark, 
The vacant interstellar spaces, the vacant into the 
vacant, 
The captains, merchant bankers, eminent men of letters. 
The generous patrons of art, the statesmen and the 
rulers, 
Distinguished civil servants, chairmen of many 
committees, 
Industrial lords and petty contractors, all go into the 
dark, 
And dark the Sun and Moon, and the Almanach de Gotha 
And the Stock Exchange Gazette, the Directory of 
Directors, 
And cold the sense and lost the motive of action. 
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        (CPP, 180) 
 
This is the daily katabasis of City men and other Londoners 
into the Tube, a ritual well known to Eliot from his days at 
Lloyds Bank, and indeed his time with Faber and Faber, when 
he would take the bus from Carlyle Mansions to Piccadilly 
Circus before riding the tube to Russell Square.98 Here it is 
made, somewhat bizarrely, to figure for the necessity that 
everyone, regardless of social standing, must sooner or 
later confront a “dark night of the soul.” The opening 
allusion to Milton’s Samson Agonistes complicates what would 
otherwise seem a straightforward mock-heroic juxtaposition 
of the modern and the ancient. The echo of Milton’s 
blindness adds a heightened pathos to the passage, but this 
does not wholly efface the bathetic effect of drawing an 
equivalence between a Tube station and a mythic underworld. 
The strangeness of this juxtaposition is heightened when 
Eliot ropes together the celestial and the chthonic: “They 
all go into the dark, / The vacant interstellar spaces.” 
“The vacant into the vacant” is a particularly striking 
formulation; the first “vacant” wavers between referring to 
the “them” of the previous line the “vacant interstellar 
spaces” of line 2. In doing so it evokes a vertiginous image 
of vacant space folding in on itself. Nevertheless, the 
                     
98 Ackroyd, T. S. Eliot: A Life, 277. 
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opening passage of the section effectively sets out its 
thematic concerns: the horror of vacant space, the remolding 
of familiar or historical landscapes, the social leveling 
already canvassed in section I, and the role of the poet in 
newly reconfigured kinds of public space. 
     “East Coker” III makes much use of the experience of 
horror vacui, which Casey locates at the center of Greek 
creation myths, and at the origin of Western literature: 
 
Even though Chaos qua Gap is neither disorder nor void 
(some early Greeks held that the primal gap contained 
air), as cosmic separation it remained threatening 
enough to call for filling… In these various ingenious 
moves to plug up the Gap, we already witness the 
phenomenon of horror vacui, that is, the intolerability 
of no-place-at-all.99 
 
In one sense, certain passages of Four Quartets might be 
said to exhibit a kind of horror vacui; long verse-
paragraphs that do not use a more disciplined stanzaic form 
(like “East Coker” III) tend to sprawl, their long lines 
inhabiting the page almost entirely. In this connection the 
earlier allusion to blindness takes on another meaning as 
well: Samson, “eyeless in Gaza,” sees not nothingness as 
                     
99 Casey, The Fate of Place, 10. 
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such, but an expanse of nothingness. Eliot, in a move that 
might be as inspired as it is self-indulgent, invokes the 
horror vacui of an infinite expanse to describe the 
perceived cultural and spiritual vacuity of a contemporary 
human landscape.  
     That Eliot felt some disdain for collectives of all 
kinds, including the so-called masses as well as the 
contemporary intellectual scene is clear as early as 1923. 
In October of that year, Eliot wrote to Charles Maurras (a 
leading member of Action Française) to solicit a 
contribution to The Criterion: 
 
Only The Criterion frankly proclaims a philosophy which 
“democrassery” is bound to find reactionary, although, 
in our view, it is the only philosophy which offers the 
slightest hope of progress at the present time… I am 
certain that the Criterion group represents the body of 
opinion nearest to l’Action Française.100 
     
Action Française, of course, was later notorious for 
espousing a variety of “Blut und Boden” rhetoric not out of 
step with that of the Nazis, and Maurras spent the remainder 
of his life after the Second World War imprisoned for 
                     
100 Eliot, The Letters of T. S. Eliot, Vol. 2, 238. 
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treason.101 This is not to suggest for a moment that Eliot 
harbored fascist sympathies (especially not on the basis of 
a single letter). But the letter does state unequivocally 
that Eliot felt at home with the profoundly anti-modern 
sentiments of Maurras and his contemporaries. Eliot’s 
approving quotation of “democrassery” from Flaubert is 
particularly telling in terms of the disdain for public 
space apparent in Four Quartets. The fact that these 
tendencies coexisted in Eliot with an appetite for dazzling 
formal novelty and a craving for recognition by the same 
public that he would happily condescend remains one of the 
most stubborn paradoxes of his personality and his career.  
     This paradox is part of the indispensible background to 
Eliot’s representation of space and place in Four Quartets. 
If the poem aspires to dwell, using stanzaic form and the 
arrested temporality of lyric to engender a sense of place, 
how does lyric go about representing, or even entering, the 
public spaces of the modern metropolis? Eliot, of course, 
was deeply ambivalent about the role of poetry in the public 
                     
101 David Carroll, French Literary Fascism: Nationalism, 
Anti-Semitism, and the Ideology of Culture (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 88–9. Cf. Anthony 
Julius’s discussion of Maurras in T. S. Eliot, Anti-Semitism 
and Literary Form (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 214–17. 
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sphere, and many critics, David Chinitz foremost among them, 
have argued that this ambivalence might account for Eliot’s 
shift from poetry to drama. As Hallie Flanagan noted in 
Dynamo, Eliot once remarked after the performance of Sweeney 
Agonistes at Vassar: “It is dubious whether the purpose of 
poetry is to communicate anyway.”102 Chinitz expands on 
Eliot’s dilemma: 
  
Eliot’s dramatic writing after Sweeney Agonistes is 
governed by two competing forces already discernible in 
his first play: the vanguardist impulse toward 
austerity, “poetry,” and frank ritualism; and the 
populist or theatrical impulse that urges avoidance of 
anything that smacks of “literature.”103 
 
Eliot’s ambition to write a popular play is well attested to 
by his letters.104 The theatre, it seems, was an acceptable 
kind of public space, preferable in some respects to the 
                     
102 Hallie Flanagan, Dynamo (New York: Duell, 1943), 84. 
103 Chinitz, T. S. Eliot and the Cultural Divide, 129. 
104 Asked by Alan Downer how long he intended to work on 
drama rather than poetry, Eliot replied “Until I can 
convince people that I know how to write a popular play.” 
Quoted in Ackroyd, T. S. Eliot: A Life, 296. 
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solitude of the printed page, the imagined community of 
poetic readership. 
On the other hand, however, the theatre as a very 
different kind of figure in “East Coker” III, weaved into 
the larger spatial metaphor of the Tube: 
 
       As, in a theatre, 
The lights are extinguished, for the scene to be changed 
With a hollow rumble of wings, with a movement of 
darkness on darkness, 
And we know that the hills and the trees, the distant 
panorama 
And the bold imposing façade are all being rolled away— 
Or as, when an underground train, in the tube, stops too 
long between stations… 
       (CPP, 180) 
 
There is a strange commingling of images here; having 
absorbed the succeeding images of a changing theatrical set, 
the reader who reaches the line on the “underground train” 
is likely to feel as though he or she has been reading about 
that all along. That is to say, the “hollow rumble,” the 
“darkness on darkness” and the “distant panorama” being 
“rolled away” seem to figure also for the scenery of the 
city as it rolls by, unseen, far above the underground train. 
The passage illuminates a peculiar truth about the 
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underground: that by circumventing all the congestion and 
complexity of the urban landscape, avoiding its obstacles by 
going underneath them, it also subverts the city’s sense of 
place. The rolling away of scenery into the darkness of the 
wings thus takes on a deeper meaning. 
     London as we know it today is in large part a product 
of the mass migrations of the nineteenth century. Francis 
Sheppard contrasts the “500,000 migrants [who] entered the 
London area during the first half of the eighteenth century” 
with the “almost 500,000 migrants coming to London in the 
single decade of the 1870s.” “Ceaseless mobility, made 
possible by new means of transport,” writes Sheppard, 
“became one of the hallmarks of modern urban 
civilization.”105 The Underground as a disembedding mechanism 
may be one of the clearest examples of the place-denuding 
effect of modernity. Characteristically, Eliot achieves an 
effect of the extraordinary though paradox; amidst this 
ceaseless mobility, he looks for stillness: 
 
Or as, when an underground train, in the tube, stops 
too long between stations 
And the conversation rises and slowly fades into 
silence 
                     
105 F. H. W. Sheppard, London: A History (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 126. 
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And you see behind every face the mental emptiness 
deepen 
Leaving only the growing terror of nothing to think 
about. 
        (CPP, 180) 
 
This passage is striking for Eliot’s palpable disdain 
towards the trappings of the modern metropolis. By leveling 
out social distinctions and denuding the city of its sense 
of place, the underground expresses the vacuity of urban 
space. The stopped underground train, almost paradoxical 
given its usual association with relentless, linear, motion, 
is a momentary concretion of the poem’s constant play with 
abstract figures for timelessness, like “the still point of 
the turning word” (CPP, 175). 
     “East Coker” III demonstrates the same syntactic 
flatness that appears in “East Coker” I. In all, eleven 
lines of the passage begin with “and.” Once again, weak 
conjunctions figure for stillness and an expanse of 
alienating space. The section closes with a perfect 
summation of the pathos felt by the imagination drawn to 
place adrift in a world of space: “And what you do not know 
is the only thing you know / And what you own is what you do 
not own / And where you are is where you are not.” Thus, in 
those passages of the Quartets depicting the condition of 
modernity directly, as opposed to those describing pre-
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modern settings like the manor house, lyric stillness 
figures for the repetitiveness and vacuity of the metropolis. 
The necessity of opposing the disembedded space of modernity 
with its prelapsarian opposite, argued throughout the 
Quartets, is reminiscent of the pre-modern nostalgia that 
Lefebvre’s Critique of Everyday Life. David Chinitz argues 
that the Quartets indicate that Eliot “finally reconciled 
himself to the everyday culture around him and managed to 
enter the local human community,” an extraordinary claim 
when the poem aligns the ordinary with disaffection and 
locates each of its visions of an integral community in the 
past.106 
 
     Ronald Bush begins his study of Eliot with a question: 
“How did the author of The Waste Land, one of the most 
highly charged, dramatic poems of the twentieth-century, 
come twenty years later to write a masterpiece of deferred 
immediacy like Four Quartets?”107 In other words, Bush holds 
the view that there is a significant break of some kind in 
Eliot’s development. A more typical gesture amongst Eliot’s 
critics, though, is that of Ron Schuchard, who, surveying 
his intellectual development during the 1910s, asserts that 
“though Eliot’s formal conversion to Anglo-Catholoicism was 
                     
106 Chinitz, T. S. Eliot and the Cultural Divide, 17. 
107 Bush, T. S. Eliot, ix. 
312 
 
eleven years away, his sensibility was religious and 
Catholic.”108 Indeed, the concept of sensibility covers a 
multitude of sins, as in A. D. Moody’s conclusion that the 
Quartets manifest an “essential conformity” with the 
“sensibility” of their age through the concept of alienation, 
common to both: 
 
Eliot… making a virtue of that alienation, would have 
the contemporary alien be a “spirit unappeased and 
peregrine”, seeking his true home in the ideal. Thus 
the alienated man of Marx’s analysis, and Eliot’s 
spiritual aliens, may be joined in the one action; and 
in that way the poem may succeed in bringing its 
society towards “A condition of complete simplicity.”109 
 
Through this extraordinary sleight of hand, Eliot emerges as 
congenial spirit even at his most retrograde moment (though 
perhaps Moody succeeds more in laying bare a retrograde 
aspect to Marx than rehabilitating Eliot). It is little 
wonder that Eliot’s critics should often be committed to 
smoothing out the latent contradictions of his work when he 
himself reaches for figures of reconciliation. “History is 
now and England,” concludes “Little Gidding,” but the 
                     
108 Schuchard, Eliot's Dark Angel, 68. 
109 Moody, Thomas Stearns Eliot, Poet, 264. 
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syntactic rupture betrays the sentiment; the reader must be 
apt to reflect that “Words strain, / Crack and sometimes 
break, under the burden” (CPP, 175, 197). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
Chapter 4: Wallace Stevens and the Ordinary Imagination 
 
I. What’s So Ordinary about “The Ordinary Women”? 
 
      In Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural 
Hierarchy in America, Lawrence Levine reminds us that the 
relative status of a given art form—opera, for instance, or 
musical theatre—is historically conditioned and susceptible 
to change.1 Levine’s study dates the emergence of a discourse 
of “high culture” in America to the late nineteenth century. 
In the early twentieth century, the same cultural hierarchy 
that largely banished the emerging popular art form of 
cinema to its lowest rungs later exalted the difficult, 
foreboding monuments of modernist literature. It is all the 
more striking, then, to find reflections on the emergence of 
cinema within the canon of “high modernist” literature. “The 
Ordinary Women,” the ninth poem in Wallace Stevens’s 
Harmonium, is exactly that. The poem was first published in 
The Dial (July 1922) as one of six poems grouped under the 
title “Revue.” Each of these poems shares the linguistic 
exuberance of “The Ordinary Women,” but most of them—
                     
1 Lawrence W. Levine, Highbrow/Lowbrow: The Emergence of 
Cultural Hierarchy in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1988). 
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especially “Bantams in Pine-Woods,” “A High-Toned Old 
Christian Woman,” and “The Emperor of Ice-Cream”—have 
acquired a firmer place in the Stevens canon. It may be time 
to restore “The Ordinary Women” to its rightful place in 
this set by considering how shrewdly it raises questions 
about the relationship between low and high culture that are 
central not only to Stevens’s whole oeuvre, but also to 
literary modernism in general. 
 In his essay “The Mass Ornament,” Siegfried Kracauer 
argues that “the position that an epoch occupies in the 
historical process can be determined more strikingly from an 
analysis of its inconspicuous surface-level expressions than 
from that epoch’s judgments about itself.”2 In other words, 
the ordinary is a better guide to the character of an epoch 
than its products of critical reflection—specifically, the 
ordinary as embodied in popular culture. But criticism 
concerned with the ordinary in modernist literature has been 
reluctant to recognize the innate connection between the 
ordinary and “mass” or “popular” culture, and the extent to 
which modernism figures anxieties about the former through 
the latter.  
                     
2 Siegfried Kracauer, “The Mass Ornament,” in The Mass 
Ornament: Weimar Essays, ed. and trans. Thomas Y. Levin 
(Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1995), 
75. 
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 Stevens was inclined toward giving his poems ironic 
titles, seeming to delight in putting a proposition at the 
head of the page that would be undermined by even the first 
line of the poem. As the reader enters a realm of “lacquered 
loges,” “girandoles,” “canting curlicues,” and “explicit 
coiffures,” the question naturally arises, “What’s so 
ordinary about the ordinary women?” (SCPP, 8–9) Some of the 
more famous critics of Stevens certainly feel that the 
poem’s style goes beyond mere exuberance and tips into bad 
taste. Even critical adversaries as implacable as Harold 
Bloom and Hugh Kenner are united in their condemnation. For 
Bloom, the poem’s “gaudiness” indicates “a kind of 
desperation,” while for Kenner the poem forces “the reader, 
as he puts down his dictionary… to reflect that sense can 
look strangely like nonsense when words do not look as if 
they meant what they do.”3 In short, the poem’s language is 
anything but ordinary. 
 However playful, though, this poem’s title is not 
obviously ironic. It really is concerned with the ordinary, 
or rather, with the means by which we escape from it and 
suspend it momentarily. Has the time the women spent 
                     
3 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 82–3; Hugh Kenner, 
A Homemade World: The American Modernist Writers (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 52. 
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watching a film been an escape from “poverty” into a world 
of aesthetic fulfillment? Or is it a diversion from one kind 
of poverty to another, film being a hollow artifice, or 
worse, a vehicle of ideological mystification? How are we to 
read the poem’s linguistic excess: as playful exuberance, 
relieving the tedium of the everyday, or as garish, hollow 
embellishment? 
 In order to address this question, we must rehearse 
some details of the poem’s setting: a particular form of 
cinema known as the American movie palace, which lends the 
poem an excuse for some of its more exotic language. That 
“The Ordinary Women” is set in a movie theater has been 
recognized at least since A. Walton Litz’s 1972 
Introspective Voyager. For Litz, the poem is about “the 
theatre of mere artistry becom[ing] the theatre of the 
imagination,” momentarily at least.4 But none of Stevens’s  
critics have yet to demonstrate how important the aesthetic 
debates surrounding early cinema are to the poem.  
 Over the twenty years following the invention of the 
motion picture projector in 1895, early cinema went through 
roughly three stages prior to the emergence of the Hollywood 
studio system and the appearance of cinematic styles and 
                     
4 A. Walton Litz, Introspective Voyager: The Poetic 
Development of Wallace Stevens (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1972), 111. 
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genres that we would recognize today. There was the pre-
Nickelodeon period (before 1905), the Nickelodeon period 
(from 1905-1912), and the movie palace period (from about 
1912 on). Nickelodeons, or small storefront theaters, began 
to replace the vaudeville show as the main setting for the 
presentation of films from 1906, and by 1910, there were as 
many as 10,000 in the United States.5 According to Charles 
Musser, “It is not too much to say that modern cinema began 
with the nickelodeons.”6 
 After 1910, however, a variety of factors conspired to 
eclipse the nickelodeon. The arrival of multi-reel films 
from Europe challenged the short-show, quick turnover model 
of the nickelodeons. Competition between theaters inspired 
the development of more impressive, attractive, and 
comfortable theaters.7 Some nickelodeons developed a 
reputation for vice as off-putting to families as the 
                     
5 Richard Abel, “Nickelodeons,” in Encyclopedia of Early 
Cinema, ed. Richard Abel (London and New York: Routledge, 
2005), 479. 
6 Charles Musser, The Emergence of Cinema: The American 
Screen to 1907 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: 
University of California Press, 1990), 417. 
7 David Robinson, From Peep Show to Palace: The Birth of 
American Film (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 
147. 
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saloons that they had replaced as “the principal social 
center in many working-class (especially immigrant) 
residential areas.”8 The culmination of each of these trends 
arrived in the form of the movie palace, also known as the 
picture palace or the palace cinema. The Mark Strand Theatre 
in New York City is generally considered the first of its 
kind, opened in 1914 at a cost of one million dollars and 
designed by Thomas W. Lamb, who would go on to establish 
himself as the foremost cinema architect of his time. In 
terms of physical size, seating capacity, and available 
amenities, the movie palace dwarfed its predecessor, the 
nickelodeon. The Strand, for instance, could seat 3,500 
patrons.9 
 Beyond their physical size, perhaps the most startling 
feature of these buildings was their wild architecture and 
extraordinary ornamentation. A capacious eclecticism brought 
together a mix of architectural styles from every age and 
culture, producing a kind of fantasy environment. Trade 
periodicals quickly began to tell a story of “blue-collar 
crowds… being replaced by refined upper-class bejeweled 
                     
8 Abel, "Nickelodeons," 479. 
9 Eileen Bowser, The Transformation of Cinema, 1907-1915 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California 
Press, 1990), 133. 
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audiences arriving at the theater in automobiles.”10 In other 
words, the nickelodeon as working-class community center had 
given way to the picture palace as middle-class evening 
entertainment. These middle-class cinemagoers might be the 
kind of pleasure-seekers depicted in “The Ordinary Women,” 
entering a world of “explicit coiffures,” “diamond point,” 
“sapphire point,” and sequined “civil fans” (SCPP, 9). 
 The palace cinemas embodied a startling disjunction 
between form and function. The motion picture projector was, 
of course, a new technology at the time, and emblematic of 
the wonders of modernity. Why, then, did architects and 
cinema owners decide that the appropriate architectural form 
in which to host these new devices should be a pastiche of 
atavistic decorative forms? It was not until the art deco 
style of the 1930s became widespread that the function of 
these buildings was reflected in an architectural style that 
might be considered fully modern. The cinema architects 
gleefully discarded Louis Sullivan’s admonition that “form 
ever follows function.”11 Indeed, the form of the palace 
cinemas goes so far as to disguise function.  
 
                     
10 Ibid., 121. 
11 David Van Zanten, Sullivan's City: The Meaning of Ornament 
for Louis Sullivan (New York: Norton, 2000), 1. 
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Fig 5.: Oriental Theatre (1926), Chicago. Courtesy of the 
Chicago Architectural Photographing Co. Collection, Theatre 
Historical Society, Elmhurst, Illinois, U.S.A. 
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The architectural excess of the historic movie palaces 
emphasizes their remove from workaday concerns. Form 
overwhelms function through elaborate ornamentation as a 
deliberate rebuke to more pragmatic styles of architecture.  
 “The Ordinary Women” is constructed around these 
ambiguities. While the poem’s extraordinary idiom is 
explained by its extraordinary setting—perhaps an 
extraordinary style applied to an extraordinary setting 
amounts to the ordinary—that idiom is nonetheless shot 
through with ambiguities. For instance, in the lines “The 
canting curlicues / Of heaven and of the heavenly script,” 
much depends on the definition of the unusual verb “canting” 
(SCPP, 9). First, it suggests “tilting, sloping, turning 
over or about,” a vivid description of gilded ornamentation. 
Second, “canting” suggests “cant,” or language “taken up and 
used for fashion’s sake, without being a genuine expression 
of sentiment.”12 If the ornaments are canting in this sense, 
they are lying or dissembling, even disguising something. 
Third, we might choose to emphasize the Latin root cantus, 
meaning “Singing, musical sound” and giving us the word 
“chanting,” reasserting its aesthetic qualities. The lines 
“The moonlight / Fubbed the girandoles” present a similar 
                     
12 “cant, n.1,” “cant, n.3” in Oxford English Dictionary, 
Second edition, 1989; online version November 2010. 
<http://www.oed.com:80/Entry/27198>; accessed 14 March 2011. 
323 
 
problem (SCPP, 8). Faced with the unusual verb “to fub,” 
readers may focus on its aural quality, and think of the 
moonlight glinting on gilded candelabras (or girandoles). 
But “fubbed” in fact means “to cheat, impose upon, 
put off deceitfully.”13 The sheen of the candelabras, then, 
is deceptive at the same time as it is beautiful. 
 It may be that the palace cinemas reflected the kind of 
anxiety about the cinema as an artistic form that Walter 
Benjamin gave expression to in his most famous essay: 
 
The technology of reproduction detaches the 
reproduced object from the sphere of tradition.… 
The social significance of film, even—and 
especially—in its most positive form, is 
inconceivable without its destructive, cathartic 
side: the liquidation of the value of tradition in 
the cultural heritage.14 
 
                     
13 “fub, v.,” in Oxford English Dictionary, Second edition, 
1989; online version November 2010. 
<http://www.oed.com:80/Entry/75176>; accessed 17 March 2011. 
14 Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Its 
Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media, 
trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2008), 22. 
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Fig. 6.: Fox Theatre (1929), San Francisco. Courtesy of the 
Terry Helgesen Collection, Theatre Historical Society, 
Elmhurst, Illinois, U.S.A. 
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In other words, film’s capacity to generate likenesses and 
illusions mechanically and therefore ad infinitum threatens 
cultural tradition by undermining the uniqueness of the art 
objects that make it up. According to Benjamin’s outlook, 
the infinite reproducibility of film is directly 
antipathetic to the aura that surrounds genuine art. 
 A further anxiety is apparent in the association of the 
nickelodeon with the “lower classes” and, due to repeated 
attacks on the new medium from the pulpit and the press, 
with vice. However, as film historians frequently note, 
fixing the demographic makeup of early film audiences is 
difficult. In the context of a disjunction between the 
public’s obvious enthusiasm for film and its vociferous 
detractors in the public sphere, the movie palace might 
nevertheless be read as a hyperbolic assertion of the new 
medium’s cultural validity. Movie palace architecture clads 
the machinery of technological reproduction in the 
ornamentation of not just one cultural tradition, but 
seemingly of every cultural tradition. While ample provision 
of porters, restrooms, air conditioning, and every other 
available comfort worked to allay middle-class audiences’ 
concerns about cleanliness and vice, the ostentatious design 
of the buildings themselves worked to soothe subtler 
concerns about the cultural legitimacy of the medium—and of 
modernity itself. To those who feared that film might signal 
the death of culture, the palace cinemas proclaimed 
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themselves the new temples of culture. Indeed, in keeping 
with the spirit of disjunction, the movie palaces’ 
architects seemed unconcerned with the profound 
contradictions in their project: the palace cinemas are 
themselves works of reproduction. Despite this particular 
Benjaminian irony, middle-class audiences flocked to them. 
 Whether or not Stevens himself was among those 
audiences is a question that we may not be able to answer 
due to lack of evidence. Stevens refers to movie theaters 
only twice in his published letters. In a letter to his wife 
of February 23, 1934, he describes his impressions of Key 
West, Florida, including: “The movie theatres are little 
bits of things.” More than ten years later, on May 2, 1945, 
he refers to an advertisement at a cinema in Hartford 
reading “Wilde and Weird,” appropriating the phrase to 
describe a series of illustrations that would accompany the 
Cummington press edition of Esthétique du Mal.15 Neither of 
these instances give the impression of Stevens as a devoted 
cinema-goer, but the first one does suggest that he was 
accustomed to a much grander style of cinema architecture 
than Key West at the time had to offer. 
 Stevens could hardly have failed to notice the 
emergence of the palace cinemas onto the urban landscape in 
the latter part of his sixteen-year residence in and around 
                     
15 Stevens, Letters of Wallace Stevens, 268, 498. 
327 
 
New York (1900-1916). The Stevenses were living at 441 West 
21st Street when the Mark Strand Theatre, frequently cited as 
the first purpose-built palace cinema, opened at 1579 
Broadway in 1914, two blocks east and twenty-two blocks 
north of their home (SCPP, 961). Stevens would have also had 
ample opportunity to observe the development of a variety of 
theatrical architectures along Broadway, particularly 
clustered around Times Square.16 Even as late as 1954, 
Stevens recalled walking along Broadway frequently during 
his time in New York, and the street is mentioned repeatedly 
in his letters.17 Nonetheless, letters from his period in New 
York generally characterize Stevens as absorbed in reading 
and writing. If he was participating in an emerging film 
culture, he did not regard that participation as important 
enough to feature in his correspondence. 
 Stevens’s lack of interest toward cinema—in contrast to 
his well-attested love of theatrical and musical stage 
performances—might be interpreted as a kind of mandarin 
disdain for “low culture.” Such an outlook would imply an 
analogy between the poem’s view and Adorno’s concept of the 
“culture industry.” This is the first theory of art that we 
                     
16 Robert A. M. Stern, Gregory Gilmartin, and Thomas Mellins, 
New York 1930: Architecture and Urbanism between the Two 
World Wars (New York: Rizzoli, 1987), 229. 
17 Stevens, Letters of Wallace Stevens, 63, 78, 177, 845. 
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might, as it were, test against the poem: popular culture in 
general, and film in particular, intrinsically embodies a 
dominant ideology. As Benjamin argues, “The function of film 
is to train human beings in the apperceptions and reactions 
needed to deal with a vast apparatus whose role in their 
lives is expanding almost daily.”18 In other words, film 
extends the repetition and technological reproduction 
characteristic of capitalist modernity into the leisure time 
of its subjects, producing the assumption that this mode of 
production’s ubiquity equates with its inevitability. A 
Benjaminian reading of the palace cinemas would suggest that 
the relationship such institutions posit between film and 
high culture is really a strategy for legitimizing social 
transformation. Few of us today would adhere to an 
unmodified version of Benjamin’s position, but his 
categories allow us to sharpen our insights into the poem’s 
suspicion toward film, particularly as that suspicion 
relates to the poem’s no less obvious concern with surface, 
illusion, and repetition. Hence the question with which I 
began this discussion: do the women in the cinema encounter 
something that might properly be called art, or are they 
duped somehow, seduced by mere appearances? 
                     
18 Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility, 26. 
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 The poem’s structure offers two contradictory answers 
to this question through the two levels of its organization. 
The first level is proceeds by blocks of two stanzas at a 
time: the women leave their “poverty,” flinging “monotony 
behind” and crowding the “nocturnal halls” of the cinema; 
they observe their surroundings (“they leaned and looked”), 
the show begins, and the women “read”—that is, view—“right 
long”; the show continues, intensifying its effects, as the 
“coiffures” become “explicit”; and finally, “Puissant speech” 
cries “quittance” and the women go home (SCPP, 8-9). This 
narrative is linear, suggesting development through time. At 
the very least, the women arrive at a different point than 
the one from which they set out. This level of organization 
may be read in a number of ways—it is probably what the 
reader notices first, and suggests progress, and the 
possibility of change. 
 However, a second, chiastic level of organization 
undermines the linear narrative. Chiasmus is a rhetorical 
trope in which a statement, grammatical construction, or 
concept is repeated in reverse order, as in Shakespeare’s 
“Fair is foul and foul is fair” (see also Keyser). The 
components of the statement form an a / b / b / a structure, 
held to resemble the Greek letter chi, or Χ. Chiasmus 
suggests stasis, equivalence, and repetition. It is above 
all a figure for reversibility, one side liable to transform 
into its opposite. In “The Ordinary Women,” the final stanza 
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repeats the first stanza almost completely; the second 
stanza’s “nocturnal halls” become the penultimate stanza’s 
“wickless halls”; and the third stanza’s “Mumbled zay-zay 
and a-zay, a-zay,” becomes the seventh stanza’s “Rumbled a-
day and a-day, a-day” (SCPP, 8-9). The latter two stanzas 
also share references to moonlight, which respectively 
“Fubbed the girandoles” and “Rose on the beachy floors.” In 
fact, the whole poem could be diagrammed to show a series of 
chiastic correspondences between the 10 stanzas: 1 / 10, 2 / 
9, and so forth.  
 At a thematic level, this structure suggests that the 
women at the end of the poem, having “read right long” of 
“beta b and gamma g” are just the same as the women at the 
beginning of the poem. The poem begins, “Then from their 
poverty they rose,” but the same line also begins the poem’s 
final stanza, suggesting that in fleeing their poverty, all 
that they found was more of it. The aesthetic is merely 
another kind of poverty, and the women have been duped, 
taken in by a world of surfaces and illusions. Indeed, the 
doubleness of the chiasmus is prefigured in the multiple 
meanings of words like “fub” and “cant” that I have already 
noted. This use of chiasmus corresponds to the theory of 
popular culture outlined above, in which film embodies the 
repetitious and dehumanizing aspects of capitalist modernity. 
The women’s entertainment is as impoverished as their 
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working lives, “their want,” a world of insubstantial 
simulacra. 
 The chiasmus, then, is the poem’s governing rhetorical 
scheme and organizational principle. One final consideration 
further underscores its importance: the chiastic “X” shape 
invokes the camera obscura, a precursor to the modern 
photographic camera and, therefore, the film camera as well. 
In the camera obscura, light passes through a small opening 
and projects onto a surface at the back of the box, 
producing an upside-down image, like so: 
 
 
Fig. 7.: Camera Obscura, from M. Brisson Dictionnaire 
raisonné de physique (Paris: A la Libraire éonomique, 1800), 
n.p. 
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As we have seen, the poem’s final stanzas amount to a 
reverse image of its opening stanzas. The poem’s structure 
thus aligns both film and the ordinary with the scheme of 
chiasmus, suggesting that stasis and repetition are part of 
their natures. 
 However, this reading is interestingly complicated by a 
crucial consideration: the poem’s chiastic structure is 
notably imperfect. For one thing, the first and final 
stanzas are not quite identical, in ways that are meaningful. 
Although the last stanza reverses “From dry catarrhs, and to 
guitars” to make “From dry guitars, and to catarrhs” (SCPP, 
8-9), giving the poem a ring structure, the preceding line 
of each stanza—“Then from their poverty they rose”—remains 
unchanged. It would have been easy to turn “from” into “to,” 
completing the symmetry and mirror effect, but Stevens chose 
not to. More importantly, a properly chiastic arrangement of 
stanzas would form the pattern 1-2-3 / 8-9-10, but in the 
poem, the pattern is 1-2-3 / 7-9-10. The eighth stanza 
breaks the pattern. Again, it would have been easy to switch 
the seventh and eighth stanzas: the poem, so altered, would 
read just as coherently. But as I will show, its meaning 
would change significantly. 
 The content of the eighth stanza gives us our best clue 
as to what kind of thematic work this broken chiasmus is 
doing:  
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How explicit the coiffures became, 
The diamond point, the sapphire point, 
The sequins 
Of the civil fans!  
(SCPP, 9) 
 
The exclamation “How explicit” is appropriate, as the poem 
centers our attention on its verbal excess. The diamond 
point and sapphire point are a hyperbolic touch, literal 
jewels adorning a poem that already drips with ornaments; 
repetition (in “The diamond point, the sapphire point”) 
emphasizes their superfluous luxuriance. The stanza also 
departs from a pattern established throughout the poem, in 
which the second line of each stanza includes an internal 
rhyme. In this stanza, rhyme gives way to exact repetition, 
emphasizing its singularity. The sentence that makes up the 
stanza is essentially a rhetorical exclamation, devoid of 
any semantic content beyond sheer emphasis—the whole stanza 
is an exclamation, not a communicative statement in the 
ordinary sense.  
 The stanza therefore bears comparison with another 
strange exclamation earlier in the poem: “Ti-lill-o!” This 
is not a stock expression like “tallyho,” which it slightly 
resembles. Whether or not “Ti-lill-o” bears any meaning at 
all is unclear. No amount of looking for homophonic clues or 
speculating about etymology will settle the word’s meaning. 
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Likewise, the chiastic pair of expressions “a-zay, a-zay” 
and “a-day, a-day” elude definition. These neologisms are 
not quite onomatopoeic—indeed, there is no rhetorical term 
to describe them, underscoring that they have no 
argumentative function. 
 In other words, each of these instances can be read as 
moments of linguistic excess, or exuberance that overwhelms 
meaning. They might be described as play in the 
deconstructive sense, gestures of sheer excess that resist 
the totalizing system of the poem’s structure and mirroring 
symmetry. The point of the broken chiasmus is to open up a 
window out of the chiasmus’s associations of repetition and 
monotony. It rebukes the interpretation of film and the 
palace cinemas as vapid simulacra, and suggests that just as 
the rogue stanza breaks out of the poem’s structure, 
aesthetic experience offers a viable escape from the 
monotony of the everyday. This is an idea we also find 
reflected and enacted in other poems from “Revue,” most 
famously in “A High-Toned Old Christian Woman” and “The 
Emperor of Ice-Cream.” 
 If we wanted to push our interpretation of these 
moments further, we could suggest that they recreate the 
birth of the aesthetic as a completely superfluous activity, 
a form of pure surplus. This, then, is the second theory of 
art that we will set against the poem: the familiar high 
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cultural sense of the aesthetic as excess that we have seen 
in Goethe: 
 
Bin die Verschwendung, bin die Poesie; 
Bin der Poet, der sich vollendet, 
Wenn er sein eigenst Gut verschwendet. 
 
[I am prodigality, I am poetry; 
I am the poet, who completes himself 
In the act of wasting his belongings.]19  
 
In other words, poetry and the aesthetic as a whole are 
defined by their exemption from forms of value derived from 
the market. “Even so I am immensely rich,” declares the 
Charioteer, “And consider myself Pluto’s equal.” Art is 
valuable precisely because it is useless. Popular culture, 
by contrast, is inherently degraded because it shackles the 
artistic impulse to the dictates of the market. Stated this 
starkly, the argument is quite untenable, of course: when 
have artists ever been free from the necessities of feeding 
themselves and keeping a roof over their heads? Nonetheless, 
the idea that art should be a realm of values free from the 
intrusion of the technological modernity that Benjamin so 
distrusted still exercises a powerful attraction.  
                     
19 Goethe, Faust, 173; my translation. 
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 This alternative sense of value is part of the 
repository of romantic beliefs about the transcendent nature 
of art that a century’s worth of materialist criticism has 
failed to eradicate completely. “The Ordinary Women” is 
carefully poised in the middle of this debate. So, to 
reformulate our original question slightly in light of these 
reflections: does the women’s visit to the movie palace 
amount to an experience of high art, autonomous and 
aesthetically pure, or of popular culture, tainted by 
ideology and the marketplace? I think that no amount of 
careful consideration of the poem will decide the question 
one way or the other, and that this ambiguity is central to 
the poem’s appeal. 
 Siegfried Kracauer was perhaps the earliest critic of 
film attuned to those ambiguities. His essay on Berlin’s 
picture palaces, entitled “Cult of Distraction,” neatly 
summarizes cinema’s aspiration to the status of high 
culture: 
 
To begin with, the architectural setting tends to 
emphasize a dignity that used to inhabit the 
institutions of high culture. It favors the lofty and 
the sacred as if designed to accommodate works of 
eternal significance.… The show itself aspires to the 
same exalted level, claiming to be a finely tuned 
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organism, an aesthetic totality as only an artwork can 
be.20 
 
In fact, Kracauer proves to be largely indifferent to 
whether or not film actually achieves its artistic ambitions. 
For him, its significance rests elsewhere: “Here, in pure 
externality, the audience encounters itself; its own reality 
is revealed in the fragmented sequence of splendid sense 
impressions… its disclosure in distraction is therefore of 
moral significance.”21 Distraction, defined in this passage 
as a condition in which surface functions as a critique of 
depth, and decoration as a critique of content, is 
Kracauer’s characteristically optimistic account of 
modernity.  
 Stevens’s ordinary women are ordinary in that, like the 
cinema audiences of their time, they seek distraction from 
the workaday world at the movies. What they find there in 
the “lacquered loges,” the “girandoles,” and the “canting 
curlicues,” is the glittering reflection of a fragmented and 
disorderly era (once again we find ourselves confronted with 
a kind of chiasmus). For Kracauer, if cinema audiences could 
have approached their experience with the right spirit of 
                     
20 Kracauer, “Cult of Distraction: On Berlin's Picture 
Palaces,” 327. 
21 Ibid., 326. 
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critique, they would have stumbled upon the great secret of 
capitalist modernity: “the masses . . . so easily allow 
themselves to be stupefied only because they are so close to 
the truth.”22 Like the theoreticians of the everyday, he 
believes that the ordinary, the popular, and the commonplace 
are the domain of ideology. The evidence of Stevens’s own 
life and the sly chiastic strategy of the poem suggest that 
he would have inclined toward a dismissive reading of cinema. 
But the poem, like Levine’s study of cultural hierarchies, 
also looks to a future in which cultural categories overlap, 
and indeed, mix promiscuously: “Evidence of what appears to 
be a growing cultural eclecticism and flexibility is 
everywhere at hand.”23 Cultural eclecticism is often taken as 
an avatar of postmodernism, but “The Ordinary Women” shows 
that the juxtaposition of “high” and “low,” collapsing both 
categories, was at the heart of “high modernism” too. I 
prefer a reading that is alive enough to cinema’s aesthetic 
pull: this is the role of the poem’s fractured chiasmus, 
which complicates too straightforward a reflection of 
reality. The story that the women see at the cinema, of 
“beta b and gamma g,” and of the “marriage-bed,” is the 
story of their romance with the aesthetic. This is “Puissant 
speech, alike in each”: the illusion of the ordinary that is 
                     
22 Ibid., 328. 
23 Levine, Highbrow/Lowbrow, 243. 
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briefly yet powerfully transfigured into the extraordinary 
through the medium of film. 
 
II. “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven” and the Modernist 
Grid 
 
      Critical assessments of Wallace Stevens have always 
gravitated towards his late long poems, “Notes Toward a 
Supreme Fiction,” “The Auroras of Autumn,” and “An Ordinary 
Evening in New Haven,” as summative expressions of the 
poet’s worldview. But one of their most crucial aspects has 
frequently been overlooked: their shared form. Helen 
Vendler’s comment on the tercets that Stevens uses for each 
of these poems is typical of critics’ lack of interest: 
“Those triads, as everyone has recognized, somehow organized 
his mind in its long stretches better than any other 
alternative.”24 To say that “everyone” agrees that “somehow” 
Stevens’s favored stanza form was useful to him is not 
terribly helpful. A more refined account is clearly needed. 
Such an account should articulate what kind of metaphorical 
work the specific formal arrangement of these poems does. 
                     
24 Helen Hennessy Vendler, On Extended Wings: Wallace 
Stevens' Longer Poems (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1969), 3. 
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Recently, critics in a number of fields have brought an 
historicist agenda to bear on questions of form as a 
corrective to the tendency amongst some practitioners of 
historicist and postcolonial criticism to favor readings 
centered on content. “We have come to treat artworks as 
‘bundles of historical and cultural content,’ a simpleminded 
mimesis replacing the dynamic formalism that characterized 
early new historicism,” according to Marjorie Levinson.25 
These critics acknowledge that the politically-informed 
readings that have obtained in most areas of literary 
research over the past few decades have been a necessary 
corrective to the hermetic bent of the New Criticism and its 
spurious assumptions about the autonomy of literary works.26 
That said, questions of form have never been far from the 
surface where modernist works are concerned, so it is a 
welcome development that they are being treated with a 
renewed sense of historical and political urgency.  
                     
25 Levinson, “What Is New Formalism?” 561. See also Susan 
Wolfson, “Reading for Form,” Modern Language Quarterly 61.1 
(March 2000): 1–16. 
26 The most sophisticated efforts in this direction are James 
Longenbach’s Wallace Stevens: The Plain Sense of Things 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), and 
Alan Filreis’s Wallace Stevens and the Actual World 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
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      Recent works on modernism and the ordinary, however, 
have continued to manifest this bias towards a reading of 
content divorced from form. Indeed, some studies on the 
topic regress even further in the direction of a naive 
biographical criticism in an effort to make the rather banal 
point that the specific kinds of ordinariness to be found in 
modernist texts reflects the specific kinds of ordinariness 
that characterized modernist authors’ lives. Form, as 
Levinson reminds us, was held by Lukàcs to be “the truly 
social element in literature.”27 While we needn’t go quite 
that far, it is clear that form is a direct expression of 
those “processes and structures of mediation through which 
particular discourses... come to represent the real.”28 
Therefore, if we come to view the modernist ordinary along 
these lines, as a novel structure of mediation for 
representing the real, we ought to seek it at the level of 
form. 
      This will be my aim in reading Stevens’s An Ordinary 
Evening in New Haven: to describe the poem’s formal 
arrangement in relation to its thematic preoccupation with 
the ordinary. The theme is clearly expressed in the poem’s 
title: the relationship between place and the ordinary. It 
is odd, then, that place in the poem is barely commented on 
                     
27 Levinson, “What Is New Formalism?” 568. 
28 Ibid., 561. 
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in two recent treatments of its relationship with the 
ordinary, Olson’s Modernism and the Ordinary and Phillips’s 
Poetics of the Everyday.29 Olson’s reading of Stevens is 
particularly vague about the relationship between the 
particular and the general in Stevens’s later poetry, and 
that relationship’s bearing on the politics of the work. 
Again and again Olson describes Stevens’s turn towards 
generality in his later work without acknowledging that this 
move might in fact denude the quality of the everyday in 
that work. In other words, what is the everyday without its 
particulars but a blank set of repetitions, the mere fact of 
having habits? Everyday practices have histories, whether 
Stevens choses to disclose them or not; and the choice not 
to is as inherently political as the content of those 
histories themselves. Phillips elides this problem entirely, 
and instead relies on a series of pronouncements in 
Stevens’s contemporary prose (collected in The Necessary 
Angel) to articulate the aesthetic aims according to which 
Stevens’s late poetry should be judged. According to 
                     
29 “The Poetics of Place in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens” 
was the topic of a special issue of The Wallace Stevens 
Journal edited by John Serio, but the essays contained 
therein treat place separately from the question of 
modernity. See The Wallace Stevens Journal 27.1 (Spring 
2003). 
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“Imagination as Value,” the commonplace should be 
contemporary poetry’s response to an era of ideological 
extremes.30 All well and good, but Phillips gives no account 
of how it does so.  
      It is difficult to see how an assertion like 
“Stevens’s lifelong interest in the commonplace, not the 
abstract, [is] the most defining feature of his finest 
work”31 sits alongside “The poems I have singled out… engage 
with war deeply but obliquely, never identifying specific 
dates, events, or facts.”32 The distinction between 
“commonplace” and “abstract” seems to demand the furnishing 
of specific dates, events, and facts, all the more so since 
“commonplace” is such a relational term: commonplace for 
whom? Olson takes it as axiomatic that the commonplace can 
critique ideological extremes from the standpoint of the 
“normal,” but the relativity of terms like “normal,” 
“everyday,” and “commonplace” makes this a tendentious 
proposition at best. By denuding the everyday of content and 
locating within it an ideology-free standpoint from which 
ideological critique can be conducted, Olson risks 
validating the normativity of Stevens’s claims.  
                     
30 See “Imagination as Value” in Stevens, Collected Poetry 
and Prose, 724–39. 
31 Olson, Modernism and the Ordinary, 116. 
32 Ibid., 128. 
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      Some resolution to this problem might be found by 
attending to the question of setting, which I alluded to 
earlier. Peter Monacell has argued that Stevens’s poetry 
addresses the suburbanization of American cities that took 
place between the 1910s and the 1940s, as did his 
contemporaries Hart Crane, William Carlos Williams, and 
Louis Zukofsky. Each of these poets was concerned, according 
to Monacell, with the question of whether or not the suburbs 
could play host to “pastoral spaces.”33 This emphasis on the 
pastoral—counterintuitive in the context of modernism—
invokes an argument about American poetry that runs from Leo 
Marx’s The Machine in the Garden through Hugh Kenner’s A 
Homemade World, suggesting that the pastoral ideal has been 
central to the American imaginary since Jefferson.34 “I’m 
ploughing on a Sunday, / Ploughing North America,” Stevens 
declares in Harmonium (SCPP, 16). Urbanization, in this mode 
of thought, represents a defilement of America’s new-world 
potential and an importation of old-world social problems 
onto “virgin soil.” The naivety of this view should have 
been apparent from the outset, and by the modernist era the 
                     
33 Peter Monacell, “In the American Grid: Modern Poetry and 
the Suburbs,” Journal of Modern Literature 35.1 (2012): 122. 
34 Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the 
Pastoral Ideal in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1964); Kenner, A Homemade World. 
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triumph of the Hamiltonian vision of America as a fiscal-
industrial power was complete.35 It is remarkable, though, 
that the anti-modern, pastoral vision of American experience 
continues to reverberate in American poetry and criticism.  
 
      In her essay about “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction,” 
“The Supreme Fiction and the Impasse of Modernist Lyric,” 
Marjorie Perloff takes a strong stand on this question. For 
Perloff, “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” (and, by extension, 
Stevens’s long poetry generally) strives to exclude both 
context and the ordinary:  
 
It is a lyric sequence that makes repeated gestures 
toward what Stevens would call “the normal” of “actual 
available social dialects,” towards the Chaplinesque 
figure in the sagging pantaloons; but the poet’s deep-
seated suspicion of “the impurities of everyday life”… 
                     
35 Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early 
Republic, 1789-1815 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 736—38. 
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can find an outlet only in the extravagant 
metaphoricity that is Stevens’ signature.36 
 
In other words, Stevens’s poetry is too flamboyantly poetic, 
too apt to avail itself of the resources of lyric, to 
represent the ordinary, or at least the ordinary 
untransfigured by lyric attention. But when Perloff invokes 
“extravagant metaphoricity” to describe Steven’s poetry in 
general, she neglects the clear diminution of Harmonium’s 
linguistic extravagance in the late poems, which correlates 
with their increasing preoccupation with the ordinary.37 
      Phillips and Olson concur that the events of the Great 
Depression and the Second World War coincided with an 
impulse in Stevens to examine the circumstances of daily 
life in greater depth. They also claim that dailyness, or 
the ordinary, remained the central subject of his poetry for 
                     
36 Marjorie Perloff, “Revolving in Crystal: The Supreme 
Fiction and the Impasse of Modernist Lyric,” in Wallace 
Stevens: The Poetics of Modernism, ed. Albert Gelpi 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
61—62. 
37 See also the discussion in chapter 16, “It Must Be 
Humdrum,” of Longenbach, Wallace Stevens: The Plain Sense of 
Things, 264–5. 
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the rest of his career. However, little attention has so far 
been given to the shifting attitudes towards the ordinary 
that his poetry manifests across this period. In other 
words, these critics neglect the question of Steven’s 
development leading up to the late poems in which 
ordinariness takes on such central importance. This will 
also provide a means of testing Perloff’s assertion about 
the poetry’s disconnect from its context. I want to read a 
couple of earlier poems in line with the foregoing 
observations about place’s pertinence to the ordinary, 
starting with Canto XXX of “The Man with the Blue Guitar,” 
from 1937.  
      This passage has taken on much importance in recent 
critical effort to situate Stevens in the aesthetic and 
political debates of the nineteen-thirties. Al Filreis reads 
the poem as a sort of dialogue between modernist 
aestheticism and its detractors, particularly leftist 
critics advocating social realism.38 Filreis charts the 
poem’s strategy of appropriating the idiom of Stevens’s 
detractors—most importantly, the charged phrase “things as 
they are”—and turning it to its own purposes, thus pointedly 
                     
38 Alan Filreis, Modernism from Right to Left: Wallace 
Stevens, the Thirties, & Literary Radicalism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 253. 
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insisting that “Things as they are / Are changed upon the 
blue guitar” (SCPP, 135).  
      After thirty cantos couched largely in an abstract 
idiom, the poem makes an equally typical gesture by turning 
to a representative figure to advance its argument: 
 
From this I shall evolve a man. 
This is his essence: the old fantoche 
 
Hanging his shawl upon the wind, 
Like something on the stage, puffed out, 
 
His strutting studied through centuries. 
At last, in spite of his manner, his eye 
 
A-cock at the cross piece on a pole 
Supporting heavy cables, slung 
 
Through Oxidia, banal suburb, 
One-half of all its installments paid. 
       (SCPP, 149) 
 
This figure, according to Filreis, is Crispin transformed 
into “a lineman for the electric company.”39 The ambiguities 
                     
39 Ibid., 276. 
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surrounding the lineman make him a provocative response to 
the demand for writers to engage more with social realities. 
For one thing, he is described explicitly as a puppet: “that 
old fantoche,” “Like something on the stage.” The worker-as-
puppet figure might appeal to a leftist reading that regards 
all working people as “puppets” of the prevailing economic 
system, their agency denied by the system that exploits 
their labor. But this worker is also, as a fictional 
creation, a puppet controlled by the poet, who stands 
against him in a relation far more god-like than between 
employer and employee.  
      This points to a larger problem with social realism as 
a whole: no amount of emancipatory intention on the part of 
authors can overcome the fictionality of their creations. 
This may be another way of stating the vertiginous paradox 
that lies at the heart of all rhetorics of non-rhetoric. 
Filreis quotes Horace Gregory, poetry editor of New Masses: 
“Newer poetry is less affected by an early acquaintance with 
Joyce, Eliot and Pound and… is no longer concerned with mere 
verbal experiment”; a preferable style would have “a hard, 
clear surface” [my emphasis].40 It should be readily 
apparent, though, that a rhetoric of non-rhetoric is still a 
rhetoric, and Filreis underscores the point by gleefully 
adducing a series of contemporaneous “social realist” poems 
                     
40 Ibid., 253. 
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that nonetheless fall back on traditional verse forms.41 
Stevens’s own way of assaying this dilemma, at least in the 
Oxidia canto, is more subtle than even Filreis gives him 
credit for. Other critics have tended to collapse the final 
line of the canto—“Oxidia is Olympia”—into the preceding 
lines:  
 
Ecce, Oxidia is the seed 
Dropped out of this amber-ember pod, 
 
Oxidia is the soot of fire, 
Oxidia is Olympia. 
       (SCPP, 149) 
 
So for Bloom, Oxidia “is revealed to be a version of 
Olympia, but only as the soot of fire is also the fire.” 
Misinterpreting the metaphor, Bloom seems unaware that a 
number of tree species rely on the extreme heat of wildfires 
to crack their seedpods. The heat of Oxidia’s industrial 
landscape fuels its transformation into Olympia. In other 
words, the metaphorical transposition of Oxidia into Olympia 
is the culmination of the canto, not at all mitigated by the 
preceding lines. The bluntness of this metaphorical 
                     
41 Ibid., 253—4. 
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transposition repudiates the realist demands of the 
guitarist’s interlocutors. 
      Again, a leftist reader could interpret the 
transformation of industrial Oxidia into mythical, utopian 
Olympia as a vindication of the hope for a proletarian 
revolution. But in concluding the canto on such a triumphal 
note, Stevens nonetheless underscores the fact that the 
vision of a world transformed by revolution depends on 
metaphorical thought in order to be envisaged. Contra the 
claim that “clarity of style” is the proper aesthetic 
principle of socially conscious literature, Stevens asserts 
that the inherent ambiguity of metaphor, its dependence on 
the interpretive work of an audience or reader, is 
inescapable. Moreover, this metaphorical transformation is a 
willful act of the mind, available at any time; any place 
might, in principle, become a better place by means of 
metaphor. But whether or not this represents a denial of or 
a flight from reality, a retreat into a world of fantasy, is 
a question that took on new urgency for Stevens in the 
context of the Second World War. In his postface to Parts of 
a World (1942), Stevens claims that 
 
it has been easy to say in recent times that everything 
tends to become real, or, rather, that everything moves 
in the direction of reality, that is to say, in the 
direction of fact. We leave fact and come back to it, 
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come back to what we wanted fact to be, not to what it 
was, not to what it has too often remained. The poetry 
of a work of the imagination constantly illustrates the 
fundamental and endless struggle with fact. (SCPP, 251) 
 
The imagination is a means of pursuing “the struggle with 
fact,” a struggle that in Stevens’s account joins the 
epistemological struggle to establish just what the facts 
are with the political struggle to resist their determinism—
in other words, “Things as they are / Are changed upon the 
blue guitar.” 
      This principle is reiterated in the Oxidia canto by 
the figure of the electrical wires—“heavy cables”—sailing 
over the suburb. Through them, the poem transforms mundane 
objects not only into the subject of poetry, but the means 
of making poetry itself: they are a version of the 
guitarist’s strings. Al Filreis connects Stevens’s figure to 
two precedents, first Muriel Rukeyser’s “The Tunnel” from 
Theory of Flight:  
 
Speak to me 
world hissing over cables, shining among steel  
strands, 
plucking speech out on a wire, linking voices 
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reach me now in my fierceness, or I am drowned.42 
 
And, through it, Hart Crane’s The Bridge: 
 
O harp and altar, of the fury fused, 
(How could mere toil align thy choiring strings!) 
Terrific threshold of the prophet’s pledge, 
Prayer of pariah, and the lover’s cry...43 
 
But these precedents seem to be operating according to 
different aesthetic principles from Stevens’s poem. Both 
explore the musical potential of the cables (one a set of 
telegraphic cables, the other the suspension cables of 
Brooklyn Bridge) through a heightened rhetoric associated 
with extreme emotional states. The speaker of Rukeyser’s 
poem awaits the message delivered over the wires with the 
urgency of life and death, while Crane’s speaker adopts a 
purposefully heightened style, full of apostrophe: “O 
harp...” “Thy choiring strings...” etc. Both take ordinary 
objects as their materia poetica, but they lift them out of 
                     
42 Muriel Rukeyser, The Collected Poems of Muriel Rukeyser 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). 
43 Hart Crane, Complete Poems and Selected Letters (New York: 
Literary Classics of the United States, 2006). 
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the context of the ordinary, thereby transfiguring them. 
Crane’s bridge is not only a bridge, but also an “altar.”  
      To this genealogy we might add an even earlier source, 
a passage from Thoreau’s journal: 
 
Yesterday & today the stronger winds of Autumn have 
begun to blow & the telegraph harp has sounded loudly… 
The tone varying with the tension of different parts of 
the wire. The sound proceeds from near the posts where 
the vibration is apparently more rapid. I put my ear to 
one of the posts, and it seemed to me as if every pore 
of the wood was filled with music...44 
 
Belying his reputation as an anti-modern recluse, Thoreau is 
surprisingly foresighted about the impact of the telegraph, 
writing just seven years after the technology was first 
demonstrated in 1844 between Washington and Baltimore.45 “To 
have a harp on so great a scale—girdling the very earth—& 
played by the winds of every latitude and longitude,” he 
writes with amazement; all the more so because “we have yet 
attributed the invention to no God.”46  
                     
44 Henry David Thoreau, A Year in Thoreau's Journal, 1851 
(New York: Penguin, 1993), 231. 
45 Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 691. 
46 Thoreau, A Year in Thoreau's Journal, 1851, 231. 
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      The telegraph epitomizes several aspects of modernity: 
The world-embracing ubiquity that Thoreau alludes to, not to 
mention the communication revolution brought about by 
decoupling communication from transportation. This latter 
aspect is an early example of what has been called the 
dematerializing tendency of modernity, opening up the 
possibility of the kind of disembedding described by 
Giddens. Thoreau’s multivalent approach to the telegraph—
celebrating it as a wonder in its own right, while at the 
same time appropriating it for his own aesthetic ends—models 
an approach to incorporating the shifting definitions of the 
ordinary necessitated by technological change into the work 
of art. Moreover, the telegraph network is a forerunner of 
one of the most influential grids of all: the power grid, 
which we encounter in Oxidia. Just as the grid in visual art 
“compel[s] our acknowledgement of a world beyond the frame,” 
the “heavy cables, slung / Through Oxidia” situate the 
“banal suburb” in the wider world of modernity. Thoreau, 
like Stevens, displays some ambivalence towards this world, 
but the remarkable thing about his telegraph harp is that 
rather than seeing modernization as a force that severs us 
from the wellspring of natural beauty, it produces a kind of 
accidental music. The ordinary, in other words, need not be 
a kind of pastoral, infected with nostalgia for a lost world 
of authenticity and a spurious organic unity with nature. 
While Oxidia remains an emblem of discontentment with the 
356 
 
modern urban environment, it differs in its moderation from 
other contemporary expressions of the same sentiment. 
      Stevens took up this theme in a cluster of poems from 
Parts of a World, the most important of which is “The Common 
Life.” This poem explores the public spaces that play host 
to the commonplace: 
 
That’s the down-town frieze, 
Principally the church steeple,  
A blank line beside a white line; 
And the stack of the electric plant, 
A black line drawn on flat air. 
 
It is a morbid light 
In which they stand, 
Like an electric lamp 
On a page of Euclid.  
       (SCPP, 204) 
 
The modern city’s rectilinear shapes are laid out here like 
a perspective drawing, as the poem puns on the word “line” 
to denote both a line of poetry and a geometric figure. The 
“church steeple” and the “stack of the electric plant,” or 
tradition and modernity, counterpoint one another in an 
uneasy balance. The poem shows, at the very least, that 
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Stevens was thinking about urban space in geometric terms. 
However, thematically speaking, it merely rehearses a cliché 
of urban oppressiveness. Moreover, the pun on “line” 
positions the speaker at a distance from the landscape 
described. The “down-town frieze” is observed from outside, 
like a literal frieze, and not actually dwelt in. This marks 
a major point of difference with “An Ordinary Evening in New 
Haven,” in which the speaker is emphatically situated within 
the world that the poem describes. 
      This departure notwithstanding, “The Common Life” 
should be regarded as a precursor poem to “An Ordinary 
Evening.” Its title even looks forward to the “commonplace,” 
that key expression from the later poem, and this 
juxtaposition reminds us that Stevens frequently indulged in 
puns based on splitting words—the commonplace (or the 
ordinary), therefore, becomes a question of the common place. 
The nature and the quality of these common places emerges as 
one of the most persistent themes in Stevens’s work, and a 
hallmark of his approach to the ordinary. This theme 
receives its highest expression in “An Ordinary Evening in 
New Haven.” In a letter to Katharine Frazier of the 
Cummington Press on May 14, 1942, Stevens carefully 
describes how the poem should be arranged, emphasizing its 
geometric order: “There will be 30 poems, each of seven 
verses, each verse of three lines. In short, there will be 
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21 lines of poetry on each page.”47 Perloff notes that with 
“one poem per page, ten poems per section, seven tercets per 
poem, the three group titles on separate pages,” the poem 
possesses what she describes as “a geometric perfection.”48 
This concern with geometry is reflected in the design of the 
volume, which features on its title page two perpendicular 
lines, a circle, and a point. While the circle and point are 
almost certainly in reference to the poem’s first canto, a 
meditation on “The inconceivable idea of the sun” (SCPP, 
329). But they also represent, intriguingly, a typology of 
the grid.49 
 
                     
47 Stevens, Letters of Wallace Stevens, 406—7. 
48 Perloff, “Revolving in Crystal: The Supreme Fiction and 
the Impasse of Modernist Lyric,” 43. 
49 Here defined, in Jack Williamson’s terms, as “a 
proportional system of coordinates intersected by vertical 
and horizontal axes.” Jack H. Williamson, “The Grid: History, 
Use, and Meaning,” Design Issues 3.2 (Autumn 1986): 15. 
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Fig. 8.: Cover of Wallace Stevens, Notes toward a Supreme 
Fiction (Cummington, MA: The Cummington Press, 1942). 
 
      Stevens carries that careful arrangement of stanzas 
and cantos over into “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven,” 
which differs from its predecessor in abandoning the section 
headings, and having six tercets per canto, instead of 
seven. We can go further than Perloff in emphasizing the 
geometry of the poem if we conduct a sort of thought 
experiment: if we take the poem out of the linear sequence 
of the book page and arranging it in two dimensions, we find 
a grid. This arrangement invites a style of reading that 
360 
 
departs from the norm of approaching a long poem in a linear 
fashion, but there are reasons to think that this might be 
justified in the case of “An Ordinary Evening.” First, 
Stevens himself abridged the poem both in the context of 
public readings, and in a version published first in the 
Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, and then in the Faber & Faber volume of his 
Selected Poems.50 This version condenses the poem from 
thirty-one cantos to eleven, and inserts canto twenty-nine 
after cantos thirty and thirty-one, suggesting that the 
order of the full poem is not immutable.  
      More importantly, the poem itself includes a number of 
cues to read it without the assumption of linearity.  The 
first canto declares the poem’s intention to present “The 
vulgate of experience,” and suggests that it will take the 
form of a “never-ending meditation,” dramatized in the first 
stanza by the lines “Of this, / A few words, an and yet, and 
yet, and yet—” (SCPP, 397). Later, Stevens draws on the 
language of the Book of Revelation to describe “Reality [as] 
the beginning not the end, / Naked Alpha, not the hierophant 
Omega...” and concludes that “Alpha continues to begin. / 
Omega is refreshed at every end” (SCPP, 400). These lines 
                     
50 See J. M. Edelstein, Wallace Stevens: A Descriptive 
Bibliography (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1973). 
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overlay the poem’s linear structure with a succession of 
cycles. The sense of an ongoing, endless meditation is 
reiterated in both rhetorical and syntactic characteristics 
present throughout the poem. The closing lines are a prime 
example: 
 
  It is not in the premise that reality 
  Is a solid. It may be a shade that traverses 
  A dust, a force that traverses a shade. 
(SCPP, 417) 
 
These lines avoid the sense of a conclusion through a 
cluster of rhetorical techniques. First, the main verb in 
these lines, “traverse,” is in the simple present tense.  As 
George T. Wright notes, when the simple present appears 
absent the kinds of temporal, conditional, or metaphysical 
qualifiers that usually accompany it in ordinary speech, it 
does a special kind of rhetorical work. By describing “a 
physical action perhaps repeatable but taking place once as 
far as we can judge” in a line of poetry, the simple present 
conjures a “realm outside our normal conscious time world, 
where every event must be assigned a more precise 
temporality.”51 In other words, the simple present takes us 
                     
51 George T. Wright, “The Lyric Present: Simple Present Verbs 
in English Poems,” PMLA 89.3 (May 1974): 565. 
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out of the realm of linear time. Second, the final lines of 
the poem—“a shade that traverses / A dust, a force that 
traverses a shade”—form a chiasmus, a rhetorical trope 
formed by the arrangement of repeated words in the form 
a/b/b/a, in this case shade/traverse/traverse/shade. This is 
only one of seven chiastic formulations in the poem. The 
essence of the chiasmus is reversibility; it establishes an 
absolute equivalence between its terms and suggests that any 
movement from term a to term b will be counterbalanced by a 
symmetrical movement from term b to term a. In other words, 
it too invokes an alternative to linearity.  
      So it is clear that the poem is invoking another code 
of reading than that of linear narrative. What this might 
be, exactly, is suggested by the poem’s peculiar willingness 
to paraphrase itself, suggesting that no single formulation 
is final, that it is instead provisional, substitutable. An 
example of this occurs in one of the poem’s most famous 
passages: 
 
 
Real and unreal are two in one: New Haven 
Before and after one arrives, or, say, 
 
Bergamo on a postcard, Rome after dark, 
Sweden described, Salzberg with shaded eyes 
Or Paris in conversation at a café. 
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(SCPP, 414) 
 
These rather disparate locales are held together in the 
context of a list, suggesting that each is as good as the 
next. Indeed, “and” and “or,” which appear twice in these 
lines, rather than “but,” or “so,” or “for,” are in a sense 
the presiding conjunctions of the poem. In other words, the 
poem engages throughout in parataxis, the trope of placing 
words or statements side by side with little in the way of 
connective syntax to impart an order or hierarchy. Parataxis 
implies that, at least within the context of the passage in 
which they appear, these words or statements are 
substitutable with one another. The next stanza— 
 
This endlessly elaborating poem 
Displays the theory of poetry, 
As the theory of life... 
(SCPP, 415) 
 
—joins the notion of substitutability with the idea of 
meditation described earlier. The rhetoric of meditation, as 
opposed to dialectic, suggests exactly this “endless 
elaboration,” rather than the aim to arrive at a conclusion. 
The modus operandi of meditation, the poem suggests, is 
substitutability. The meditative poem demands a mode of 
reading that moves through a series of variations on a theme 
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without elevating any single one to the status of a 
conclusion. Another way of putting this is that the poem 
conspicuously counters what Barthes described as poetry’s 
inherent tendency towards the syntagmatic imaginary by 
invoking a certain paradigmatic uncertainty. The grid is an 
apt metaphor for this paradigmatic/syntagmatic uncertainty: 
the two orders are, of course, usually described as axes, 
and where two axes coincide, we find ourselves once again 
face to face with the grid. In her classic essay on grids 
from her book The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other 
Modernist Myths, Rosalind Krauss claims that grids 
“explicitly reject a narrative or sequential reading of any 
kind.”52 When the poem counters syntagmatic progress with 
paradigmatic uncertainty, it exploits a realm of linguistic 
potentiality as opposed to one of action. It evokes, in 
Stevens’s own phrase, “the pleasures of merely circulating.” 
      Krauss argues that  
 
By virtue of the grid, the given work of art is 
presented as a mere fragment, a tiny piece arbitrarily 
cropped from an infinitely larger fabric. Thus the grid 
                     
52 Rosalind E. Krauss, “Grids,” in The Originality of the 
Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths (Cambridge, MA, and 
London: MIT Press, 1986), 13. 
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operates from the work of art outward, compelling our 
acknowledgement of a world beyond the frame.53 
 
That is to say, any particular instance of the grid can 
potentially be extended in all directions along an infinite 
plane. Similarly, the paradigmatic axis has the potential of 
an infinite recycling of terms, just as the syntagmatic axis 
allows any formulation, in principle, to be infinitely 
extended. So, in short, the rhetorical strategies that the 
poem employs to circumvent linearity are reflected in its 
grid-like formal organization. Moreover, these 
characteristics bear witness to the poem’s concern with the 
ordinary in that the ordinary is characterized by the 
circular logic of repetition, habit, and routine rather than 
teleological, linear time. Forestalling the tendency of 
artistic representation to impose narrative order, then, is 
one strategy for mitigating its transfiguring effects, and 
maintaining the ordinariness of the commonplace. 
      Cook approaches this aspect of the poem from a 
slightly different perspective; she is concerned to show 
that the poem is, in her terms, anti-apocalyptic. The key to 
this reading is a pun in the name of one of its few 
“characters,” “Professor Eucalyptus.” “Eucalyptus,” as a 
botanical term invented in the eighteenth century, means 
                     
53 Ibid., 18. 
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“well covered.” The contrast with “apocalypse,” from the 
ancient Greek apokalypsis, or “uncovering,” is clear. Cook 
is concerned not to place too much weight on this dichotomy, 
though. To avoid doing so, she evokes Stevens’s own attempt 
to break through a dichotomy by introducing a third term: 
 
 These fitful sayings are, also, of tragedy: 
 The serious reflection is composed 
 Neither of comic nor tragic but of commonplace. 
        (SCPP, 408)  
  
Cook’s reading of the poem’s anti-apocalyptic orientation is, 
in effect, another way of describing its approach to the 
ordinary, although she herself does not make this connection 
explicit. As Frank Kermode has demonstrated, we expect 
narrative to be, to some degree, apocalyptic in the broad 
sense of moving towards an end. The constructor of that 
narrative manipulates an economy of knowledge which, at its 
conclusion, sets all preceding events into a comprehensible 
totality. “Narrative,” in fact, might be too narrow a 
category, for we frequently expect even non-narratival forms, 
poetry in particular, to structure themselves according to a 
principle of finitude, in part so as to reassure us that our 
own lives possess a coherent structure and direction: 
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If there is one belief (however the facts resist it) 
that unites us all, from the evangelists to those who 
argue away inconvenient portions of their texts, and 
those who spin large plots to accommodate the 
discrepancies and dissonances into some larger scheme, 
it is this conviction that somehow, in some occult 
fashion, if we could only detect it, everything will be 
found to hang together.54 
 
The ordinary takes place prior to, or beneath, these 
retrospective assemblies of experience, and by resisting the 
urge to order things teleologically, literature comes closer 
to representing it.  
      The grid thus stands for a fundamentally different 
structure than the one that Kermode describes, one that 
connects the poem with a broad stream of modernist 
aesthetics in the visual arts from Malevich to de Stijl to 
Mondrian. Grids figure prominently in the work of these 
artists, as strident declarations of their work’s modernity. 
In view of what I have already said, it is no surprise to 
find Krauss declaring that, in painting, “the grid 
                     
54 Kermode, “The Man in the Macintosh,” 72. 
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announces… modern art’s… hostility… to narrative.”55 In 
painting, the grid also opposes perspective. Rather than 
mapping the space of a room or a landscape, or a group of 
figures onto the surface of a painting, it maps only the 
painting itself, forcing the physical and the aesthetic 
planes to coincide. This kind of mapping is certainly 
apparent in Stevens’s conscientious instructions on the 
layout of “Notes toward a Supreme Fiction” to the Cummington 
Press; one is reminded of nothing so much as George Perec’s 
Species of Spaces, in which artfully arranged typography 
exposes and plays upon the materiality of the page on which 
it occurs. The aesthetic space of the poem, in other words, 
is mapped directly onto the physical space of the page. 
According to Krauss,  
 
Those two planes—the physical and the aesthetic—are 
demonstrated to be the same plane: coextensive, and, 
through the abscissas and ordinates of the grid, 
coordinate. Considered in this way, the bottom line of 
the grid is a naked and determined materialism.56 
 
But this materialism is often contradicted by the attitudes 
of those artists who use the grid in their work. For 
                     
55 Krauss, “Grids,” 9. 
56 Ibid., 10. 
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Mondrian and Malevich, the materiality of the painting is 
not the point at all; rather, “from their point of view, the 
grid is a staircase to the Universal.”57 One example of this 
spiritualist perspective is to be found in Kazimir 
Malevich’s Suprematist manifesto of 1915. The manifesto 
declares that pictorial abstraction is a means of 
representing pure feeling untethered to the objects of the 
material world, which is more or less a secularized 
description of the spiritual realm. Similar sentiments are 
reflected in Mondrian’s manifesto, Neo-Plasticism in 
Painting.58 The grid is the quintessence of abstraction, and 
therein lies its spiritual dimension.  
      As a result, the grid takes on a special status in 
modernist aesthetics. In the context of a secularizing 
world, as described in Weber’s famous thesis of modernity as 
disenchantment, artists faced a seemingly stark choice 
between material and spiritual modes of expression. 
According to Krauss, “the curious testimony offered by the 
grid is that at this juncture,” those artists “tried to 
                     
57 Ibid., 11. 
58 See Kazimir Malevich, The Non-Objective World: The 
Manifesto of Suprematism (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 
2003); Piet Mondrian, The New Art / the New Life: The 
Collected Writings (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987). 
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decide for both.”59 Krauss attributes the longevity and 
ubiquity of the grid in modernist art to its power to make 
us “able to think we are dealing with materialism (or 
sometimes science, or logic) while at the same time it 
provides us with a release into belief (or illusion, or 
fiction).”60 Krauss’s binary between materialism and belief 
easily becomes another, that is, Stevens’s famous definition 
of poetry as the conflict between reality and imagination. 
But whereas “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction” and “The 
Necessary Angel” both insist on the intractability of this 
conflict, “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven” strives for its 
resolution in the recognition of a higher unity between the 
two, as in lines like “Real and unreal are two in one: New 
Haven / Before and after one arrives...” An even stronger 
statement of the same principle occurs in canto XI: 
 
In the metaphysical streets of the physical town 
We remember the lion of Juda and we save 
The phrase... 
 
.................................................. 
 
                     
59 Krauss, “Grids,” 12. 
60 Ibid. 
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The phrase grows weak. The fact takes up the 
strength 
Of the phrase. It contrives the self-same 
evocations 
And Juda becomes New Haven or else must. 
(SCPP, 403) 
 
Juda refers to the historical Kingdom of Judah, specifically 
its capital, Jerusalem. The ordinary city, New Haven, is 
made to coincide with the spiritual city of Jerusalem. Why 
then, is the desired resolution between reality and the 
imagination so resolutely situated in a particular place, 
and why New Haven?  
      To answer this question, I’d like to shift my focus on 
the grid from the painting to architecture. Indeed, the 
practice of town planning has brought the grid into the 
daily lives of far more individuals than modern art ever 
could. In her recent work The Grid Book, Hannah Higgins 
takes an appealingly trans-historical approach, and draws 
particular attention to the Greek city of Miletus, rebuilt 
on a grid plan over three centuries after an earthquake in 
479 BCE, to draw an analogy between the modernist pictorial 
grid and the urban grid. To quote Alan Waterhouse’s 
Boundaries of the City, in Miletus “everywhere the grid 
boundaries confirmed the sense of being embraced by the 
landscape, carrying the eye beyond the confines of the 
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street to the revered forests, outcrops, and hills shaped in 
the image of the deities.”61 In other words, the grid 
reconciles the opposites of built and natural environments, 
orienting the city to its surrounding landscape. Waterhouse 
reads the grid as an expression of the general tendency in 
Greek myth to favor the reconciliation of symbolic 
opposites. In Higgins’s phrase, “the Hellenistic [grid] 
expressed both rational and irrational ideas, or perhaps an 
irrational belief in rational form.”62 Higgins’s comment 
looks forward to the age of reason, in which grid plans took 
on a utopian aspect on the assumption that urban form could 
profoundly influence human behavior. The utopian aspirations 
associated with the grid were renewed in the modernist 
period by Le Corbusier. Surveying this history from Miletus 
to the 20th C. in The City of Tomorrow and its Planning, Le 
Corbusier declares “Where the orthogonal is supreme, there 
we can read the height of a civilization... When man begins 
to draw straight lines he bears witness that he has gained 
control of himself and that he has reached a condition of 
order.”63 This is not the place to offer a comprehensive 
                     
61 Cited in Hannah B. Higgins, The Grid Book (Cambridge, MA, 
and London: MIT Press, 2009), 59. 
62 Ibid., 60. 
63 Le Corbusier, The City of Tomorrow and Its Planning, trans. 
Frederick Etchells (New York: Dover, 1987), 43. 
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history of the urban grid; even Higgins’s study stops far 
short of that. Suffice to say, the uses and aspirations 
associated with the grid have often reflected prevailing 
tendencies in intellectual history.  
      Le Corbusier also argues that “we must have the 
courage to view the rectilinear cities of America with 
admiration. If the aesthete has not so far done so, the 
moralist, on the contrary, may well find more food for 
reflection than at first appears.”64 This point reminds us of 
another paradox implied by the grid: that it is at once 
historical and trans-historical. It emerges as the result of 
a determined human effort to order the built environment, 
and comes in and out of favor throughout history. At the 
same time, however, as Le Corbusier and Hannah Higgins 
remind us, the grid reflects the fundamental order of the 
universe as described in Euclidean geometry. By “the 
rectilinear cities of America,” Le Corbusier means gridded 
cities like New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, where the 
grid was chiefly a matter of facilitating easy 
transportation and efficiently parceling out real estate. 
But the earliest American grid cities were designed in mind 
of spiritual considerations as well.  
      The earliest gridded city in colonial north America, 
as it happens, was New Haven itself. New Haven was founded 
                     
64 Ibid., 10. 
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in 1638 by the Rev. John Davenport, a wealthy Puritan 
merchant, and is, according to James Kornwolf’s Architecture 
and Town Planning in Colonial North America, “exceptional 
among early New England towns in having been conceived as a 
‘model’ community with a perfectly square, nine-block 
gridiron plan dominated by a central village green and with 
pragmatically arranged streets leading out from the town to 
the harbor and the surrounding countryside.”65 The generous 
public green, with the community’s place of worship at the 
center of it, gives material expression to the spiritual 
aspirations of the Puritan settlers towards a sober, 
ordered, and communally-focused society. New Haven itself 
represents the desire to make the physical world congruent 
with spiritual ambitions. Indeed, as Cook points out, 
Stevens’s poem exploits a pun on New Haven and New Heaven 
that went to the heart of the aspirations of its Puritan 
founders. In fact, the poem goes further even than Cook had 
suspected, in that its “geometrical perfection,” to use 
Perloff’s phrase, mimics the principles along which the town 
itself was designed.  
  
                     
65 James D. and Georgiana W. Kornwolf, eds. Architecture and 
Town Planning in Colonial North America, Vol. 2 (Baltimore 
and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 1009. 
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Fig. 9. New Haven, detail from 1806 engraving by William L. 
Lyon based on a 1748 drawing by James Wadsworth, in  
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      The poem frequently invokes New Haven precisely when 
it tries to mediate between the conflicting demands of 
matter and spirit or heaven and earth, for instance in canto 
XV: 
 
The instinct for heaven had its counterpart: 
The instinct for earth, for New Haven, for his  
room, 
The gay tournamonde as of a single world 
 
In which he is and as and is are one. 
(SCPP, 406) 
 
The instinct for heaven and the instinct for earth are 
separately delineated before being reconciled in a single 
world, a world in which “as and is,” or simile and identity, 
or imagination and reality, are one. The same principle 
finds a slightly different formulation earlier in the poem, 
in canto XII: 
 
  The poem is the cry of its occasion, 
  Part of the res itself and not about it. 
(SCPP, 404) 
 
Res, Latin for “thing,” invokes Descartes’ res extensa, or 
corporeal substance. The poem belongs to the world of things 
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themselves, not a derivative world of representations. These 
lines encapsulate a whole modernist discourse of artistic 
autonomy. The grid, too, is implicated in this. The grid, 
somehow abstract and referential at once, carefully poised 
on the dividing line between realism and literary artifice, 
may ultimately be a metaphor for not having metaphors. It is 
a form that underwrites the poem’s repeated claims not to be 
a poem at all, a part of, and not about, the world. 
      These claims, however, do not entirely succeed, nor 
could they. “An Ordinary Evening” remains a work of art, 
despite its willingness to claim otherwise. The poem even 
recognizes this ambiguity in canto XXIX: 
 
In the land of the lemon trees, yellow and yellow  
were 
Yellow-blue, yellow-green, pungent with citron-sap, 
Dangling and spangling, the mic-mac of mocking  
birds. 
 
In the land of the elm trees, wandering mariners 
Looked on big women, whose ruddy-ripe images 
Wreathed round and round the round wreath of  
autumn. 
 
They rolled their r’s, there, in the land of the  
citrons. 
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In the land of big mariners, the words they spoke 
Were mere brown clods, mere catching weeds of talk. 
       (SCPP, 415) 
 
The “big women” are certainly descendants of the “fat girl 
terrestrial” who appeared as a figure for reality at the end 
of “Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction.” Here, the poem resorts 
to an elaborate metaphoricity (to use Perloff’s term) 
familiar from Stevens’s earlier poetry, even adopting some 
of the characteristic images of Harmonium.66 Perloff connects 
the canto with a passage from Stevens’s letter to Hi Simon 
in a letter of January 12, 1940:  
 
Of course, I don’t agree with the people who say that I 
live in a world of my own; I think that I am perfectly 
normal, but I see that there is a center. For instance, 
a photograph of a lot of fat men and women in the woods, 
                     
66 Marie Borroff describes these passages in “Notes” as 
typifying “the prodigality of Stevens’s inventiveness, an 
ever-accruing wealth which need never hoard itself but can 
be spent at once.” Language and the Poet: Verbal Artistry in 
Frost, Stevens, and Moore (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1979), 74. 
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drinking beer and singing Hi-li Hi-lo reminds me that 
there is a normal that I ought to try to achieve.67 
 
The ordinary, that is to say, need not be a version of 
“reality grimly seen,” but can with the aid of the 
imagination take on a celebratory aspect. Steven’s decision 
to end the abridged version of the poem with this canto 
reminds us that there is an irreducible element of the 
aesthetic to every instance of poetry. As Stevens wrote to 
Henry Church on January 21, 1946, “For myself, the 
inaccessible jewel is the normal and all of life, in poetry, 
is the difficult pursuit of just that.”68 
      I have tried to show that the formal organization of 
“An Ordinary Evening in New Haven” imitates its subject, the 
“common place” of New Haven. The challenge for any work of 
art that seeks to represent the ordinary is that once the 
ordinary is taken into the charmed circle of art, within the 
frame, as it were, it is thereby transfigured and ceases to 
be ordinary. Having worked through the demands made by 
social realist critics in the 1930s, Stevens positions the 
ordinary beyond, or perhaps below, realism. The poem 
marginalizes the question of context, but not in the way 
                     
67 Stevens, Letters of Wallace Stevens, 352. 
68 Ibid., 521. 
380 
 
that Perloff claims. The poem abandons the codes of 
realistic representation in favor of a different set of 
aesthetic aspirations altogether. Stevens’s response to this 
aesthetic dilemma, like Mondrian and Malevich before him, is 
to dissolve the frame by forcing abstraction and 
representation to coincide. “An Ordinary Evening” discards 
the aspiration to represent the ordinary in favor of 
insinuating itself into the ordinary. The grid is Stevens’s 
metaphor for not having metaphors, a figure for the 
resolution of opposites that his poetry tries to achieve. 
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Coda: Don DeLillo and the Half-Life of Modernism 
 
 Debate over the meaning, nature, and morality of 
consumerism has been a perennial feature of economic and 
political debate in the West since the term was popularized 
by Vance Packard’s The Waste Makers (1960). Packard 
forecasted that increased global competition for resources 
would soon mean that “something will have to give—either 
mode of living or population growth or both—long before a 
mere century has passed.”1 His warning must have seemed 
anything but timely when it was issued; during the 1950s, 
the OECD countries averaged a 4 per cent annual rate of 
economic growth, rising to nearly 5 per cent during the 
1960s.2 But as that rate of expansion subsided to around 3 
per cent annually during the 1970s, and against the backdrop 
of oil shocks and a profitability crisis in the American 
corporation, public opinion began to endorse Packard’s 
                     
1 Vance Packard, The Waste Makers (New York: D. McKay Co., 
1960), 214. 
2 Stephen A. Marglin, “Lessons of the Golden Age: An 
Overview,” in The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting 
the Postwar Experience, ed. Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet 
Schor (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
1. 
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concerns. “Moments of breakdown and disruption,” Frank 
Trentmann has argued, “allow us to see what is needed to 
keep ordinary consumption practices going.”3 In the 1970s, 
concepts like peak oil suggested that those ordinary 
consumption practices were demanding more resources than the 
earth could provide. As a result, now-ubiquitous practices 
like recycling transitioned from the countercultural world 
of The Whole Earth Catalogue to the mainstream.4 The end of 
the post-war boom, we might say, precipitated a wholesale 
reconsideration of the status of waste. Only recently, 
however, has the topic of waste become central to 
discussions of consumption, anxieties about which have 
become perennial.5 Indeed, waste offers a useful supplement 
                     
3 Frank Trentmann, “The Politics of Everyday Life,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of the History of Consumption, ed. Frank 
Trentmann (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 524. 
4 “Whereas only two cities operated municipal recycling 
programs in 1970, more than two hundred did in 1982.” Susan 
Strasser, Waste and Want: A Social History of Trash (New 
York: Metropolitan Books, 1999), 284. 
5 Major studies of consumer culture from the 1990s, for 
instance, tend to lack any sustained discussion of waste, 
the inevitable byproduct of consumption (e.g. Ben Fine and 
Ellen Leopold, The World of Consumption (London and New 
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to the theory of consumption put forward in Michel de 
Certeau’s Practice of Everyday Life, in which consumers are 
imagined as “unrecognized producers, poets of their own 
acts,” and use is refigured as the production of meanings 
that exceed the bounds of the system that generates 
commodities.6 Consumers are also producers in a literal 
sense: producers of waste. 
The impact of this revaluation of waste on the academy 
is exemplified by the archaeologist William Rathje’s 
“Garbage Project,” beginning at the University of Arizona in 
Tucson, in 1972. Rathje’s work applied an ethno-
archeological methodology to contemporary American 
households, comparing analyses of their household garbage 
with self-reporting about their consumer habits. Comparison 
of these two sources revealed illuminating discrepancies 
between ordinary people’s actual habits of consumption and 
their self-reporting, notably in the case of socially 
opprobrious behavior like beer or red meat consumption.7 
                                                              
York: Routledge, 1993); Don Slater, Consumer Culture and 
Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997)); Strasser’s Waste 
and Want seems to bridge this divide for the first time.  
6 de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, xviii. 
7 Jeanne E. Arnold et al., Life at Home in the Twenty-First 
Century: 32 Families Open Their Doors (Los Angeles: Cotsen 
Institute of Archaeology Press, 2012), 9. 
384 
 
“What people have owned—and thrown away,” argues Rathje, “—
can speak more eloquently, informatively, and truthfully 
about the lives they lead than they themselves ever may.”8 
Rathje is drawn to the frisson of the unknown in the 
ordinary, the sense that the most intimate sphere of our own 
lives might be where we know ourselves the least: “Would we 
ourselves recognize our story when it is told, or will our 
garbage tell tales that we as yet do not suspect?”9 Garbage, 
in other words, has the potential to reveal the consumerist 
id of its producers. The sense that waste can tell us 
something fundamental about our own culture is not, of 
course, unique to Rathje; its significance was one of the 
basic arguments of Mary Douglas’s Purity and Danger:  
 
Dirt [i]s matter out of place.... [This] implies two 
conditions: a set of ordered relations and a 
contravention of that order.... Where there is dirt, 
there is a system. Dirt is the by-product of a 
systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so 
far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate 
                     
8 William L. Rathje and Cullen Murphy, Rubbish!: The 
Archaeology of Garbage (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 
2001), 58. 
9 Ibid., 11. 
385 
 
elements. The idea of dirt takes us straight into the 
field of symbolism.10 
 
Despite their different emphases, Douglas and Rathje share 
the conviction that waste offers a subterranean map of the 
society in question, a sort of night-time inverse of day-
time world we are more familiar with.  
This sense of waste as offering a privileged insight 
into the mysteries of the ordinary is central to work of the 
novelist Don DeLillo. White Noise (1985), the novel that set 
off a groundswell of interest in DeLillo, is preoccupied not 
only with the sorts of mundane objects that fill the station 
wagons delivering students to their college at the start of 
the academic year in the book’s opening pages, but in the 
obverse of this “brilliant event”: the waste and detritus of 
consumer society.11 Later in the novel, having discovered 
that his wife Babette has been cheating on him to gain 
access to an experimental drug that abates the fear of 
death, the protagonist, Jack Gladney, finds himself rooting 
through the family’s compacted rubbish to locate a vial of 
the drug: 
 
                     
10 Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts 
of Pollution and Taboo (London: Routledge, 1966), 35. 
11 Don DeLillo, White Noise (London: Picador, 2009), 3. 
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I unfolded the bag cuffs, released the latch and 
lifted out the bag. The full stench hit me with 
shocking force. Was this ours? Did it belong to us? Had 
we created it? I took the bag out to the garage and 
emptied it. The compressed bulk sat there like an 
ironic modern sculpture, massive, squat, mocking. I 
jabbed at it with the butt end of a rake and then 
spread the material over the concrete floor. I picked 
through it item by item, mass by shapeless mass, 
wondering why I felt guilty, a violator of privacy, 
uncovering intimate and perhaps shameful secrets. It 
was hard not to be distracted by some of the things 
they’d chosen to submit to the Juggernaut appliance. 
But why did I feel like a household spy? Is garbage so 
private?12 
 
Gladney’s meditation on the possible meanings of household 
waste gives way to the paradoxical pleasure of listing items 
of garbage: 
 
I found crayon drawings of a figure with full 
breasts and male genitals. There was a long piece of 
twine that contained a series of knots and loops. It 
seemed at first a random construction. Looking more 
                     
12 Ibid., 297. 
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closely I thought I detected a complex relationship 
between the size of the loops, the degree of the knots 
(single or double) and the intervals between knots with 
loops and freestanding knots. Some kind of occult 
geometry or symbolic festoon of obsessions. I found a 
banana skin with a tampon inside. Was this the dark 
underside of consumer consciousness? I came across a 
horrible clotted mass of hair, soap, ear swaps, crushed 
roaches, flip-top rings, sterile pads smeared with pus 
and bacon fat, strands of frayed dental floss, 
fragments of ballpoint refills, toothpicks still 
displaying bits of impaled food. There was a pair of 
shredded undershorts with lipstick markings, perhaps a 
memento of the Grayview hotel.13 
 
Gladney thus adopts the role of an amateur garbologist, 
wringing meaning out of “the size of the loops, the degree 
of the knots (single or double) and the intervals between” 
them, turning garbology into a figure for reading itself.  
The theme of waste expands its significance in 
Underworld (1997), a novel whose title evokes a whole 
constellation of tropes to do with waste and reuse. Indeed, 
the novel seems to have been catalyzed in part by the rise 
of garbage studies since the 1970s. When Brian Glassic, Nick 
                     
13 Ibid., 297–8. 
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Shay’s colleague in the waste management business drives too 
far south on the Jersey side of the Hudson river en route to 
Manhattan, he finds himself with a view back towards the 
city over the Fresh Kills Landfill on Staten Island, 
formerly the largest landfill site in the world: 
 
He imagined he was watching the construction of 
the Great Pyramid at Giza—only this was twenty-five 
times bigger… Brian felt a sting of enlightenment. He 
looked at all that soaring garbage and knew for the 
first time what his job was all about. Not engineering 
or transportation or source reduction. He dealt in 
human behavior, people’s habits and impulses, their 
uncontrollable needs and innocent wishes, maybe their 
passions, certainly their excesses and indulgences but 
their kindness too, their generosity, and the question 
was how to keep this mass metabolism from overwhelming 
us.14 
                     
14 Don DeLillo, Underworld (London: Picador, 2011), 184. 
Glassic’s point of reference for the size of the Fresh Kills 
site is drawn directly from Rathje, who opens Rubbish! with 
his own evocative description of the site: “It is the 
largest active landfill in the world. It is twenty-five 
times the size of the Great Pyramid of Khufu at Giza, forty 
times the size of the Temple of the Sun at Teotihuacan.” 
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As the novel develops, it quickly becomes apparent that this 
metabolism extends beyond municipal waste to encompass the 
whole economy—cultural and material—of twentieth-century 
America. To an even greater extent than in White Noise, 
DeLillo’s characters in Underworld seek out what he 
describes in an interview as  
 
a sense of the importance of daily life and of ordinary 
moments. In White Noise, in particular, I tried to find 
a kind of radiance in dailyness. Sometimes this 
radiance can be almost frightening. Other times it can 
be almost holy or sacred.15 
 
The most prominent figure in Underworld for this radiance, 
which clearly evokes the autonomy and irreducibility of the 
                                                              
Rathje and Murphy, Rubbish!, 4. Nick Shay’s colleague 
Detwiler, whose own fascination with waste began with a 
career as a “garbage guerrilla who stole and analyzed the 
household trash of a number of famous people,” recalls A. J. 
Weberman, the gonzo journalist who performed similar 
excavations on Neil Simon, Muhammad Ali, and Abbie Hoffman, 
also recounted in Rubbish!, 17. 
15 Don DeLillo and Thomas DePietro, Conversations with Don 
Delillo (Jackson: University of Mississippi, 2005), 70–1. 
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aesthetic, is the waste that abounds throughout the novel in 
the full range of its metaphorical guises. 
The peculiar aptness of waste to anchor an “epic 
counterhistory” of the cold war is summed up by Joshua 
Goldstein, who argues that it 
 
mark[s] multiple boundaries—between past and present, 
public and private, value and its opposite. Waste is 
disruptive, poorly differentiated, marginalized, and 
hence (and herein lies a major challenge for the 
historian) goes unaccounted and often undocumented. 
Waste is not just un(der)known and un(der)valued 
because it lies at the edge of our attention and value 
systems, but because it is intrinsically destabilizing 
of forms of knowledge and systems of value.16 
 
The underworlds of DeLillo’s novel encompass a variety of 
unknown and unvalued forms of knowledge, including official 
secrets, repressed personal histories, and the detritus of 
                     
16 Catherine Morley, The Quest for Epic in Contemporary 
American Fiction: John Updike, Philip Roth and Don Delillo 
(New York: Routledge, 2009), 127. Joshua Goldstein, “Waste,” 
in The Oxford Handbook of the History of Consumption, ed. 
Frank Trentmann (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 328. 
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popular culture. Rathje invokes the archaeologist Gordon R. 
Wiley, who argued on the basis of his field work (“only 
partly in jest”) that “Homo sapiens may have been propelled 
along the path to civilization by his need for a degree of 
organization sufficiently sophisticated, and a class 
structure suitable stratified, to make possible the disposal 
of mounting piles of debris.”17 Narrative, we might say with 
only a hint of metaphorical overreach, serves a similar 
purpose: to organize the detritus of experience and 
establish out of it a manageable order.  
 In Underworld, that process of making order out of 
waste and detritus is explored through a series of author-
surrogates: a sculptor, Klara Sax, a graffiti artist Ismael 
Muñoz (Moonman 157), and the outsider artist Simon Rodia, 
creator of the Watts Towers in Los Angeles.18 Klara Sax is 
the exemplary artist-as-bricoleur: her early work earns her 
the moniker “the bag lady” for her use of found objects. “We 
took junk and saved it for art. Which sounds nobler than it 
was. It was just a way of looking at something more 
carefully.”19 Later (though this is recounted earlier in the 
                     
17 Rathje and Murphy, Rubbish!, 33. 
18 See Jesse Kavadlo, “Recycling Authority: Don Delillo's 
Waste Management,” Critique: Studies in Contemporary Fiction 
42.4 (2001): 284–401. 
19 DeLillo, Underworld, 393. 
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novel), Klara presides over a project to turn a vast 
graveyard of B-52 bombers in the New Mexico desert into an 
art installation: 
 
We’re painting, hand painting in some cases, putting 
our puny hands to great weapons systems, to systems 
that came out of the factories and assembly halls as 
near alike as possible, millions of components stamped 
out, repeated endlessly, and we’re trying to unrepeat, 
to find an element of felt life, and maybe there’s a 
sort of survival instinct here, a graffiti instinct—to 
trespass and declare ourselves, show who we are.20 
 
The bombers, like the Bomb itself, are a form of waste now 
that the cold war has ended, and Klara’s art works to 
exorcise the dread of that era by reclaiming its materials. 
Quoting Oppenheimer, who described the bomb as “merde,” she 
explains: “something that eludes naming is automatically 
relegated, he is saying, to the status of shit… It’s also 
shit because it’s garbage, it’s waste material.” “What I 
really want to get at,” she concludes, “is the ordinary 
thing, the ordinary life behind the thing.”21 The parallels 
between her work and Nick’s are stated clearly:  
                     
20 Ibid., 77. 
21 Ibid. 
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We were the Church fathers of waste in all its 
transmutations. I almost mentioned my line of work to 
Klara Sax when we had our talk in the desert. Her own 
career had been marked at times by her methods of 
transforming and absorbing junk.22 
 
Nick and Klara are joined then, by more than a youthful 
sexual escapade (precisely the kind of buried personal 
history the novel tries to redeem): they share a fascination 
with waste, its coded data, and its place in the cultural 
and artistic economies they are a part of. 
Furthermore, at different points during the novel, they 
both visit Watts Towers, the Los Angeles landmark built out 
of steel rods and pipes, wire mesh, and mortar, and 
decorated with found objects including ceramic tiles, soft-
drink bottles, and seashells over thirty-three years by 
Italian immigrant Sabato Rodia. The Watts Towers are an 
exemplary instance of outsider art. Nick Shay visits the 
towers and finds in Rodia, a figure reminiscent of his 
disappeared father Jimmy, himself an immigrant from Italy. 
Rodia’s work appears to Nick as “a kind of swirling free-
souled noise, a jazz cathedral, and the power of the thing, 
for me, the deep disturbance, was that my own ghost father 
                     
22 Ibid., 102. 
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was living in the walls.”23 For Klara, whose visit is relayed 
later in the novel but occurs chronologically earlier than 
Nick’s, the Towers are “a place riddled with epiphanies”; 
“She didn’t know a thing so rucked in the vernacular could 
have such an epic quality.”24  
The Watts Towers are an emblem of the novel’s own 
procedure, as well as the aspirations of its characters: not 
the mere transformation of waste into art, the 
transfiguration of the commonplace described by Arthur 
Danto, but rather the reconciliation of the ordinary and the 
aesthetic in the figure of waste, which invokes 
simultaneously both the unruly, unsystematic stuff of the 
ordinary and the splendid excess of Goethe’s charioteer: 
“Bin die Verschwendung, bin die Poesie.”25 The charioteer 
goes on: “Auch ich bin unermeßlich reich / Und schätze mich 
dem Plutus gleich…” [“Even so I am immensely rich / And 
consider myself Pluto’s equal.”]26 DeLillo reports that the 
title of Underworld originates from a comparable set of 
connotations: “I first hit upon Underworld when I started 
                     
23 Ibid., 277. 
24 Ibid., 492. 
25 See Arthur C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace: A Theory of Art (Cambridge, MA, and London: 
Harvard University Press, 1981). 
26 Goethe, Faust, 173. 
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thinking about plutonium waste buried deep in the earth. 
Then about Pluto, the god of the dead and ruler of the 
world. New connections and meanings began to suggest 
themselves…”27 
 This double valence of waste as it is explored 
throughout Underworld has broad ramifications for the vexed 
debate over DeLillo’s modernism or postmodernism, which 
given DeLillo’s exemplary status amongst contemporary 
American novelists, offers an insight into the issue of 
literary periodization in the twentieth century generally. 
In the course of this debate, critics have deployed one or 
both versions of postmodernism, as a cultural condition and 
an aesthetic agenda. Catherine Morley reads DeLillo’s 
fiction as “truly postmodern,” because it “resists critical 
and theoretical schematicism or totalizing theories,” a 
version of Lyotard’s sense of the postmodern.28 In Paul 
Gleason’s view, “like Baudrillard and Jameson, [DeLillo] 
holds that postmodernism is a cultural condition determined 
by mass-market capitalism… They reject twentieth-century 
waste culture.”29 Peter Knight likewise invokes Baudrillard 
                     
27 Jonathan Bing, “The Ascendance of Don Delillo,” Publishers 
Weekly, August 11, 1997. 
28 Morley, The Quest for Epic, 124. 
29 Paul Gleason, “Don Delillo, T. S. Eliot, and the 
Redemption of America's Atomic Waste Land,” in Underwords: 
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in a discussion of DeLillo’s characters who seem to “no 
longer have an unmediated access to an authentic self and 
perhaps no longer even have an authentic self.”30 Paul Giaimo 
offers an unconvincing account of DeLillo as neither 
“modernist” nor “postmodernist,” but “neo realist.”31 On the 
other hand, Philip Nel argues for DeLillo’s continued 
indebtedness to modernism, ultimately situating DeLillo as a 
modernist writer addressing a postmodern situation.32 
 The net effect of these debates has been to 
aggressively reify the concepts under discussion for little 
gain in our understanding of DeLillo. Nel’s account of 
modernism amounts to familiar bromides like “DeLillo shares 
with his modernist (and Romantic) ancestors a faith in the 
value and power of linguistic art,” and “an emphasis on the 
                                                              
Perspectives on Don Delillo's Underworld, ed. Joseph Dewey, 
Steven G. Kellman, and Irving Malin (London: Associated 
University Presses, 2002), 142. 
30 Peter Knight, “Delillo, Postmodernism, Postmodernity,” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Don Delillo, ed. John N. Duvall 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
31. 
31 Paul Giaimo, Appreciating Don Delillo: The Moral Force of 
a Writer's Work (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011), 20. 
32 Philip Nel, “Delillo and Modernism,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Don Delillo, 17. 
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role of the artist as hero.”33 Likewise, Knight falls back on 
the dated postmodernist criticism that “the foundation of 
modernism was built on the notion of ‘art for art’s sake,’ a 
championing of the realm of pure aestheticism in the face of 
the life-sapping influence of the market and mass culture.”34 
Such dated accounts of modernism and postmodernism produce 
perverse readings of the novel that unambiguously align 
DeLillo with the critics of “consumer culture”: 
 
Viewed in connection with Underworld’s structure, the 
central diagrammatic axes of the novel—consumer excess 
and nuclear waste—allow the novelist-historiographer to 
reveal the dark information hidden inside the smallest 
event: the subterranean fractures, erosions, and 
                     
33 Ibid., 19, 23. 
34 Knight erroneously aligns Anthony Giddens with Frederic 
Jameson and David Harvey as theorists who argues for 
postmodernity as a description of cultural and social 
conditions in the present. For Giddens’s actual stance on 
“radical modernity,” see below. Knight, “Delillo, 
Postmodernism, Postmodernity,” 28–9, 35.  
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poisons that punctuate the progression of techno-
industrial society.35 
 
Mark Osteen offers one of the few alternative accounts in 
the available criticism:  
 
In the efforts of Ismael, Sabato Rodia, and Klara Sax, 
and in the ambiguous transformation of a dead girl into 
an angel, DeLillo offers the potential for phoenixlike 
resurrection out of the ashes of capital, holding out 
the bare possibility of a new kind of connection.36 
 
Yet once again the figures of “phoenixlike resurrection” and 
“the ashes of capital” invoke a prelapsarian mythology that 
DeLillo himself seems at pains to dispel. The remarkable 
thing about DeLillo’s writing is that it figures the 
ordinary under the condition of modernity as a process of 
continuous transformation, and concludes the novel on a note 
                     
35 Salah el Moncef bin Khalifa, “Don Delillo's Underworld and 
the Inscriptions of the Commonplace,” Angelaki: Journal of 
the Theoretical Humanities 13.1 (April 2008): 160. 
36 Mark Osteen, American Magic and Dread: Don Delillo's 
Dialogue with Culture (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 254. 
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of comic reconciliation and optimism about the integrity of 
the social whole.37 
 Many, though by no means all, of these misreadings of 
modernism owe something to the arguments put forward by 
Andreas Huyssen in After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass 
Culture, Postmodernism, which amount to one of the most 
resilient accounts there is of literary periodization in the 
twentieth century. Huyssen follows Peter Bürger’s Theory of 
the Avant-Garde by separating modernism from the historical 
avant-garde, and drawing a line of continuity between the 
latter and postmodernism. Whereas the avant-garde and 
postmodernism embrace mass culture and everyday life in the 
context of an explicitly progressive politics, modernism is 
characterized by a “paranoid” view of the masses, and an 
anti-democratic, reactionary impulse towards aesthetic 
autonomy. “It is not surprising,” argues Huyssen, 
 
that major American writers since Henry James, such as 
T. S. Eliot, Faulkner and Hemingway, Pound and Stevens, 
felt drawn to the constructive sensibility of 
                     
37 In the novel’s spectacular conclusion, “J. Edgar Hoover, 
the Law’s debased saint,” is “hyperlinked at last to Sister 
Edgar—a single fluctuating impulse now, a piece of coded 
information. Everything is connected in the end.” DeLillo, 
Underworld, 826. 
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modernism, which insisted on the dignity and autonomy 
of literature, rather than to the iconoclastic and 
anti-aesthetic ethos of the European avantgarde which 
attempted to break the political bondage of high 
culture through a fusion with popular culture and to 
integrate art into life.38 
 
Throughout After the Great Divide, Huyssen posits an 
aversion to the ordinary as a defining characteristic of 
modernism: the modernist work is, he claims, “totally 
separate from the realms of mass culture and everyday 
life.”39 Reading modernism for the ordinary as I have done 
throughout this thesis makes it apparent how radically wrong 
Huyssen’s account of modernism must be. 
 Part of the uncaniness of Huyssen’s argument arises 
from a radically expanded modernist canon: one so capacious 
in fact, and so indifferent to the institutional aspect of 
the modernist enterprise, that it skirts incoherence. Thus 
Flaubert’s Madame Bovary-indeed, the specific passage I 
discuss in chapter 2—becomes a paradigmatic text in the 
argument that modernism defines itself by hostility towards 
                     
38 Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass 
Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
University of Indiana Press, 1986), 167. 
39 Ibid., 53. 
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mass culture. “Woman (Madame Bovary) is positioned as reader 
of inferior literature—subjective, emotional and passive—
while man (Flaubert) emerges as writer of genuine, authentic 
literature—objective, ironic, and in control of his 
aesthetic means.”40 Moreover, “the repudiation of 
Trivialliteratur has always been one of the constitutive 
features of a modernist aesthetic intent on distancing 
itself and its products from the trivialities and banalities 
of everyday life.”41 Seeming to acknowledge that this account 
of modernism will struggle to account for Joyce, Huyssen 
draws an entirely ad hoc distinction within his modernist 
canon between a “Mallarmé-Lautréamont-Joyce” axis and a 
“Flaubert-Thomas Mann-Eliot” axis.42 One of the foundational 
moves of the new modernist studies, and one borne out in 
this thesis, has been to draw attention to the full extent 
of modernism’s imbrication with popular forms, and 
especially that its attitude to those forms is far from 
unalloyed condemnation.  
                     
40 Ibid., 46. 
41 Ibid., 47. 
42 In doing so, Huyssen already departs from influential 
comparative models, like Gerald Gillespie, Proust Mann Joyce 
in the Modernist Context (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2003). 
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Frederic Jameson, too, whose authority is frequently 
invoked by postmodernism’s advocates, establishes a 
distinction between modernism and postmodernism by 
attributing characteristics already manifest in the former 
to the latter:  
 
If, indeed, the subject has lost its capacity… to 
organize its past and future into coherent experience, 
it becomes difficult enough to see how the cultural 
production of such a subject could result in anything 
but ‘heaps of fragments’ and in practice of the 
randomly heterogeneous and fragmentary and the 
aleatory.43 
 
This could stand just as well as a description of the 
ordinary under the condition of modernity, and the subject’s 
dissolution therein; moreover, even the phraseology recalls 
Eliot. Jameson’s championing of the concept of “late 
capitalism” as the social condition under which 
postmodernist art arises has also begun to wear thin.44 Even 
                     
43 Frederic Jameson, Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of 
Late Capitalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1991), 
25. 
44 Cf. Jameson, “Culture and Finance Capital,” 246–7. 
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as putatively postmodernist trends in literature appear 
exhausted in the face of, amongst other things, a resurgence 
of realism, capitalism itself seems in little danger of the 
imminent collapse that the adjective “late” implies. The 
“crisis in historicity” that Jameson identifies seems 
chiefly to affect postmodernist critics, whose determination 
to identify postmodernism with a concrete historical break 
now seems less persuasive than an alternative like Giddens’s 
radicalized modernity.45 
 Moreover, as the example of DeLillo shows, despite the 
radicalization and globalization of modernity, and the total 
interpenetration of everyday life by abstract systems, the 
ordinary retains its irreducible affinity with the aesthetic. 
I have argued that every literary representation of the 
ordinary is also a representation of its impossibility; 
nonetheless, in pursuit of this paradoxical aesthetic aim, 
modernism and its descendants constitute an exploration of 
the limits of literary representation unprecedented in its 
breadth. We might recall Nick Shay’s interview with Father 
Paulus in Underworld:  
 
                     
45 Jameson, Postmodernism, 22; Giddens, The Consequences of 
Modernity, 163. 
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 “Everyday things represent the most overlooked 
knowledge. These names are vital to your progress. 
Quotidian things. If they weren’t important, we 
wouldn’t use such a gorgeous Latinate word. Say it,” he 
said. 
“Quotidian.” 
“An extraordinary word that suggests the depth and 
reach of the commonplace.”46 
 
In these straitened times, when we are constantly called 
upon to articulate the “value” of the humanities, we might 
be led finally to assert with the discipline’s detractors 
that the humanities are indeed a “waste,” but ready to 
counter that where there is waste there is a system, and in 
waste—the splendid excess of art—there is the potential to 
resist it, or at the very least to understand it. “Does it 
glow at the core with personal heat, with signs of one’s 
deepest nature, clues to secret yearnings, humiliating 
flaws? What habits, fetishes, addictions, inclinations? What 
solitary acts, behavioral ruts?”47 Only by attending to the 
ordinary can we find out. 
                     
46 DeLillo, Underworld, 542. 
47 DeLillo, White Noise, 297. 
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